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Die BÄ orsenindustrie im Wandel
'Wir sind eigentlich weder deutsch noch eine BÄ orse. Wir sind ein globales Liqui-
ditÄ atsnetzwerk.' (Werner G. Seifert, 2004).1
Die BÄ orsenindustrie hat in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten einen signi¯kanten Wandel
durchlaufen - und das nicht nur in Deutschland. BÄ orsen haben schon lÄ angst nicht mehr den
Charakter vergangener Tage, in denen ihre Mitglieder auf dem Parkett um Aktienpakete und
-kurse von inlÄ andischen Unternehmen feilschten und an den genossenschaftlich organisierten
HandelsplÄ atzen eher eine vertrauliche ClubatmosphÄ are herrschte. Eine Vielzahl der BÄ orsen hat
den Parketthandel abgescha®t, ist selbst an einer BÄ orse gelistet und orientiert sich primÄ ar
am Shareholder Value und somit an den Interessen einer internationalen AktionÄ arsbasis. Mitt-
lerweile existieren BÄ orsenplÄ atze, die mehrere LÄ ander umspannen. Der franzÄ osisch dominierten
Euronext kommt hier eine Vorreiterrolle zu. Aber auch andere BÄ orsen, wie die Deutsche BÄ orse
und die Schweizer BÄ orse, haben lÄ anderÄ ubergreifend ihre Derivatehandelsplattformen vereinigt
und mit ihrem Jointventure Eurex die umsatzstÄ arkste DerivatebÄ orse der Welt gescha®en. In
jÄ ungster Zeit werden nun auch transatlantische Allianzen zwischen amerikanischen und eu-
ropÄ aischen BÄ orsen angedacht. Sowohl die Strategie der Nasdaq, die bisher eine SperrminoritÄ at
von Ä uber 25% an der Londoner BÄ orse hÄ alt, als auch die der New York Stock Exchange, die eine
Fusion mit der Euronext anstrebt, belegen dies.
Zudem stehen BÄ orsen mittlerweile in direktem Wettbewerb mit ihren Kunden und ehemali-
gen EigentÄ umern, den FinanzintermediÄ aren wie Banken und WertpapierhÄ auser. Sie konkurrieren
um WertpapierauftrÄ age von Investoren, da Banken nicht mehr jede Order automatisch an sie
weiterleiten. Stattdessen versuchen manche FinanzintermediÄ are, die erhaltenen Investorenauf-
trÄ age im eigenen Haus mit einer entsprechenden reziproken Order zusammenzufÄ uhren, um somit
die Geld-Brief Spanne des Wertpapiers als Gewinn einzubehalten. Diese Internalisierung von
AuftragsausfÄ uhrungen ist seit einigen Jahren insbesondere in England und Deutschland eine
bedeutende Einkommensquelle fÄ ur WertpapierhÄ auser geworden. Gleichzeitig sto¼en BÄ orsen im-
mer stÄ arker in GeschÄ aftsbereiche vor, die bislang die DomÄ ane ihrer Kunden reprÄ asentierten. Hier
sei der Handel von bestimmten Kreditderivateprodukten genannt, die bisher au¼erbÄ orslich zwi-
schen gro¼en WertpapierhÄ ausern gehandelt wurden. Sowohl die Chicago Mercantile Exchange
als auch die Eurex planen den Handel dieser Titel auf ihren eigenen Plattformen. Ein weiteres
Beispiel ist die vertikale Integration von Wertpapierabwicklungs- und Wertpapierverwahrungs-
geschÄ aften. Gro¼e internationale Banken wie BNP Paribas, Citigroup und State Street kÄ ampfen
hier gegen BÄ orsen um Marktanteile.
Wie kam es zu dem hier beschriebenen Wandel? Der entscheidende Katalysator ist der ge-
stiegene Wettbewerbsdruck auf traditionelle BÄ orsen, welcher in vielen FÄ allen zu einer Umstruk-
turierung ihrer Organisationsform und EigentÄ umerstruktur fÄ uhrte. Diese neu ausgerichteten
BÄ orsen verstanden sich nun als regulÄ are, gewinnorientierte Firmen, die nicht mehr in erster
Linie ihren Kunden, sondern ihren neuen EigentÄ umern, den AktionÄ aren, verp°ichtet waren.
Struktur des ersten Kapitels Im Folgenden werden zunÄ achst die drei wesentlichen Fak-
toren angesprochen, die den Wettbewerb in der BÄ orsenindustrie erhÄ ohten. Hier wird vor allem
Bezug auf die europÄ aischen MÄ arkte genommen, jedoch ist ein Gro¼teil dieser Elemente auch
in der Entwicklung in anderen WirtschaftsrÄ aumen vorzu¯nden. Danach wird die dadurch in-
duzierte Umwandlung der Organisationsform von BÄ orsen und deren Folgen nÄ aher beleuchtet.
Im Anschluss wird die hierzu bestehende Literatur kurz angesprochen und diejenigen Frage-
stellungen identi¯ziert, die bislang nicht ausreichend Beachtung fanden. Schlie¼lich werden vier
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Arbeitspapiere vorgestellt, die sich mit diesen Fragen beschÄ aftigen und den Kern dieser Disser-
tation darstellen.
GrÄ unde fÄ ur den gestiegenen Wettbewerbsdruck ZunÄ achst fÄ uhrte die Globalisierung
zu einer stÄ arkeren Vernetzung der FinanzmÄ arkte. Investoren fragten vermehrt Wertpapiere
auslÄ andischer Unternehmen nach, um etwa eine bessere Diversi¯zierung ihrer Portefeuilles zu
erreichen. Gleichzeitig wÄ ahlten Kapital suchende Unternehmen nicht mehr ausschlie¼lich eine
HeimatbÄ orse fÄ ur einen BÄ orsengang aus, sondern erwogen Listings auch an auslÄ andischen BÄ orsen.
Der geringere home-bias dieser beiden Hauptkundengruppen von BÄ orsen und Finanzinterme-
diÄ aren fÄ uhrte damit zu einem hÄ oheren Wettbewerb um internationale Wertpapierhandels°Ä usse
und Listings zwischen den BÄ orsen. Als Folge konzentrierte sich der Handel verstÄ arkt auf die
BÄ orsen, die die grÄ o¼te LiquiditÄ at aufwiesen, weil sich dort auch die niedrigsten Transaktions-
kosten fÄ ur Investoren und Emittenten herausbildeten.
Ein weiteres Element, das den gestiegenen Wettbewerb zwischen den BÄ orsen in Europa
Ä uberhaupt erst ermÄ oglichte, waren nationale und supranationale Deregulierungsma¼nahmen,
welche zur Ä O®nung der MÄ arkte und damit zur Erosion von Markteintrittsbarrieren fÄ uhrten.
Die 1986 in Kraft getretenen Big Bang Reformen im englischen Finanzsektor erwiesen sich
als Antriebsfeder fÄ ur weitere, umfassende Deregulierungsma¼nahmen in anderen europÄ aischen
LÄ andern und auf Ebene der EU. Beispielhaft seien die Investment Service Directive (1993) und
der Financial Services Action Plan (1999) genannt, die zu einer Deregulierung und Vereinheitli-
chung der Regulierung auf den europÄ aischen FinanzmÄ arkten fÄ uhrten. Mit der Implementierung
des 'Markets in Financial Instruments Directive' (MiFID) wird ab 2007 eine weitere Harmo-
nisierung auf europÄ aischer Ebene angestrebt. Industrieexperten erwarten, dass dies zu einer
Zunahme des Wettbewerbsdrucks auf die BÄ orsen fÄ uhren wird.2
Schlie¼lich Ä ubten vor allem die Entwicklungen im IT- und Telekommunikationsbereich einen
erheblichen Ein°uss auf die Wettbewerbssituation im BÄ orsensektor aus. Sie verÄ anderten die
Art und Weise des Wertpapierhandels nachhaltig. Der Parketthandel wurde vielfach durch ein
elektronisches Orderbuch substituiert. Des Weiteren ist keine physische PrÄ asenz der Handels-
teilnehmer an der BÄ orse mehr notwendig. Banken und WertpapierhÄ auser aus Paris kÄ onnen bei-
spielsweise mittels Remote Membership am elektronischen Handelssystem der Deutschen BÄ orse
teilnehmen und auf weitere IntermediÄ are zur OrderausfÄ uhrung verzichten. Zudem sind zahlrei-
che neue, rein elektronische Handelsplattformen entstanden, die Alternative Trading Systems
(ATS) oder Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) genannt werden und mit traditionellen
BÄ orsen um WertpapierauftrÄ age konkurrieren. Die zuvor erwÄ ahnte Internalisierung von Kunden-
auftrÄ agen bei Banken wurde ebenfalls erst durch den Einsatz einer entsprechenden Transakti-
onssoftware mÄ oglich.
Demutualization von BÄ orsen Durch die verÄ anderten Rahmenbedingungen gelang es der
Londoner BÄ orse, mit der EinfÄ uhrung eines elektronisch gestÄ utzten Handelssystems (SEAQ-I)
Ende der 80er Jahre, erhebliche Marktanteile zu Lasten der kontinentaleuropÄ aischen BÄ orsen hin-
zuzugewinnen. Die Stockholmer BÄ orse, die durch die Migration des Handels von schwedischen
Titeln nach London unmittelbar betro®en war, entschied sich 1993 als erste, eine weitreichen-
de Restrukturierung ihrer Organisationsform durchzufÄ uhren. Die bei BÄ orsen Ä ubliche genossen-
schaftliche Unternehmensverfassung, zu englisch 'mutual', deren wesentliche Merkmale in der
Regel die gemeinnÄ utzige Orientierung, die Einheit zwischen Eigentum und Mitgliedschaft, sowie
die demokratische Kontroll- und Entscheidungsstruktur (one-member, one-vote Prinzip) dar-
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stellen3, wurde zugunsten einer gewinnorientierten, aktionÄ arsbasierten Corporate Governance
aufgegeben. Zahlreiche BÄ orsen folgten diesem Beispiel, das allgemein mit dem Begri® Demu-
tualization umschrieben wird.
Eine der aus Ä okonomischer Sicht wesentlichsten VerÄ anderungen stellte bei der Demutualiza-
tion die Trennung zwischen Eigentum und Mitgliedschaft an der BÄ orse dar. WÄ ahrend BÄ orsen
zuvor in der Regel im Besitz ihrer Mitglieder, d.h. Banken und WertpapierhÄ auser, waren,
sind es nun Ä uberwiegend (Outside) Investoren, die lediglich eine ¯nanzielle, nicht aber eine
geschÄ aftliche Beziehung mit der BÄ orse haben. Als Folge sind BÄ orsen nun in erster Linie dem
Shareholder Value verp°ichtet, wohingegen die ehemaligen Kunden-EigentÄ umer auch ihre ei-
genen GeschÄ aftsbeziehungen mit der BÄ orse berÄ ucksichtigt wissen wollten. Hieraus leiten sich
Implikationen fÄ ur die Wohlfahrt der BÄ orsen sowie fÄ ur ihre verschiedenen Kundengruppen wie
Banken, WertpapierhÄ auser, Investoren und Emittenten ab. Zwei prominente Beispiele seien im
Folgenden beschrieben:
Erstens erleichterte die Trennung von Eigentum und Mitgliedschaft die EinfÄ uhrung eines
konkurrenzfÄ ahigen, elektronischen Handelssystems, da opponierende Mitglieder, die durch den
Computerhandel den Wegfall ihrer IntermediÄ arsfunktion fÄ urchteten, eine solche Entscheidung
aufgrund der verÄ anderten EigentÄ umerstrukturen nicht mehr blockieren konnten.4 Im Ergebnis
fÄ uhrte die Demutualization dadurch zu einem Wohlfahrtsgewinn fÄ ur die BÄ orse und ihre End-
kunden (Investoren und Emittenten), da sie nun eine kostengÄ unstigere Dienstleistung anbieten
konnte. Gleichzeitig rief sie jedoch Wohlfahrtsverluste bei den opponierenden Mitgliedern her-
vor, die nun geringere Renten im Wertpapierhandel verdienten.
Als zweites Beispiel sei die vertikale Integration von BÄ orsen in das Wertpapierabwicklungs-
geschÄ aft genannt. Wie im zweiten Kapitel im Detail diskutiert wird, werfen einige Marktteil-
nehmer vertikal integrierten BÄ orsen vor, dass sie damit eine Abschottungsstrategie verfolgen,
um den Wettbewerb zu ihren Gunsten zu beein°ussen. Sollte dieser Vorwurf berechtigt sein,
wÄ urde ein solches Verhalten zu Wohlfahrtsgewinnen bei den BÄ orsen und ihren AktionÄ aren zu
Lasten von IntermediÄ aren, Investoren und Emittenten fÄ uhren. Daher ist verstÄ andlich, dass die
Diskussion Ä uber die Vor- und Nachteile von vertikaler Integration in Europa erst entbrannte,
als die gewinnorientierte und von (Outside) Investoren dominierte Deutsche BÄ orse beschloss,
diesen GeschÄ aftbereich hinzuzukaufen. WÄ are die BÄ orse hingegen noch in der Hand ihrer Mitglie-
der gewesen, hÄ atten diese den Zukauf vermutlich weit weniger kritisch gesehen, da sie Ä uber ihre
Beteiligung an der BÄ orse sowohl von den Gewinnen dieser Investition pro¯tiert, als auch eine ih-
ren eigenen GeschÄ aftsinteressen widerstrebende Preispolitik nicht zugelassen hÄ atten. Dass diese
Vermutung durchaus plausibel ist, unterstÄ utzt die empirische Beobachtung, dass zum einen ver-
tikal integrierte BÄ orsen weit verbreitet sind. In 2003 etwa, waren 30 der 50 weltweit wichtigsten
BÄ orsen in diesem GeschÄ aftsfeld tÄ atig. Zum anderen sind diese BÄ orsen in mehr als zwei Drittel
der FÄ alle (23 von 30) im Besitz von IntermediÄ aren.5
Bestehende Literatur und Fragestellungen dieser Dissertation Die bestehende Li-
teratur zu diesem Gebiet konzentriert sich bislang vor allem auf die gesamtwohlfahrtlichen
Aspekte im BÄ orsensektor, die die VerÄ anderungen im Wettbewerb und in der Corporate Go-
vernance herbeigefÄ uhrt haben. Hart und Moore (1996), (1998), beschÄ aftigen sich zum Beispiel
mit der Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen eine (Outside) investorengefÄ uhrte BÄ orse eine hÄ ohere
3FÄ ur eine umfassende Ä okonomische Diskussion von Genossenschaften, siehe Hansmann (1996).
4Vergleiche Steil (2002), der sehr anschaulich die Anreizwirkungen der verschiedenen Akteure beschreibt.
5Quellen: Handbook of World Stock, Derivatives & Commodity Exchange 2001-2004, Jahresberichte der
BÄ orsen. Die Daten wurden fÄ ur ein noch nicht verÄ o®entlichtes Manuskript erhoben, welches in einem Industriere-
port mit dem Arbeitstitel 'Governance of Market Infrastructure Institutions' erscheinen wird, der von Dr. Ruben
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Gesamtwohlfahrt erzielt als eine GenossenschaftsbÄ orse. Sie kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine
gewinnorientierte BÄ orse e±zienter sein wird, wenn der Wettbewerbsdruck relativ hoch ist und
die Mitglieder stark heterogene Interessen besitzen. Krishnamurti, Sequeira und Fangjian (2003)
untersuchen empirisch, ob ein Unterschied in der MarktqualitÄ at zwischen der genossenschaftli-
chen Bombay Stock Exchange und der 'demutualized' National Stock Exchange existiert. Ihre
Resultate zeigen, dass die MarktqualitÄ at an der genossenschaftlich organisierten BÄ orse geringer
ausfÄ allt. Ein weiterer Literaturstrang beschÄ aftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen von Demutualiza-
tion auf die regulatorischen P°ichten von BÄ orsen. Marktteilnehmer Ä au¼erten die BefÄ urchtung,
dass die QualitÄ at der Selbstregulierung unter der Gewinnmaxime der BÄ orsen leiden kÄ onnte. Als
BegrÄ undung wurde angefÄ uhrt, dass diese BÄ orsen einen Anreiz haben kÄ onnten, bei der schwer
veri¯zierbaren Beaufsichtigung der MÄ arkte Kosten einzusparen, um eine hÄ ohere Pro¯tabilitÄ at
zu erreichen. Autoren wie Pirrong (2000), Karmel (2000) und Elliott (2002) haben sich mit
dieser Problematik auseinandergesetzt und vertreten die Meinung, dass zum einem die dadurch
drohenden Reputationsverluste gegen ein solches Verhalten sprechen und zum anderen Ä ahnliche
Anreizkon°ikte auch bereits bei nicht gewinnorientierten BÄ orsen bestanden. Des Weiteren exis-
tiert eine Reihe von BeitrÄ agen, die sich mit der Vorteilhaftigkeit von vertikalen und horizontalen
Integrationsstrategien von BÄ orsen aus der Perspektive der Gesamtwohlfahrt beschÄ aftigen. Die
Papiere von Koeppl und Monnet (2003) sowie Tapking und Yang (2004) stehen dabei einer
vertikalen Integration eher kritisch gegenÄ uber.
Die Auswirkungen, die der Wandel in der Branche - insbesondere die VerÄ anderung in der
Governance - auf die BÄ orsen selbst hatte, ist bislang in der Literatur weit weniger intensiv disku-
tiert worden. Autoren wie Schmiedel (2001), (2002) sowie Mendiola und Ohara (2003) streifen
die Thematik, jedoch besitzen ihre Papiere einen anderen Fokus. Die hier vorliegende Dissertati-
on beleuchtet daher einige Fragestellungen, die sich durch die verÄ anderten Rahmenbedingungen
fÄ ur die BÄ orsen ergeben:
1. Welche Ä okonomischen Charakteristika herrschen in dieser Branche vor und welche Indus-
triestruktur erscheint vorteilhaft?
2. Welchen Ein°uss hat die Corporate Governance von BÄ orsen auf ihre WettbewerbsfÄ ahigkeit?
Arbeiten gewinnorientierte BÄ orsen tatsÄ achlich e±zienter als genossenschaftlich organisier-
te Handelsplattformen?
3. Weshalb entscheiden sich BÄ orsen, ihre Organisationsform zu Ä andern und wie wird das
Investitionsverhalten von BÄ orsen dadurch beein°usst?
4. Welchen Ein°uss haben unterschiedliche GeschÄ aftsmodelle, insbesondere vertikale oder
horizontale Integration, auf die operative E±zienz von BÄ orsen?
Inhalt des zweiten Kapitels Frage 1 stellt den Hauptfokus des zweiten Kapitels dar, wel-
ches das Arbeitspapier mit dem Titel 'Settling for E±ciency - A Framework for the European
Union' zum Inhalt hat und in Zusammenarbeit mit Marco Wei¼ entstand.6 Das Papier dient
als Einstieg in die Thematik und bietet zunÄ achst eine deskriptive, industrieÄ okonomische Ana-
lyse der Funktionen der BÄ orsen- und Wertpapierabwicklungsindustrie. Als Evaluierungshilfe
dienen hierbei drei Dimensionen der E±zienz: (1) Die statische E±zienz betrachtet, wie die
6Das Papier ist bisher in der Working Paper Reihe Finance und Accounting Nr. 151 der UniversitÄ at Frank-
furt erschienen und wurde auf zwei wissenschaftlichen Konferenzen angenommen und vorgetragen (INFINITI
Conference on International Finance, Trinity College, Dublin und 'Clearing and settlement of ¯nancial markets:
Europe and beyond', Cass Business School, London). Es wird demnÄ achst als Kapitelbeitrag im Buch von Marco
Wei¼ mit dem Titel 'E±cient Organizational Design - Balancing Incentives and Power' im Palgrave Macmillan
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verschiedenen Funktionen mÄ oglichst kostengÄ unstig erfÄ ullt werden kÄ onnen. (2) Die dynamische
E±zienz zielt vor allem auf die InnovationsfÄ ahigkeit von Industriestrukturen ab, d.h. es wird
erÄ ortert, ob eine betrachtete Industriestruktur Wettbewerb und damit Innovationen in der Zu-
kunft ermÄ oglicht. (3) Systemische E±zienz ist gegeben, wenn sich die zu analysierende Struktur
gegenÄ uber systemischen Schocks als robust erweist.
Die hier betrachteten WertschÄ opfungsstufen Handel, Abrechnung und Abwicklung zeigen
wegen der erheblichen Skalen-, Verbund- und Netzwerke®ekte Charakteristika eines natÄ urlichen
Monopols auf, so dass eine Konsolidierung der AktivitÄ aten auf wenige Plattformen aus Sicht der
statischen E±zienz vorteilhaft wÄ are. Jedoch ist zu befÄ urchten, dass eine zu starke Konsolidie-
rung der AktivitÄ aten die dynamische E±zienz der Industrie wegen des Fehlens von Wettbewerb
beintrÄ achtigen wÄ urde. BezÄ uglich der systemischen E±zienz sind zwei Szenarien vorstellbar:
Einerseits bietet eine Konzentration der Risiken auf wenige Plattformen die MÄ oglichkeit des
e±zienten, zentralisierten Risikomanagements. Andererseits erÄ o®net eine stÄ arkere Fragmentie-
rung der MÄ arkte eine hÄ ohere Zahl von AusweichmÄ oglichkeiten fÄ ur die Marktteilnehmer, falls
einer von ihnen ausfallen sollte.
In einem nÄ achsten Schritt werden drei Parameter vorgestellt, die die wesentlichen Kompo-
nenten darstellen, um ein konsistent kon¯guriertes und e±zientes Industriedesign zu entwickeln:
(1) Die Grenzen der Unternehmung legen fest, inwieweit ein Plattformanbieter vertikal, d.h.
entlang der Funktionen der WertschÄ opfungskette, integriert sein soll. (2) Der verwendete Kom-
munikationsstandard, der fÄ ur die InformationsÄ ubermittlung zwischen den WertschÄ opfungsstufen
eingesetzt wird, kann entweder einen proprietÄ aren oder o®enen Quellcode besitzen und deter-
miniert die Innovationsanreize auf der einen sowie den Marktzugang fÄ ur Wettbewerber auf
der anderen Seite. (3) Schlie¼lich wird die Organisationsform und EigentÄ umerstruktur auf den
einzelnen WertschÄ opfungsstufen betrachtet, d.h. ob eine staatliche, genossenschaftliche oder
gewinnorientierte Unternehmensverfassung vorliegt.
Abschlie¼end werden drei idealisierte, konsistent kon¯gurierte Industriestrukturen vorge-
stellt, von denen eine, welche als 'Contestable Monopolies' bezeichnet wird, den AnsprÄ uchen
nach statischer, dynamischer und systemischer E±zienz am besten genÄ ugt: Sie ist gekennzeich-
net durch konsolidierte Plattformen sowie o®ene Kommunikationsstandards. Dadurch wird der
potentielle Markteintritt von neuen Wettbewerbern ermÄ oglicht, wenngleich ein Markteintritt
im Idealfall nicht erfolgen wird, da die bestehenden Betreiber durch niedrige Transaktions-
preise und hohe Innovationskraft diesen verhindern. Der Regulierer muss in einer solchen In-
dustriekon¯guration lediglich die Contestability des Marktes gewÄ ahrleisten, in dem er fÄ ur o®ene
Kommunikationsstandards sorgt. Damit wird ihm zwar eine wichtige, aber dennoch beschrÄ ankte
Rolle zugewiesen, so dass sich E±zienzverluste aufgrund zu gro¼er BÄ urokratie in Grenzen halten
sollten.
Inhalt des dritten Kapitels Die zweite Frage nach dem Ein°uss der Corporate Gover-
nance auf die WettbewerbsfÄ ahigkeit von BÄ orsen wird in Kapitel 3 beantwortet, welches auf
dem Arbeitspapier mit dem Titel 'Demutualization, Outsider Ownership and Stock Exchange
Performance - Empirical Evidence' basiert.7 Hierbei wird anhand eines selbst gesammelten
Datensatzes von 28 BÄ orsen fÄ ur die Jahre 1999-2003 der Ein°uss verschiedener Governance-
strukturen auf die operative E±zienz und FaktorproduktivitÄ at untersucht. Motivation hierfÄ ur
ist, dass sich BÄ orsen laut einer Umfrage von Scullion (2001) durch die Restrukturierung in ein
7Dieses Papier ist in der Working Paper Reihe Finance und Accounting Nr. 157 der UniversitÄ at Frankfurt
erschienen, sowie auf drei wissenschaftlichen Konferenzen vorgetragen worden (Paris International Meeting on
Finance, 2005, Workshop on Law and Economics, Bocconi UniversitÄ at, Mailand, 2006 und European Financial
Management Association, Madrid, 2006). Die aktuelle Fassung entspricht weitgehend der im November 2005 in
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gewinnorientiertes Unternehmen eine verbesserte WettbewerbsfÄ ahigkeit erho®en, die sich unter
anderem in erhÄ ohter operativer E±zienz und FaktorproduktivitÄ at widerspiegeln sollte.
Ein wesentlicher Punkt, der dabei explizit analysiert wird, ist, inwieweit ein BÄ orsengang zu
einer Verbesserung der E±zienz fÄ uhrt. Dies ist vor dem Hintergrund zu sehen, dass zahlreiche
BÄ orsen zwar eine Demutualization im Sinne einer Umwandlung in ein gewinnorientiertes, ak-
tionÄ arsbasiertes Unternehmen durchgefÄ uhrt, jedoch die bestehenden Mitglieder als EigentÄ umer
behalten haben. Andere BÄ orsenbetreiber verÄ anderten hingegen die EigentÄ umerstrukturen durch
ein Listing nachhaltig, indem sie ihre Anteile an (Outside) Investoren verkauften, die keine
geschÄ aftlichen Beziehungen mit den BÄ orsen unterhalten. Manche Industrieexperten sehen das
'going public' als notwendige Bedingung, um eine hÄ ohere operative E±zienz zu gewÄ ahrleisten.8
Die Vorteile eines BÄ orsenganges sollten demnach die zusÄ atzlichen Kosten Ä uberwiegen, die durch
Ausgaben fÄ ur die Neuemission sowie durch strengere VerÄ o®entlichungsp°ichten entstehen. Aus
diesem Grund ist es von Ä okonomischer Relevanz, inwieweit gelistete BÄ orsen tatsÄ achlich einen
zusÄ atzlichen E±zienzgewinn gegenÄ uber demutualisierten BÄ orsen erzielen, die keinen BÄ orsengang
vorgenommen haben.
Um diese Fragestellung empirisch beantworten zu kÄ onnen, wird in einem ersten Schritt ei-
ne nicht-parametrische E±zienz- und FaktorproduktivitÄ atsmessung mittels Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) vorgenommen. Durch die Verwendung von linearen Programmen kÄ onnen hier-
durch E±zienzwerte von Multi-Input, Multi-Output-Unternehmen errechnet werden. Dieses
gegenÄ uber eindimensionalen Output-zu-Input-Quotienten vergleichsweise aufwÄ andige Verfah-
ren ist notwendig, um ein mÄ oglichst realistisches Abbild der Produktionsfunktion von BÄ orsen
zu erhalten. Dies liegt darin begrÄ undet, dass die Plattformbetreiber eine unterschiedliche Anzahl
von AktivitÄ aten verfolgen. Eine Konzentration auf einen bestimmten Output wÄ urde somit dieje-
nigen BÄ orsen benachteiligen, die einen stÄ arkeren Fokus auf nicht berÄ ucksichtigte Outputs legen,
weil es meist nicht mÄ oglich ist, eine entsprechende Anpassung der Inputseite vorzunehmen.
In einem zweiten Schritt werden die ermittelten E±zienz- und FaktorproduktivitÄ atswerte
als abhÄ angige Variablen in Regressionsanalysen eingesetzt, um den Ein°uss von bestimmten
Faktoren zu messen, die zwar nicht unmittelbar mit den Produktionsprozessen der BÄ orsen
zusammenhÄ angen, sich jedoch auf ihre operative E±zienz auswirken kÄ onnen. Es wurden vier
Bereiche identi¯ziert, die hierbei relevant sein kÄ onnten: WÄ ahrend der Wettbewerbsdruck, die
¯nanzielle FlexibilitÄ at und die verschiedenen GeschÄ aftsmodelle der BÄ orsen als Kontrollvariablen
in die Regression ein°ie¼en, ist der Ein°uss des vierten Bereiches, die Organisationsform der
BÄ orsen, der Hauptfokus des Artikels. Hierbei wird zwischen BÄ orsen unterschieden, die (1) als
Genossenschaft (oder als staatliches Institut) organisiert sind, (2) Handelsplattformen, die eine
Demutualization durchgefÄ uhrt haben, jedoch nach wie vor im Besitz ihrer Mitglieder sind, und
(3) solchen, die mittels eines BÄ orsengangs hauptsÄ achlich Ä uber (Outside) Investoren als AktionÄ are
verfÄ ugen.
Die Ergebnisse bestÄ atigen, dass BÄ orsen, die eine Demutualization durchgefÄ uhrt haben, Ä uber
eine hÄ ohere operative E±zienz verfÄ ugen. Allerdings schneiden sie gegenÄ uber GenossenschaftsbÄ orsen
in der FaktorproduktivitÄ atsanalyse schwÄ acher ab. Eine mÄ ogliche ErklÄ arung hierfÄ ur ist, dass
durch die Restrukturierungsma¼nahmen in der Organisationsform auch bestehende AktivitÄ aten
modi¯ziert wurden und somit einer (temporÄ aren) operationellen Friktion unterlagen. Eine wei-
tergehende Analyse zeigt in der Tat, dass die VariabilitÄ at der Inputvariablen bei den BÄ orsen
am hÄ ochsten ist, die wÄ ahrend der Betrachtungsperiode ihre Governancestruktur Ä anderten. Da-
her ist zu vermuten, dass eine Restrukturierung zu erhÄ ohten operativen Ine±zienzen fÄ uhrt.
Eine weitere wesentliche Erkenntnis des Beitrages ist, dass gelistete BÄ orsen keine signi¯kant
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hÄ ohere E±zienz als demutualisierte, nicht gelistete Unternehmen besitzen. Daher erscheint es
als wahrscheinlich, dass die BÄ orsengÄ ange nicht aufgrund der zu realisierenden operativen E±-
zienzgewinne durchgefÄ uhrt wurden, sondern als mÄ ogliche Exit-Option fÄ ur diejenigen Mitglieder
einer BÄ orse genutzt wurden, die eine Modernisierung der BÄ orse ¯nanziell und strategisch nicht
mittragen wollten.
Inhalt des vierten Kapitels Die Frage 3 nach dem Investitionsverhalten von BÄ orsen und den
Motiven zur Demutualization wird in Kapitel 4 behandelt, welches das Arbeitspapier mit dem
Titel 'Investment Behavior of Stock Exchanges and the Rationale for Demutualization - Theory
and Empirical Evidence' beinhaltet und in Koautorenschaft mit Marcel Tyrell entstanden ist.9
Im theoretischen Teil wird zunÄ achst mit Hilfe eines statischen Global Games Modells das
Investitionsverhalten von zwei BÄ orsen mit unterschiedlicher Governancestruktur analysiert, die
im Wettbewerb um einen Teil k des Handelsvolumens v + k ihrer Mitglieder stehen. Hierbei
werden Investitionen mit ¯xen Kosten betrachtet, die Ä uber eine TransaktionsgebÄ uhr ¯nanziert
werden und nur dann wertsteigernd fÄ ur die Mitglieder sind, wenn ein bestimmtes Handelsvolu-
men auf der Plattform vorhanden ist. Das Basismodell ergibt, dass die Investitionsneigung einer
von Investoren kontrollierten, gewinnorientierten BÄ orse im Vergleich zu einer genossenschaftlich
organisierten Plattform hÄ oher ist, da letztere sich ex ante nicht an ein bestimmtes Transakti-
onsgebÄ uhrenniveau binden kann. Dies liegt darin begrÄ undet, dass die genossenschaftliche BÄ orse
Ä uber keine wesentlichen ¯nanziellen Pu®er in Form von Eigenkapital verfÄ ugt und somit die
gesamten Kosten der Investition in jedem Fall von den Mitgliedern getragen werden mÄ ussen.
Bei gewinnorientierten BÄ orsen hingegen existieren externe Eigenkapitalgeber, die fÄ ur eventuelle
Verluste aus der Investition aufkommen, sodass hier das Commitment-Problem nicht existiert.
Dies fÄ uhrt in der Folge dazu, dass die Mitglieder der genossenschaftlichen BÄ orse, wenn sie beab-
sichtigt zu investieren, das Handelsvolumen k auf die gewinnorientierte Plattform transferieren,
weil sie sonst - analog zu einem Bank-Run10 - befÄ urchten mÄ ussten, die Kosten der Investition
alleine zu tragen. Dies wird die genossenschaftliche BÄ orse antizipieren und in der Konsequenz
geringere Anreize besitzen, in das Projekt zu investieren. Hingegen erhÄ alt die gewinnorientierte
BÄ orse durch diesen Umstand noch zusÄ atzliche Anreize in das Projekt zu investieren, da sie ne-
ben dem Handelsvolumen ihrer eigenen Mitglieder nun auch mit der LiquiditÄ at der Mitglieder
der konkurrierenden BÄ orse rechnen kann und somit die Vorteilhaftigkeit des Projektes cete-
ris paribus weiter steigt. Da jedoch die wechselwilligen Mitglieder der GenossenschaftsbÄ orse
befÄ urchten mÄ ussen, dass die gewinnorientierte BÄ orse die E±zienzgewinne nicht an sie weiter-
geben wird und stattdessen die Renten der Investition fÄ ur sich selbst verbucht, wird dies unter
bestimmten Bedingungen doch zu einer Investition an der eigenen BÄ orse fÄ uhren, um durch eine
Second-Sourcing Taktik eine bessere Verhandlungsposition gegenÄ uber der gewinnorientierten
BÄ orse in der GebÄ uhrenfestsetzung zu erzielen. Dieser E®ekt ist dabei positiv mit dem Anteil
des Handelsvolumens k
v korreliert, der zwischen den BÄ orsen transferiert werden kann.
Das Grundmodell nimmt zunÄ achst eine gleichmÄ a¼ige Verteilung der aus der Investition gene-
rierten Renten auf die Mitglieder an. Dies bedeutet, dass das Projekt als Investition in das Kern-
geschÄ aft der BÄ orse interpretiert wird, wie es zum Beispiel bei einer Modernisierung der Handels-
plattform und den damit verbundenen Einsparungen pro gehandelte Transaktion denkbar wÄ are.
In einer Erweiterung wird zudem der Fall einer ungleichmÄ a¼igen Distribution der Renten be-
trachtet. Empirisch gesehen kÄ onnten dies Investitionsvorhaben in verwandte GeschÄ aftsbereiche
9Dieser Beitrag ist wÄ ahrend eines gemeinsamen Forschungsaufenthalts an der Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia entstanden. Er ist kÄ urzlich fÄ ur die 13. Tagung der Deutschen Gesellschaft fÄ ur
Finanzwirtschaft (DGF) angenommen worden.
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wie Derivatehandel, Wertpapierabwicklung oder Systemsoftwarevertrieb sein, die nicht fÄ ur alle
Mitglieder in gleichem Ma¼e vorteilhaft sind. So wird beispielsweise eine auf Aktien spezialisier-
te Kursmaklerin nur einen geringen Nutzen von einer Investition in den Derivatehandel oder in
die Softwareentwicklung haben, jedoch mÄ usste sie die Kosten in Form von hÄ oheren Transakti-
onskosten mittragen. Ein gro¼es Wertpapierhaus, das zahlreiche AktivitÄ aten abdeckt, hingegen
kÄ onnte die Vorteile aus dieser Investition einfacher internalisieren und wÄ are somit ein Pro¯teur
dieser Investition. In einer Konstellation, in der die Mehrheit der Mitglieder eine negative Ex-
ternalitÄ at durch die Investition befÄ urchten muss, werden die Ergebnisse des Grundmodells, d.h.
die hÄ ohere Investitionsneigung einer (Outside) investorendominierten BÄ orse, weiter verstÄ arkt,
da sie die Mitglieder der GenossenschaftsbÄ orse mit positiver ExternalitÄ at zu einer fÄ ur sie vor-
teilhafteren GebÄ uhrenstruktur abwerben kann. Falls eine Mehrheit der Mitglieder jedoch eine
positive ExternalitÄ at von dieser Investition erhÄ alt, ist die Investitionsneigung der Genossen-
schaftsbÄ orse sowie der investorenorientierten BÄ orse fÄ ur niedrige k
v-Werte gleich. Erst wenn k im
Vergleich zu v gro¼ ist, besitzt eine GenossenschaftsbÄ orse geringere Investitionsanreize, da die
Vorteile aus dem Second-Sourcing von den hohen Kosten der Investition an der eigenen BÄ orse
Ä ubertro®en werden.
In einem weiteren Schritt wird ein dynamisches Overlapping-Generations Modell betrachtet,
um die Ä UberlebensfÄ ahigkeit von genossenschaftlich organisierten BÄ orsen zu analysieren, wenn sie
im Wettbewerb mit gewinnorientierten Plattformen stehen. Dabei wird angenommen, dass jede
Generation von Mitgliedern genau zwei Perioden lebt und die jeweils junge Generation darÄ uber
entscheidet, ob sie ihr Handelsvolumen auf die angestammte, genossenschaftlich organisierte
BÄ orse transferiert oder alternativ ein Angebot einer gewinnorientierten BÄ orse annimmt und
somit die genossenschaftliche BÄ orse in der Folgeperiode 'aussterben' lÄ asst. Es wird gezeigt, dass
eine genossenschaftliche BÄ orse nicht mit einer gewinnorientierten Handelsplattform konkurrie-
ren kann. Des Weiteren wird bewiesen, dass sie - falls sie sich ebenfalls in eine gewinnorientierte
BÄ orse konvertiert - den Wettbewerb Ä uberstehen wird. Aus den beiden Ergebnissen kann somit
der in der Empirie beobachtbare Umstand erklÄ art werden, dass traditionelle BÄ orsen, die nicht
Ä uber moderne Handelssysteme und wettbewerbsfÄ ahige GebÄ uhren verfÄ ugen, sukzessive an Liqui-
ditÄ at gegenÄ uber gewinnorientierten Handelsplattformen verlieren und dass die Demutualization
oftmals der einzige Ausweg ist, ihr Ä Uberleben zu sichern.
Im empirischen Teil des Artikels werden zwei Hypothesen entwickelt, die auf den Ergebnissen
der theoretischen Modelle basieren. Zum einen wird mit einem leicht verkleinerten Datensatz,
der auch in den empirischen Untersuchungen der Kapitel drei und fÄ unf zur Anwendung kommt,
Ä uberprÄ uft, ob die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Demutualization mit steigendem Wettbewerbsdruck
steigt. Zum anderen wird veri¯ziert, ob die Investitionsneigung von BÄ orsen tatsÄ achlich steigt,
wenn sie von (Outside) Investoren kontrolliert werden. FÄ ur beide Fragestellungen werden Probit-
Regressionen verwendet, da die abhÄ angigen Variablen jeweils dichotomer Natur sind. Um si-
cherzustellen, dass keine Verzerrungen bei der SchÄ atzung der Wettbewerbs- und Governanceko-
e±zienten durch korrelierte Fehlerterme entstehen, werden die beiden Probit-Modelle simultan
geschÄ atzt. Die Ergebnisse bestÄ atigen die Hypothesen auf statistisch hochsigni¯kantem Niveau.
Inhalt des fÄ unften Kapitels Die vierte Frage nach der E±zienz und FaktorproduktivitÄ at
von verschiedenen GeschÄ aftsmodellen wird im fÄ unften und letzten Kapitel der Dissertation
analysiert und verwendet dabei die AusfÄ uhrungen des Arbeitspapiers mit dem Titel 'Stock
Exchange Business Models and Their Operative Performance'.11 Der Beitrag untersucht em-
11Dieses Papier ist in einer Vorversion in der Working Paper Reihe Finance und Accounting Nr. 158 der
UniversitÄ at Frankfurt erschienen, sowie auf einer Konferenz vorgetragen worden ('Clearing and settlement of
¯nancial markets: Europe and beyond', Cass Business School, London, 2005). Die aktuelle Fassung ist fÄ ur dieCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS 10
pirisch, inwieweit verschiedene GeschÄ aftsmodelle, wie etwa die Integration von Derivatehandel,
Wertpapierabwicklung oder Softwareentwicklung und -vertrieb sich auf die operative E±zienz
und FaktorproduktivitÄ at von BÄ orsen auswirken. Die Analyse leistet damit einen empirischen
Beitrag zur Diskussion Ä uber horizontale und vertikale Integrationskonzepte im BÄ orsensektor,
die von zahlreichen europÄ aischen Marktteilnehmern und der EU-Kommission intensiv gefÄ uhrt
wird. Zwar werden in diesem Artikel keine gesamtwohlfahrtlichen E®ekte gemessen, jedoch sind
Aussagen Ä uber die operative E±zienz von verschiedenen GeschÄ aftsmodellen der erste Ansatz-
punkt, um best-practice GeschÄ aftsmodelle zu identi¯zieren, die am kostengÄ unstigsten arbeiten
kÄ onnen.12
Die hierbei verwendete Methodik entspricht weitgehend der Vorgehensweise aus Kapitel
drei: ZunÄ achst werden mittels DEA die technische E±zienz und FaktorproduktivitÄ at ermit-
telt. Anschlie¼end werden diese Ergebnisse auf verschiedene GeschÄ aftsmodelle regressiert, wobei
weiterhin fÄ ur andere Faktoren wie Governance, Wettbewerbsdruck und ¯nanzielle FlexibilitÄ at
kontrolliert wird. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die E±zienz von horizontal oder vertikal inte-
grierten BÄ orsen nicht hÄ oher ist als bei solchen, die sich ausschlie¼lich auf den Kassamarkthan-
del konzentrieren. Unter gewissen technologischen Annahmen Ä uber die Produktionstechnologie
(Variable-Returns-to-Scale) schneiden sie sogar signi¯kant schlechter ab. Allerdings scheint die
FaktorproduktivitÄ at bei vertikal sowie bei horizontal und vertikal integrierten BÄ orsen signi¯kant
hÄ oher als bei fokussierten BÄ orsen auszufallen. Die Untersuchung bietet somit keine eindeutige
Indikation zur UnterstÄ utzung horizontaler oder vertikaler GeschÄ aftsmodelle.
zweite Runde des Review-Prozesses im Journal of Banking and Finance eingereicht worden.
12Inwieweit ein technisch e±zientes GeschÄ aftsmodell auch zu einer Verringerung der Transaktionskosten fÄ uhrt,
hÄ angt allerdings von weiteren Faktoren wie der Governance der BÄ orsen und dem Wettbewerb ab.Chapter 2
Settling for E±ciency - A
Framework for the European
Union ¤
¤This is a slightly revised version of the book chapter 'The European Securities Transaction Industry', which
is forthcoming in E±cient Organizational Design - Balancing Incentives and Power by Marco Wei¼. We thank
Reinhard H. Schmidt, Marcel Tyrell and Ingo Walter for their comments. We appreciate discussions with Stefan
Mai and Andreas Wolf of Deutsche BÄ orse Group.
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2.1 Introduction
Despite a lot of re-structuring and many innovations in recent years, the securities transaction
industry in the European Union is still a highly ine±cient and inconsistently con¯gured system
for cross-border transactions. Many EU politicians eagerly promote the completion of the
Single European Market, but - few exceptions aside - the industry structure still resembles
closely the former fragmented market structure of largely independent organizations operating
along national lines. This causes higher costs in the handling of cross-border securities1 which
ultimately translates into higher costs of capital - a signi¯cant competitive disadvantage for
European ¯rms compared to companies in the USA.
Industry experts point at several aspects that impede the realization of an e±cient securities
transaction system. While trading is widely seen as e±cient, clearing and settlement processes
across di®erent countries are still too costly. The fragmented industry structure which does not
allow for capturing the signi¯cant bene¯ts from scale, scope, and network e®ects is paralyzed
by several obstacles to consolidation. Besides political, cultural, and legal barriers among the
di®erent countries, the motives of the market participants such as infrastructure providers and
direct users sometimes contribute to the impediment of consolidation e®orts and thus prevent
a socially optimal solution.
What has become increasingly visible is the lack of a common communication standard
among service providers. This could be a result of vertically integrated providers with incom-
patible information dissemination standards and post-trading routines. As a consequence, the
typical cross-border trade requires substantial interaction among the pertaining di®erent trad-
ing, clearing, and settlement systems which can only be e®ectively dealt with by additional
intermediaries such as (sub)custodians. This extends the length of the value chain and thereby
increases the costs for the investors. More interaction requirements are also more risky due to
the higher complexity of the trade and a higher likelihood of failures. Higher risks usually mean
additional collateral requirements, which is a further cost driver.
Not surprisingly, there are diverging opinions on how to cope with the current ine±ciencies.
Don Cruickshank, former CEO of the London Stock Exchange, favors a market structure that
separates trading from post-trading activities, while the latter should be organized as a utility
comparable to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) in the USA:
"If the single market in ¯nancial services is to be delivered, then competition and
regulatory policies must be allowed to work side by side. [...] We can see [that]
some spring shoots of such an approach is in moves to allow exchanges to compete
on a harmonised utility clearing and settlement layer as the most e®ective way of
reducing transaction costs in the securities industry as a whole and maximising the
potential for competition elsewhere in the securities value chain."2
This stands in strong contrast to Werner Seifert's view, former CEO of Deutsche BÄ orse,
who claims that an e±cient solution can be delivered by vertical integration of the activities
and that the culprit are the myriads of di®erent regulators in the EU:
"Many people claim that clearing and settlement should be done by a single, Europe-
wide utility, like in the US, and that greedy private operators help themselves from
the till by insisting that trading, clearing, and settlement remain integrated. Not
1Lannoo and Levin (2001, p. 14 - 30) and Deutsche BÄ orse Group and Clearstream International (2002, p. 15
- 29) present a cost analysis of cross-border transactions.
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so! At Deutsche BÄ orse we have looked at this very closely, and the overwhelming
problem in the integration of European capital markets is driven by di®erent reg-
ulations, even di®erent applications of identical rules where they exist - the whole
messy business of EU regulation, with actual implementation left to the member
states."3
What these two views reveal is that di®erent and sometimes intertwined forces are at play
in the European securities transaction industry. The motives of the di®erent opponents can be
biased by strategic deliberations and the desire to advance the industry structure to the own
advantage. This paper sheds some light on these opposing claims by applying economic tools
to identify the underlying economies in the industry and to comment on an e±cient securities
transaction system for the European Union. Our contribution is to provide a framework for
the analysis of this industry which identi¯es and structures the di®erent elements, interprets
e±ciency in a broader sense, and o®ers policy advice by proposing consistently con¯gured
trading, clearing, and settlement systems (TCS-systems) that achieve high levels of e±ciency
from the perspective of a benevolent organizational designer. Applying the methodology of
system theory, we give answers to the following questions: (1)What are economic characteristics
of the relevant activities, and which constituencies are involved in these activities? (2) Which
strategic decisions can be conducted by the industry players, and what are the consequences
thereof? (3) What are consistently con¯gured organizational designs that provide superior
e±ciency to alternative set-ups?
Our framework presents three systems for the European securities transaction industry
that are con¯gured in a consistent way: The ¯rst assigns a prominent role towards regulation
and allows to capture the economies in the industry to a great extent by integrating and
consolidating the di®erent activities in the di®erent national markets. The second lets the
market forces work and - although more fragmented - allows for high innovation and dynamics
in the industry. The third consistent system is characterized by consolidation and integration as
well, but instead of heavy regulation it is kept open to market forces by adjusting the necessary
elements, so that any ensuing monopoly remains contestable. We conclude that the third design
has its advantages over the other two: Policy makers in the European Union should strive to
implement the various elements of it to a consistent whole to the bene¯t of the European capital
market.
Related literature Public authorities and academics alike have taken an interest in the Eu-
ropean securities transaction industry. Di®erent regulatory bodies and committees established
by the European Commission mainly focus on the identi¯cation of structural weaknesses of the
industry and outline concrete recommendations to overcome these problems: In response to
ECOFIN's request to give regulatory proposals for the European Securities Markets in 2001,
the Committee of Wise Men, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, demands a further restructuring
and a scrutiny for the requirement of a regulatory framework in the clearing and settlement
area. Furthermore, they point at competitive issues and general systemic risk aspects that
may evolve in the context of monetary policy and the functioning of payment systems.4 The
Giovannini Group, a consultative group headed by Alberto Giovannini and appointed by the
European Commission, analyzes the cross-border clearing and settlement arrangements in the
EU and ¯nds that international transactions are more complex and costly than domestic trans-
actions due to ¯fteen barriers and that these ine±ciencies represent a paramount barrier to
3Seifert (2003, p. 82).
4See Lamfalussy (2001).CHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 14
integrated ¯nancial markets.5
The European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) disagrees to the claim
of some market participants that a forced consolidation into a pan-European regulated utility
would solve these problems. Instead, they pledge for an ownership separation between trading
and post-trading facilities in order to foster fair competition.6 The Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) jointly developed recommendations for securities settlement
systems that aim to improve the safety and e±ciency of these systems. In particular, the report
recommends minimum requirements that these systems should be obliged to ful¯l and the best
practices that they should strive for.7 Based on these recommendations, the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Central Bank (ECB) published 19
standards8 which also incorporated comments on standardization, communication and messag-
ing, and business continuity9 as well as on standards for risk management controls10. Market
participants were consulted on draft versions, and many institutions used their chance to re-
spond. Some organizations also published their own reports and white papers on the industry.11
Academic papers usually highlight particular aspects of the industry by focusing on a certain
aspect in the securities transaction value chain, while inevitably neglecting other potentially
interrelated factors. Some contributions provide empirical research on the main activities:
MalkamÄ aki and Hasan (2001) investigate potential economies of scale and scope at stock ex-
changes, while Schmiedel, MalkamÄ aki, and Tarkka (2006) focus on the same subject in the
case of settlement systems. A related study was conducted on network e®ects at exchanges
by Schmiedel and Hasan (2003). Additionally, formal models are presented for various topics
such as on the economics of ¯nancial networks by Economides (1993), on vertical integration
by KÄ oppl and Monnet (2003) and Tapking and Yang (2004), on competition between central
securities depositories (CSD) by Kauko (2003), and on competition between custodians and
CSDs by Holthausen and Tapking (2003). Furthermore, moral hazard aspects were modeled to
distinguish between net and gross settlement by Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003).
There are, however, also contributions that apply a more holistic approach and thus are
closer related to the framework used in this paper. One of the ¯rst academic contributions is by
Giddy, Saunders, and Walter (1996): They analyze four alternative models for the European
clearing and settlement market mainly from the perspective of the users of these services.
Di®erences between their models exist in the way the linkages between the CSDs are structured.
Our approach is similar to theirs in respect to evaluating trading, clearing, and settlement along
three dimensions and deriving distinct organizational designs for a future industry setting.
Unlike their approach, we take microeconomic incentives of the key industry players in more
detail into account and base the analysis of possible systems on sounder foundations regarding
these aspects.
The paper by Milne (2002) establishes analogies between other utility network industries,
such as the telecommunication sector, and the securities settlement market. These markets,
he argues, have similarities in possessing a natural monopoly that has to be regulated. Milne
5See Giovannini Group (2001) and Giovannini Group (2003) for details on these barriers in di®erent areas.
6See European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (2001).
7See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (2001).
8See Committee of European Securities Regulators and European Central Bank (2004).
9These issues were particularly raised by the G30, an international body composed of senior ¯gures from the
private and public sectors and academia.
10The European Association of Central Counterparty Clearing Houses (EACH) was one of the initiators of
this point.
11See, for example, the White Paper by Deutsche BÄ orse Group (2005) which describes the post-trade market.CHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 15
identi¯es the book-entry function and the transmission of corporate actions as the two activities
of the value chain that need to be regulated via access pricing and the establishment of common
communication standards. He concludes that this minimal regulatory e®ort should su±ce to
create a level playing ¯eld on all other stages such as clearing, settlement, and custody, rendering
further public interventions unnecessary. While we agree on this notion, we extent his policy
advice by presenting and applying a more comprehensive framework that - together with the
methodology of system theory - allows a broader policy advice.
The paper closest to ours in spirit and result is by van Cayseele (2004) who agrees with
our reasoning proposed in a previously published working paper version of this paper12. Van
Cayseele starts from the same premises, asking what an economically optimal outcome for
the clearing and settlement industry would be. Relying on the concepts of 'essential facilities'
and of 'two-sided markets'13, he concludes that the advantage of a market solution relying
on contestability of the industry is to be preferred over a single regulated monopoly with the
potential costs of government failure.
Outline Section 2.2 brie°y describes the three e±ciency concepts deployed in this paper.
We concentrate on the activities of trading, clearing, and settlement along the value chain
and the providing institutions.14 We explain the underlying economies of the activities at
each level of the value chain and the interdependencies across the whole chain in Section 2.3.
The role of regulators is brie°y discussed as well. Section 2.4 regards possible strategies and
associated actions to highlight the microeconomic incentives of the infrastructure providers.
Three important decisions about the con¯guration of the design have to be made - where to
set the boundaries, whether to adopt an industry-wide standard, and how to assign ownership
rights. We show consistent TCS-systems in Section 2.5 that are e±cient from the viewpoint of
social welfare. Its individual components are complementary and thus reinforcing each other.
Potential drawbacks and implications for social welfare are discussed. Section 2.6 concludes
with a comparative organizational analysis.
2.2 Three concepts for evaluation
Economic rents are created through 'good' investment decisions by the various constituencies
and allocated to them through 'good' distribution rules. This interplay between ex ante in-
centives and ex post distribution determines also the e±ciency of possible TCS-systems. We
analyze e±ciency along the three lines of static, dynamic, and systemic e±ciency to evaluate
the generated economic rents and estimate the resulting overall e±ciency. We shortly describe
each concept and potential trade-o®s between them.
Static e±ciency A certain activity is performed in a statically e±cient way if there is no
solution that would allow a less costly implementation. It is under this notion that the com-
monly used concept of cost e±ciency is considered. Parameters in°uencing the static e±ciency
are the costs of production which in turn are in°uenced by the underlying technologies and the
12See Serifsoy and Wei¼ (2003).
13See also Rochet and Tirole (2003).
14Custody functions follow the settlement process. These ensue the distribution of coupon payments, the
implementation of corporate actions and the lending of securities besides the trading-induced transfer of own-
ership. We will subsume these transaction-induced custody aspects under the settlement activity and ignore
the other services in custody. Taking into account all aspects of custody would add to the complexity, while
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economies arising from them. In the securities transaction industry, network externalities15 are
prevalent. They lead in many areas, like the trading of a single derivative instrument or the
settlement of a particular stock, to an e±cient market structure that is a natural monopoly.
Static e±ciency generally increases if the number of companies conducting business along
the securities transaction value chain decreases due to the underlying economies. The costs of
any regulation that has to be set up to keep the remaining companies and their rent-extracting
potential in check, however, lead to a lowering of static e±ciency.
Dynamic e±ciency Activities are performed in a dynamically e±cient way if today's struc-
tures and investments do not hamper the e±cient performance of these activities in the future.
By investing in a certain technology or by institutionalizing a certain industry structure, the
ability to change and to adapt becomes a®ected. Particularly the dominance by a network
provider may have detrimental e®ects on the innovativeness of the market.16 Industry struc-
tures and processes that do not allow for innovation and for quality improvement in future thus
are not e±cient under the notion of dynamic e±ciency. Competition in the market usually
helps to alleviate problems such as low innovativeness or poor quality of the goods and services.
The absence of competition may lead to complacency and to less innovation as it is common
in a monopolistic environment. For estimating dynamic e±ciency, key parameters are (1) the
industry structure that determines the di±culty of entering the TCS-industry, (2) the rate of
technological innovation, and (3) the propensity of all constituencies to invest and the resulting
sum of all investments.
Systemic e±ciency Our third evaluation concept, denoted systemic e±ciency, provides in-
sight on systemic risk issues that are inherent on various stages of the value chain and takes into
account the stability of the TCS-industry when faced with adverse systemic events. We de¯ne
systemic e±ciency as the degree of robustness of the activities in the securities transaction
industry to systemic risks that are borne from strong adverse systemic events.17 A systemic
event occurs when a 'bad event' for one or more market participant(s) has subsequent negative
repercussions on other market participants. Such an event may vary in severity, ranging from
a delay in payment or delivery of the securities in question to a full-blown failure of a party to
meet the agreed-upon obligations. Potential contagion e®ects have to be taken seriously most
notably in cases of strong negative systemic events like a failure of an institution. Systemic risk
issues are treated with great care by public and private entities. Both ex ante (crisis prevention)
and ex post (crisis management) measures have to be introduced in order to deal with systemic
risks. Appropriate regulation has to ensure this.
Interdependencies Note that the three concepts of e±ciency are interdependent: (1) The
statically e±cient solution of a monopoly conveys only minor incentives to innovate, whereas a
few players in an oligopoly can interact in heavy competition and try to develop better products
and processes thereby increasing dynamic e±ciency. They also compete for monopoly rents that
are non-existent in a perfect-competition-environment where the users of the infrastructure reap
the main part of economic rents. The potential pro¯t that can be gained is, therefore, a big
enough incentive to undertake the large technological investments needed up-front. (2) Static
e±ciency can decline when measures are taken to increase systemic e±ciency: The provision of
15For a detailed discussion on network externalities confer Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 173 - 225).
16See Economides (1993, p. 92).
17The terminology used is adapted from de Bandt and Hartmann (2000) albeit the authors discuss this issue
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collateral, for example, increases the stability of the industry against adverse shocks but levies
opportunity costs on the market participants. The existence of economic rents also facilitates the
build-up of a ¯nancial bu®er that allows these companies to be more stable in times of systemic
crises. (3) Perfect competition would contribute potentially more in terms of innovativeness
thereby increasing dynamic e±ciency but the systemic e±ciency could be damaged: A more
fragmented structure may impose more work on regulators to keep the overall system sound.
However, competition also fosters innovations in risk management tools which are bene¯cial to
systemic e±ciency.
2.3 The securities transaction industry
To analyze the securities transaction industry we de¯ne the securities transaction value chain
and the constituencies that are involved in these activities. The value chain has three main
activities: Securities need to be traded, the results of the trade have to be con¯rmed and
calculated by a clearing process, and the delivery of money and paper to the parties to a trade
has to be settled. Institutions like exchanges, clearing houses, and central securities depositories
(CSD) provide these services. Two more constituencies are involved in the value chain, namely
the users and regulators. The users are the clients of the infrastructure provider and can be
further broken down into banks and brokers as direct users18 and investors and issuers as
indirect users. The regulators monitor the processes in the industry to ensure a sound and
e±cient transaction environment. Their appropriate role is discussed at the end of this section.
2.3.1 Economies of the securities transaction value chain
Network e®ects There exist strong positive network externalities on each of the three stages:
In trading, network e®ects can be both observed on the investors' as well as on the issuers' side.
For the former, becoming a member of an already large network of investors that trade on the
same platform increases both her own and the other's utility by providing additional liquidity
to the market.19 The latter group bene¯ts from larger networks as these can absorb the issuers'
need for capital more easily.
There are viable positive network externalities on the user side for both clearing and set-
tlement. A concentration on few transaction systems allows for a higher proportion of clearing
and settlement instructions to be processed internally. This increases the utility of all users
because costly links to other networks become less necessary. In the extreme, a single clearing
and settlement network would be faster and less costly in comparison to processes which require
the interaction with several clearing and settlement systems.
Economies of scale The providers of trading, clearing, and settlement facilities can reap
signi¯cant economies of scale as the setup costs for a transaction platform have a substantial
portion of ¯xed costs, so that average costs fall with increasing transaction volume. This view
18Banks and brokers are the main institutions using the infrastructure as the immediate users. They play a
pivotal role in the securities transaction value chain for institutional as well as retail investors on the one side
and for companies with their underwriting business on the other side. By internalizing security transactions and
by acting as subcustodians, banks are to a certain degree also direct competitors of the infrastructure providers.
A model on the competitive relationship between CSDs and custodians can be found in Holthausen and Tapking
(2003).
19The pivotal role of liquidity stems from the potentially large costs that can arise from illiquidity during
trading. According to Deutsche BÄ orse Group and Clearstream International (2002, p. 17 - 22) their proportion
of total trading costs is substantial. Liquidity can be characterized along four dimensions, namely width, depth,
immediacy, and resilience. See Harris (1991, p. 3). For a model of such two-sided markets see Rochet and Tirole
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is con¯rmed by empirical investigations. MalkamÄ aki's analysis on the processing of trades at
stock exchanges shows scale economies for increasing trading volume.20 Another contribution by
Schmiedel, MalkamÄ aki, and Tarkka (2006) measured signi¯cant economies of scale for settlement
systems: Platforms with high transaction volumes will be able to o®er lower transaction costs
to users than low-volume competitors. For non-automated transaction systems, i.e. °oor-based
trading, this e®ect is not as pronounced as for automated trading systems, since the ratio of
¯xed costs to variable costs is higher for the computerized system.
Economies of scale are also present in counterparty risk management. Especially if a central
counterparty (CCP) is used in the clearing stage, the users of the facility can save resources
on the management and control of counterparty risks. By pooling risk management facilities
at the CCP, costs can be eliminated by risk management specialization e®ects. Additionally, if
netting mechanisms are used, the users will enjoy reduced capital provision requirements and,
therefore, lower opportunity costs.21 As a consequence, scale economies may be even more
pronounced in clearing than in other stages.
Economies of scope All three activities exhibit also potential economies of scope. Providers
are able to process di®erent types of securities on the same platform, while incurring only rel-
atively low incremental costs. Clearing facilities that process di®erent classes of securities such
as stocks, bonds, and derivatives have additional leeway for scope economies as they are able to
implement innovative risk management procedures such as cross-collateralizing with di®erent
securities classes. This would lead to an overall decrease in capital provision requirements to
the users and would consequently save costs.
The upshot of the results above suggests a tendency towards a strong concentration of the
activities or even a natural monopoly on each stage of the value chain due to the underlying
and mutually reinforcing economies. According to our de¯nition in section 2.2, a concentration
in the industry translates into high static e±ciency.
Contestability of the market A concentrated market in turn lowers dynamic e±ciency
as the latter falls with decreasing levels of competition. The existence of substantial network
externalities or scale and scope economies creates a barrier to entry and o®ers established
platforms some protection from competitors.22 Nevertheless, high levels of dynamic e±ciency
can be achieved if the market for securities transactions remains contestable, i.e. if competitive
and innovative infrastructure providers can gain market share at the expense of established
competitors.
The diversion of transaction volume from an incumbent provider is the more likely the
more of the following aspects coincide: (1) The competitor demands lower fees. Domowitz and
Steil (1999, p. 8 - 9) give several examples of this behavior. (2) A competing provider o®ers a
signi¯cantly better service for users based on a better technology which may manifest itself in
faster, more reliable or more convenient transaction handling. (3) The competitor o®ers new
products or services which have not been supplied and 'monopolized' by an established provider
yet. (4) Clearing and settlement institutions reduce their capital provision requirements by
introducing netting processes. However, this point may be a matter of regulatory concern
as competing institutions might want to apply less stringent risk management procedures to
successfully underbid the fee structure of competitors.
20However, he con¯nes his ¯ndings for very large stock exchanges. See MalkamÄ aki (1999) for further details.
21See Van Cauwenberge (2003, p. 94).
22This view is shared by Economides (1993, p. 92 - 93). He states that, as a consequence of the reinforcing
nature, a ¯nancial "network exhibits positive critical mass". A further consequence of networks "is that history
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Systemic risk issues Systemic e±ciency is particularly relevant in the clearing and settle-
ment of securities and appendant funds. There are several sources of and alleviation e®orts
to systemic risks. Clearing and settlement institutions have developed risk management tools
that attempt to reduce both ex ante and ex post the various types of settlement risk. Since the
various types of systemic risks, such as counterparty, custody, and cross-border risks, have been
elaborated in detail by other contributors23 we focus on the relationship between systemic e±-
ciency and market concentration. The relationship is not straight-forward. Both a fragmented
and a consolidated industry structure have to deal with trade-o®s.
A concentrated industry structure can exploit economies in centralizing risk management
e®orts as it is more cost e±cient to have one party collect the information and to monitor
the other parties instead of having all parties monitoring each other. Thus, a central risk
manager will be more cost e±cient and more sophisticated. However, the central risk manager
may bank too strongly on its dominant position and believe that public entities would bail
him out in case of a failure. Moral hazard may materialize in the form of reduced monitoring
e®orts.24 Therefore, regulatory e®ort - albeit rather easy as only one institution has to be
controlled - might be necessary.25 Additionally, a higher degree of consolidation leads to less
complexity in the interaction between the providers and thus reduces the probability of failures
in communication and asset transfers.
A fragmented industry structure on the other hand may provide systemic e±ciency that
is superior to a concentrated market. More industry players will usually lead to higher levels
of competition. A possible parameter of competition can be the provision of sound and stable
transaction systems among providers which boosts systemic e±ciency. Another positive aspect
of fragmentation is the existence of redundancies which - if communication protocols between
di®erent transaction systems are compatible - can be used to re-route transactions from a
failed to an intact system. Multiple transaction systems may thus increase the robustness
of the industry although potential contagion e®ects between the providers may weaken this
advantage.
2.3.2 Vertical interdependencies in the value chain
In several European countries, the dominant trading institution often also exercises control in
the activities further downstream, i.e. the exchange is vertically integrated into the domestic
clearing and settlement activities. This setting is mainly driven by e±ciency motives as it
enables to process straight-through the whole transaction in a faster, more cost e±cient, and
more reliable manner. Straight-through processing (STP) at a single institution o®ers signi¯-
cant economies to both users and providers in comparison to the processing between separate
entities as: (1) It lowers communication costs between the respective activities thereby im-
proving static e±ciency. (2) Innovations concerning the processing of transactions are easier to
implement, since coordination e®orts with other providers along the value chain are not nec-
essary. This shortens the implementation period and, therefore, increases dynamic e±ciency.
(3) It makes transaction failures less frequent, since the data transmission process is optimized
in-house, for example by implementing a proprietary communication standard. This represents
an improvement in systemic e±ciency.
However, with the decline in IT-infrastructure costs in recent years, the arguments for
vertical integration are not as strong as they have been some years ago as transmission costs
23See Giovannini Group (2001, p. 18 - 19) and de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
24See Diamond (1984) on the use of such delegated monitoring as a rationale for the existence of banks.
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to outside institutions are now signi¯cantly less costly and not necessarily higher than in-house
transmission costs.
Furthermore, as trading habits of investors gradually shift from a domestic towards a more
international approach, the national 'silos', as the vertically integrated entities are also called,
not only no longer represent the investor's scope of transaction activities but even hamper
frictionless processing of cross-border transactions in Europe. This is due to their incompatible
proprietary communication standards which each national silo had developed to communicate
along its own controlled value chain - a legacy that makes communication between silos a highly
complex and ine±cient task.
Di®ering communication standards between vertical silos also de facto impede the contesta-
bility of the downstream activities, i.e. clearing and settlement markets. They represent an
e®ective entry barrier against other providers that strive to enter the market of an established
silo. They are unable to do so because once a trade is made on the established trading plat-
form competitors are restricted to o®er their services for the downstream functions due to the
existing proprietary communication standard of the established provider. Therefore, clearing
and settlement activities of the established provider are protected by its trading activity and
are thus barely subject to contestability. This may result in dynamic ine±ciencies.
2.3.3 Regulation
E±cient trading, clearing, and settlement of securities is important for the functioning of the
whole economy. Companies need to get access to ¯nance, and private households need a vehicle
by which they can save their ¯nancial surplus. This assigns ¯nancial markets in general and the
TCS-industry in particular a pivotal role. The well-being of other industries and many people
depends on it. Adverse e®ects spill over into other parts of the economy implying negative
externalities. Therefore, regulation of the TCS-industry is a means to avoid or to mitigate
these external e®ects.
These spill-over e®ects are very material in the settlement stage of the securities transaction
value chain when the payment system is involved. A failure of one party to meet its obligations
might lead to contagion e®ects that have negative e®ects on the liquidity of the banking system
and threatening the economy by this transmission channel. The central bank as lender of last
resort has an incentive to deal with these regulatory issues. It therefore needs to be (and also
is) one of the key regulating institutions, since central bank money is frequently involved in
settling the cash side of securities transactions. Other regulatory bodies are concerned with
di®erent aspects: For example, the performance of each activity for all users - which are of
a considerably heterogeneous degree - in a fair manner needs to be ensured, i.e. access to
the infrastructure must be open and in an undiscriminating way. The European Commission
with various reports - the Lamfalussy Report, the two reports of the Giovannini Group, and
the Investment Services Directive - is committed to this task in the Single European Market.
National agencies implement actions to put these aspects into practice today. Regulators often
join their forces to set standards after consulting the relevant industry players, e.g. the joint
working group set up by the European Central Bank and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR). A single European Financial Services Authority might one day take over
this job. In all cases, the right balance between static, dynamic, and systemic e±ciency must
be chosen by regulators.
Regulation lowers static e±ciency, since it is costly to set up a bureaucracy - or a publicly
owned entity in the extreme - to achieve the performance of the three activities in the value
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could be a cost-e±cient alternative. Possible means for this outsourcing lie in the self-regulation
by the infrastructure provider. Whenever they can compete on quality, as many exchanges do
with di®erent market segments and the attached regulatory conditions, regulation need not be
of the costly public variant. As a second means, the infrastructure can also be user-governed.
In this setting, the club of users writes its own rules. Whenever little entry in this club is
required, this can again be better than publicly provided regulation.
The current system with competing regulatory regimes in Europe - with sometimes overlap-
ping competencies, sometimes unattended areas - is seen nearly unanimously by the industry
as a major barrier to business, since a level playing ¯eld is not provided. We come back to the
question of regulation in the context of the three e±cient systems in Section 2.5.
2.4 Strategic conduct - The provider's action set
In this section we analyze the three key parameters in our framework that the providers of
the infrastructure, the users, and the regulators can use to interact strategically to shape the
future of the securities transaction industry. The focus is on the providers of the infrastructure,
possible actions and reactions of the other constituencies are taken into account where necessary.
The three parameters in the action set that we look at are (1) the boundary decision of the
infrastructure providers, (2) the decision whether to adopt an open standard or to develop a
proprietary communication tool, and (3) the governance of the infrastructure providers.
2.4.1 Boundary decision
The institutions providing the infrastructure for trading, clearing, and settling the di®erent
¯nancial instruments face the problem whether to integrate di®erent activities in the organiza-
tional design of one ¯rm or whether to concentrate on just one function or one speci¯c ¯nancial
instrument. We describe two distinct business models - the vertically integrated silo and the
vertically focused ¯rm.
The vertically integrated silo The ¯rst business model is the vertical silo - the combination
of trading, clearing, and settlement under the roof of one ¯rm. It is applied, for example, by
Deutsche BÄ orse. The advantage of such a model is that it allows to reap the bene¯ts that
derive from the economies of scope between the three functions as described in Section 2.3.2.
Communication is easier when the three functions are performed in close proximity within the
same organization. Speci¯c forms of data exchanges between the three stages of the value chain
and straight-through processing allow for the emergence of economic rents.26
However, one of the adverse e®ects such a business model has, which might be a prevalent
microeconomic motive behind this strategy, is the leverage of a (natural) monopoly on one
stage of the value chain upstream or downstream to other stages. Particularly, a vertical silo
may cross-subsidize its trading costs - and thereby attracting customers from other platforms -
through its monopoly pro¯ts on the clearing and settlement stage or vice versa.27 By this strat-
egy, an institution following the business model of vertical integration e®ectively strengthens
its competitive position. Furthermore, the vertical silo forecloses the market for competitors:
By restricting access for them in one activity, users can be forced also to 'buy' the solution for
26See Williamson (1985) for the role of speci¯city in explaining vertical integration.
27The detrimental e®ect of vertical integration on horizontal consolidation between di®erent infrastructure
providers on the same stage of the securities transaction value chain is formalized by KÄ oppl and Monnet (2003)
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another activity from the same institution. If there is no choice for them but to deal with the
same provider, a monopoly rent can be extracted from the users, thereby further increasing the
economic rents generated in this model due to the speci¯city inherent in it.
Therefore, the interesting question arises whether Deutsche BÄ orse can deliver its promises
given that it controls downstream activities and de facto can foreclose the market due to its
monopoly on the following stage in the value chain. When faced with the speci¯c and co-
specialized investments they have to undertake, banks and brokers could be reluctant to join
in this venture.
The vertically focused ¯rm The other business model that has promising features is that
of more focused infrastructure providers and the use of market mechanisms between di®erent
stages of the value chain. A prominent example for this industry setting was used in England
where three independent institutions, namely London Stock Exchange, London Clearing House,
and Crest, provided infrastructure services only for one stage of the value chain, respectively.28
If a good solution for the data transfer between the three activities of the securities transaction
value chain is implemented, this model has appeal because it does not give too much power into
the hands of a single entity that can control access to its infrastructure - an infrastructure that
exhibits strong network e®ects. For each activity, the users can choose the best institution that
provides it in the most e±cient way. Competition forces less e±cient institutions out of business
and sets high-powered incentives for the surviving. As such ¯rms do not have to worry about
any interdependencies between their di®erent lines of business, they are more eager to adopt
new and better technologies and processes. Any cannibalization of value propositions within the
same ¯rm cannot happen. These institutions increase, therefore, static and dynamic e±ciency.
A possible drawback which might be taken into account by the regulators is less systemic
stability that too high-powered incentives might induce. How the problem of establishing a
market mechanism for the intermediate goods - the information transfer from one stage to the
next in the value chain - can be dealt with is the topic of the next section.
2.4.2 Communication standards and accessibility
The interaction between the stages of the value chain is of crucial importance to the way
business is performed in the TCS-industry. It necessitates the infrastructure providers to make
decisions both on the information transfer mode, i.e. the type of communication standard, and
the degree of accessibility of their activities to competitors.
Proprietary versus open communication standards Proprietary standards infer that
the information format of the transactions cannot be interpreted without co-specialized in-
vestments so that competitors are discriminated against, whereas an open standard enables
competitors to process the information and allows users to switch the providers more easily.29
The decision whether to adopt an open standard or to set up a proprietary system is inter-
twined with the vertical boundary decision. In the case of a vertically focused infrastructure
provider the solution is trivial. Such an institution has to rely on the market for the perfor-
mance of upstream and downstream activities, the communication protocol has to be in an
28In the past years, the London Clearing House has teamed up with Euronext's Clearnet, while Crest has
merged with Belgium-based Euroclear .
29The battle for an unique communication standard and the di®erent competing approaches are described in
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open and understandable format.30 The case is di®erent for companies following the business
model of a vertical silo: Such companies can develop a solution that allows them to keep the
information, which has to be passed along the securities transaction value chain , private. By
doing so, it can develop an idiosyncratic data exchange format that allows them to generate an
economic rent due to the speci¯c nature.
However, an economic rent could also be generated by foreclosing the market for an upstream
or downstream activity. Users are forced to rely on the same institution and buy the bundled
product in a one-stop shop. They have to invest in co-specialized computer systems that allow
them to handle this proprietary data format. With an open communication standard between
the di®erent stages of the value chain a deconstruction becomes possible. There would be a
choice for customers to deal with the best and most e±cient institution.
Analyzing open and proprietary communication standards on the basis of our three e±-
ciency concepts reveals that there are two major advantages for proprietary in comparison
to open communication standards: (1) They can be more speci¯c in relation to a certain ¯-
nancial instrument or a certain institution than open communication standards and thus be
more statically e±cient. (2) A higher dynamic e±ciency can be obtained, since a proprietary
communication standard allows for the complete appropriation of the economic rent that is
generated by innovations. Additionally, the bene¯ts of innovations made with open standards
could be enjoyed by every participant without being obliged to invest into this innovation.
Thus, underinvestment problems may arise with open standards.
However, proprietary communication has also two major drawbacks when compared to
open standards: (1) Proprietary standards provide more incentives for strategic behavior to
infrastructure providers which can be to the detriment of the users. Thus, market foreclosure
strategies and mutual reinforcements of monopolies on di®erent stages of the value chain can
have a negative impact on users. Both static and dynamic e±ciency may be impaired. A
communication standard that is open to all market participants prevents or at least alleviates
this strategic behavior: It is easier for competitors of the infrastructure provider or for the
users themselves by means of internalization to work around such a foreclosure. (2) Proprietary
standards raise more regulatory concerns if a regulator wants to ensure the proper functioning
of the market and access for other constituencies. Therefore, static e±ciency may be lowered
due to the increased regulation costs. Additionally, systemic e±ciency may be low if regulators
do not control the proprietary standard properly.
Restricted versus open accessibility Accessibility is the °ip-side of communications and
refers to interactions between competitors across di®erent stages of the value chain, i.e. between
trading and clearing or between clearing and settlement. Open access describes the ability of
institutions to provide their services on one stage of a transaction although other stages of
the value chain are performed by competitors. This stands in contrast to transactions where
access is restricted by a provider. Restriction of access is possible whenever a provider is able
to leverage its dominant position on other stages of the value chain. This may, for example,
occur if a dominant trading facility prevents other providers of downstream activities to receive
the transaction and automatically route it to their own post-trading facility instead. Another
example for dominance can be found in the opposite direction if a settlement provider has the
monopoly on a certain security and refuses to accept transactions that are traded or cleared
from anybody but its own upstream activity provider. Therefore, restricted accessibility can
30One could also imagine the case that a proprietary standard is used. In this case, the outcome would be a
hybrid solution along the lines of Williamson (1985): Long-term contracts or strategic alliances are necessary to
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strongly impede fair competition among providers in the TCS-industry.31
Accessibility as well as the communication standard decision primarily depend on the indus-
try structure32, the allocation of power between the di®erent constituencies, and the governance
and ownership of the providers of the infrastructure. Using (or being forced by a regulator to
use) a common means of communication technology e®ectively opens markets. The power that
is conveyed by open markets to users allows them to search for the best price and quality. This
in turn eventually forces a redistribution of economic rents away from the incumbent providers
who would otherwise hang on to an ine±cient allocation of resources from a welfare perspective.
It is to these governance aspects that we turn next.
2.4.3 Ownership structure and governance
Ownership of a good is an incentive device: If residual decision rights are aligned with the
rights to residual income, decisions are made in such a way as to maximize this share. The
maximization of it optimizes social welfare whenever these decisions can be made independent
of others. It therefore matters who ultimately has control over a certain good or resource. This
is also the case for a ¯rm - a much more complex 'good' and a whole bundle of resources. For
our analysis, we take into account the ownership structure of a provider of the infrastructure
in the securities transaction value chain to check whether economically sound decisions will be
made by this institution. Three distinct forms of ownership can be identi¯ed: (1) A for-pro¯t
¯rm that operates to maximize the pro¯t that is distributable to its shareholders as dividends,
(2) a nonpro¯t mutual that operates to maximize the utility of its members, and (3) a publicly-
owned entity that provides a good or service that would not be provided e±ciently by a private
¯rm due to its public good nature and the underlying external e®ects.
Public ownership of an infrastructure provider can be a means to deliver a service that must
be provided by a natural monopolist. The public policymaker, acting in the interest of society
as a whole, is not interested in narrow pro¯t motives but rather tries to provide this service in
the e±cient quantity. This gain is, however, very likely to be o®set by ine±ciencies that public
bodies bring with them. Without a pro¯t motive the resulting incentives in the publicly owned
¯rm are weakened and ine±ciencies are reintroduced.
In recent years, many publicly-owned monopolies in diverse industries were privatized, and
for-pro¯t ¯rms were established instead. In this form of ownership - the standard capitalist
form most commonly analyzed in economic theory - the residual decision rights are aligned
with the residual claims and better incentives are thereby conveyed. The public interest of the
provision of the right quantity for the correct price in these network industries is better served
by a regulator who has less decision power (and less potential for meddling) than an outright
publicly owned enterprise. The shift in control and power away from a public authority towards
the private agents that use and provide the infrastructure increases overall welfare by nurturing
better decisions because the resulting economic rents are exploitable by these decision makers.
The third possible ownership arrangement is that of mutual ownership. In the mutual
form, the users of the infrastructure provide the necessary investments themselves, so that the
statically e±cient quantity is produced for a price that is lower than the monopoly price. The
direct users are members in the providing institution and take into account the supplementing
31See also Milne (2002) who proposes to regulate access to the book transfer (which would fall under the notion
of settlement in our argument) as he identi¯es it as the natural monopoly within the clearing and settlement
industry.
32There is a strong interdependency and complementarity between accessibility, communication standard,
and vertical boundary decision of the providers: We observe the tendency that a vertically integrated ¯rm often
employs a proprietary standard with restricted access, while a vertically focused ¯rm prefers open standards
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function that the infrastructure has for their core business in which they ultimately want to
generate economic rents. The amount of economic rent that is generated in such a mutually-
owned institution is therefore lower compared to a for-pro¯t ¯rm, while ine±ciencies are reduced
in comparison to a publicly-owned and over-regulated authority. Such a structure has its
drawbacks, however. The membership of the mutual can procrastinate, and new entrants can
be discouraged from using the same infrastructure. If the members are too heterogeneous, the
governance of 'one member - one vote' instead of 'one share - one vote' can cause decisions to
be distorted by the divergent interests, and the larger players can be held up by the smaller
constituencies.33 In recent years there has been a wave of demutualizations, especially among
exchanges, due to these problems.34
Why are ownership and governance aspects important? The governance of the infras-
tructure providers is of particular importance for the e±ciency with which securities transactions
are performed. The Council of Institutional Investors, representing 130 pension funds holding
$3 trillion in assets in the USA, criticizes that of the three constituencies of the New York Stock
Exchange - members (intermediaries like broker-dealers and specialists), listed companies, and
investors - only the members are allowed to vote and to choose the board. This structure has
a potential negative e®ect on the self-regulation of the exchange, since that is biased towards
the members' interests.35
The governance structure also in°uences the ability of a ¯rm to innovate and to be e±cient in
a more dynamic sense. Too much power in the wrong hands hinders the necessary innovation in
the face of disruptive technologies. The introduction of electronic trading systems, for example,
was heavily fought by °oor-based brokers that have an important voice in the governance of
exchanges. If these are not only the users of the infrastructure but can also exert power through
a mutual ownership arrangement, they can block such innovations that would make them worse
o® but lead to large gains for other users.
2.4.4 Interdependencies in the action set
The three described action parameters are not independent of each other. We want to highlight
some interdependencies here as a precursor to the comparative analysis of the three organiza-
tional designs in Section 2.6.
Boundary decision and communication standards Open standards are a means to cred-
ibly commit an institution performing a certain function in the securities transaction value chain
not to pursue a foreclosure strategy through vertical integration. The leveraging of a natural
monopoly on one stage of the value chain for a certain ¯nancial instrument cannot be used
to force customers to use the infrastructure of the same institution on the previous or next
stage in the value chain as well. The choice for customers and the threat of market entry by
upstarts do not allow institutions to use their power to extract more than their 'fair' share of
economic rents generated by the activities of the securities transaction value chain. This makes
a strategy of vertical integration less attractive. On the contrary, in such a setting it would be
necessary for the integrated institution to compete with many focused ¯rms that know their
activity by heart. Any advantage in terms of higher economic rents these focused institutions
can gain can only come from better service, which leads them to pursue a strategy that puts
33Hart and Moore (1996) present a model in which the heterogeneity of users makes a mutual structure less
preferable.
34See also Domowitz and Steil (1999, p. 14 - 16) on this issue.
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a premium on innovation. Even if the vertically integrated ¯rm also pursued aggressive R&D
activities, it would be faced with the dilemma of cannibalizing its own success whenever it came
across an innovation on one stage of the securities transaction value chain that would force it to
restructure the relationship between the integrated stages. The need to meddle with transfer
prices weakens incentives for middle managers or even leads to outright sabotage of the new
product or process by the managers of the less innovative stage.
Ownership structure and communication standard Economic rents can be generated
by for-pro¯t ¯rms by suitably using the ideas of industrial organization theory to structure the
industry to make it more di±cult to enter the market. One such tool is a proprietary standard
probably in combination with a strategy of vertical integration. In the other two ownership
forms we described - public and mutual ownership - these incentives to foreclose the market
by opting for a proprietary communication standard are not that prominent, since the appro-
priation possibilities of any rents generated are less good for the owners of such institutions.
In the case of a publicly provided infrastructure of the natural monopoly functions this insti-
tution will settle on its own (proprietary) standard, but fair access is usually granted by the
provider of the public good. In the case of a mutual ownership structure the tendency is for
an open communication standard, because the users themselves will gain from less diversity
between di®erent providers: In this case they have to invest only in one system to cope with
data from numerous institutions on the other stages of the securities transaction value chain.
However, incentives to develop the common standard and to take account of better possibilities
in data exchange through broadband connections and better encryption and decompression
algorithms are needed. One possibility is the use of open source-like structures: Franck and
Jungwirth (2002) see the advantage of such structures in donations that are made by inter-
ested constituencies without a crowding out of valuable investments in the case of an emerging
standard. Cooperatives are then a preferable organizational form that allows to establish a
standard without the e®ects of competition that would lead to a fragmentation or to a lock-in
into an ine±cient system.36
Boundary decision and ownership structure Mutually owned organizations have their
drawbacks in terms of slow decision making and weakened incentives due to the lack of the pro¯t
motive. Vertical integration augments this disadvantage by making the organization even more
complex. The users of the infrastructure for the securities transaction value chain are therefore
more likely to set up several cooperatives, each one highly focused along the value chain that
have probably di®erent members and to rely on open standards for the exchange of information
between them. The users themselves restrict the activities of a cooperative to the absolute
necessary.
The solution of public ownership is more likely to be vertically integrated, but a sensible
and economically minded policy maker would again opt for a deconstruction of the value chain
and a private provision for the activities where this is the best option. Unregulated private
organizations that run in the best interest of their shareholders are very likely to pursue a
strategy to shape the industry in their favor and to erect entry barriers whenever possible. As
mentioned before, a foreclosure strategy of leveraging a monopoly position from one activity
to the next makes perfect sense for such institutions. Privately-owned companies are therefore
likely to increase their scale and scope by actively integrating along the value chain when no
countervailing forces prevail.
36For a theoretical underpinning of cooperatives and their investment incentives in emerging standards see
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We have now outlined the constituents of our framework and discussed them in detail. In the
following section we put these parameters together to concentrate on the systemic relationships
between them that make some con¯gurations more e±cient from a perspective of maximizing
overall welfare than others.
2.5 Proposals for an e±cient organizational design
Systems in general consist of various modules. Between these modules or elements there can
be a complementary relationship. Complementarity between any two such elements implies
that the simultaneous increase in both elements leads to an overall superior performance. In
the case that such a complementary relation between the elements of a system exists, the right
con¯guration of these modules matters. Only if they are adjusted for supermodularity, the
design in question will be internally consistent. Such a consistent system will perform better
than any system in which deviations from the coherent con¯guration in one or a few parameters
occur.37
This section presents three idealized systems where the con¯gurations of selected elements,
especially the parameters of the action set described above, are set thus that the complementary
relationship is taken into account and the overall system is e±cient from the viewpoint of a
benevolent system designer. Small deviations from the con¯gurations suggested lead to an
overall less e±cient solution.
2.5.1 System 1 - Regulated monopoly
Description The system of a regulated monopoly has two distinct features implied by its
name: (1) There is no competition in the provision of the activities on those levels of the
securities transaction value chain that are consolidated and (2) the role of the regulator is very
pronounced in these stages. Usually the roles of regulators and providers are combined, and
the infrastructure is publicly owned.
The horizontally consolidated and possibly even vertically integrated structure can take
several forms depending on the scale of integration in each activity. In the USA, for example,
the Depositories Trust & Clearing Corporation is the monopoly for clearing and settlement
activities, and trading occurs on several exchanges. Many national markets in Europe were
structured as a vertical silo with all three activities integrated into one entity. What are the
advantages of such a system?
The consolidation in each activity allows to reap economies of scale and scope along the
securities transaction value chain for the providers. Users, on the other hand, enjoy the strong
bene¯ts of a single network. The public ownership and the lack of competition lead to low
incentives to innovation activity. The threat of entry is subdued, since the underlying economies
as well as the publicly sanctioned role as the sole provider entrench this institution.
Vertical integration even enhances this entrenchment, but also leads to the possibility of
straight-through processing and an e±cient use and dissemination of information from one
stage of the value chain to the next. The low rate of innovation and the resulting stability
in the industry makes it feasible to write detailed plans. The low innovation activity is also
consistent with a low investment propensity of all players and low total investments. The
37Recall that mathematically, complementarity relates to a positive cross-derivative: The ¯rst-order returns
for the increase in one element are still more enhanced if the second element is also increased. Consistency is the
characteristic that any pairwise combination between any two elements has a nonnegative cross-derivative - also
referred to as a supermodular relationship - between them. Confer Topkis (1998) for a mathematical approach.CHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 28
users of the infrastructure are willing to undertake the necessary co-specialized investments.
The standardization process is organized by the regulator, which uses its powerful position to
enforce and set the standard means of communication. The sum of total investments is low,
since no company can compete with such a vertically integrated, publicly owned organization
that uses the underlying economies of scale and scope.
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of possible industry outcomes of a regulated monopoly
as well as the position of the power center between the constituencies.
Figure 2.1: TCS-System 1: Regulated Consolidation
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency in these settings is relatively high due to the strong
exploitation of network, scale, and scope economies. The signi¯cant market power of the
providers has its counterweight in the public ownership structure, so that the ine±ciencies of
a monopoly do not prevail. However, the incentive structure within a big public agency brings
also some costs in terms of lost e±ciency. It depends on the actual processes and organizational
structures of this body whether the combined e®ect is still positive.
Dynamic e±ciency is rather low due to the lack of competition. The pressure for product
or service innovations will remain limited to the detriment of the users. The overall investment
activity is too low, and potential competitors are deterred from entering the industry.
The analysis of systemic e±ciency in these settings has a two-sided result. Consolidation
enables the centralization of risk management at the infrastructure providers - which can be
more e±cient than a decentralized risk management solution. However, as mentioned above,
moral hazard aspects such as the reduction of risk management e®orts due to a too-big-to-fail
feeling may endanger systemic e±ciency in these settings.
The regulators are the center of power in the system of a regulated monopoly. Ideally, this
should reduce potential moral hazard issues in risk management and ensure fair transaction
prices for the users, i.e. the users should bene¯t from exploited scale economies. However,
regulation itself is costly, so that increasing systemic e±ciency will lead to a loss in static and
dynamic e±ciency. This organizational design is most notably interesting when static e±ciency
aspects outweigh dynamic considerations. This may be the case when disruptive innovations
are expected to be rather rare in the future and the processes in the industry are settled and
stable.
2.5.2 System 2 - Competitive fragmentation
Description In contrast to system 1 the market structure of system 2 is rather scattered,
i.e. it features polypolistic characteristics including several providers for trading, clearing, and
settlement. A high level of competition on all stages of the securities transaction value chain
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the use of open standards, since otherwise the users would have to undertake co-specialized
investments to several providers. Open standards and good access possibilities allow new com-
petitors to enter the market easily whenever they see ¯t. This is consistent with the high rate
of innovation that is increased by such new entrants. The tendency to invest is high, since it
can be the basis for Schumpeterian rents. The resulting overall investment level is, therefore,
possibly too high when too many uncoordinated investments are undertaken. Overinvestment
and a resulting bubble can lead to cycles of investments that exacerbate the economic cycle
and the ups and downs of ¯nancial markets.
The ownership of these ¯rms rests in private hands, since that is the most e±cient incentive
tool to sustain the needed rate of technological progress to keep this system stable. The role of
the regulators is very subdued: Any exaggerated activity by them would lead to a lowering of
investment incentives for the private companies that then would have to fear a meddling of the
regulators. The only activity they should engage in is to ensure open access. Self-regulation by
the competing providers is a means for them to di®erentiate themselves from competitors and
attract more users and a better competitive advantage. The epicenter of power lies with the
privately-owned providers or with the users depending on the providers' ownership structure.
The tendency for vertically integrating the securities transaction value chain is low: Cross-
subsidies from one stage to the next are not possible due to the ¯erce competition on each
stage, and the reluctance for change in such a vertically integrated institution that is faced with
cannibalizing its own success whenever new processes or products occur, makes it a suboptimal
solution.
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of the industry setting as well as the position of the power
center.
Figure 2.2: TCS-System 2: Competitive Fragmentation
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency is low in this setting. The relatively small size of the
providers does not allow for the harvest of scale and scope economies. Also, positive network
e®ects for the users remain unexploited due to the large number of smaller networks in this
fragmented industry setup. Consolidation e®orts exist, but a constant stream of new industry
entrants armed with new, innovative products and services prevent the creation of one dominant
monopoly. A system with several relatively small market participants prevails.
Dynamic e±ciency, on the other hand, is high due to ¯erce competition and low entry bar-
riers of the market. Open communication standards ensure that providers with better services
will be able to o®er their service to users without being strongly hampered by established
providers. Users such as banks can e®ectively threaten providers to internalize transactions,
should they not be satis¯ed with existing products and services. An exact con¯guration of
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the one hand, an industry setting with open standards may not provide enough incentives for
the providers to develop the standardized technology further due to free-riding inducements.
On the other hand, uncoordinated investments can lead to value destruction when too much is
invested in boom times of a cycle. The system has therefore to strike a delicate balance between
this under- and overinvestment problem.
Systemic e±ciency is rather high. Although this setting has no (public) regulator but is
mainly self-regulated, the robustness in the provision of securities transaction possibilities is,
nevertheless, quite high. The driving factor is the competition among providers, in this case, the
competition for the most stable and secure transaction system. Thus, infrastructure providers
have an incentive to compete on quality and create a safe TCS-environment for their clients.
However, an important precondition for this scenario is the transparency of the providers' risk
management e®orts to the users. If it is di±cult for the latter to evaluate the quality of risk
management, the providers may have the adverse incentive to boost pro¯tability by cutting
down on costly risk management procedures and endanger systemic e±ciency. This race-to-
the-bottom e®ect may be prevented by a user-dominated governance structure.
Another positive aspect of the competitive fragmentation on systemic e±ciency is that the
fragmented market structure which is characterized by high levels of infrastructure redundancies
and open standards enables a relatively easy re-routing of transactions in emergency cases. Am-
ple substitution possibilities for the users and low switching costs due to open communication
standards ensure systemic robustness in times of the failure of one institution. However, de-
pending on the nature of an adverse systemic event, contagion between the di®erent transaction
systems may occur and thus neutralize the positive redundancy aspects.
A system of competitive fragmentation is particularly interesting in a dynamically chang-
ing environment when returns on innovations are high and static e±ciency considerations are
dominated by dynamic e±ciency aspects.
2.5.3 System 3 - Contestable monopolies
Description There are two crucial characteristics to the third system we propose: (1) The
market for infrastructure providers is more or less consolidated and (2) communication between
the industry participants - both horizontally and vertically - is performed via open standards.
New entrants into the market are able to communicate with the others and are granted access
to established providers. The e±cient size with respect to scale and scope economies limits the
number of direct competitors on each horizontal stage, and natural monopolies prevail. The
users bene¯t from the merits of a large single network. Vertical integration is rather detrimental
in such a system, since the monopoly positions on di®erent stages could be used strategically
by the providers to reinforce rent extraction possibilities in other activities to the disadvantage
of the users. Two possibilities exist by which such behavior can be ruled out: For one, a public
regulator can ensure open access and limit any vertical integration attempts. For the other, the
users themselves can mutually own the necessary infrastructure and restrict such behavior by
the management of the provider in question. Depending on which concept is used to restrict
the infrastructure provider from capturing too large a share of the economic rents, the epicenter
of power is somewhere between the regulators and the users.
Open standards and guaranteed access allow new entrants to enter the market and further
limit the rent appropriation potential of the incumbent. With better products or processes they
are in a good position to challenge the incumbent and to gain the upper hand eventually. The
rate of technological progress and innovation is therefore higher than in system 1 of a regulated
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has to keep up with the innovative progress or risks to become obsolete and to lose his position
to an upstart. Again, self-regulation can be a means of competition with the better quality
and stability gaining an advantage. This allows to reduce the public regulation and the costs
associated with it.
Figure 2.3 shows idealized industry structures in analogy to system 1. The boxes with
dashed lines illustrate potential new entrants into the industry.
Figure 2.3: TCS-System 3: Contestable Monopolies
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency in a system of contestable monopolies is enhanced in
this setting due to the high level of consolidation in the three stages of the value chain. The
existence of a quasi-monopolistic infrastructure enables full exploitation of existing economies
of scale and scope and network e®ects. Static e±ciency gains are passed on to the users in
this system, as each level on the value chain is contestable to market entries due to open
communication standards. Furthermore, the costs of regulation can be kept to a minimum and
is not distorting investment incentives for the providers.
Dynamic e±ciency is also high and is achieved by the open standards architecture which
results in contestability in each activity and low barriers to entry. This prevents the existing
monopolist from appropriating a too large portion of the monopoly rent as potential entrants
with better service o®erings pose an e®ective threat. Nevertheless, some barriers to entry, such
as liquidity, still exist in a certain security on the trading level and allow a monopolist to reap
rents from his dominant market position. These rents further ensure that the incumbent has
a strong incentive to maintain this position and to react to the incentives provided thereby.
As mentioned in section 2.4.2, there are also some drawbacks to open communication stan-
dards with regard to dynamic e±ciency aspects such as potential free-riding behavior in the
development of innovations.
Systemic e±ciency is high in this system. The setting bene¯ts from its two main charac-
teristics of being rather consolidated and having open communication standards. The former
aspect enables the industry to centralize its risk management at one institution, while the lat-
ter ensures competition for the most stable transaction system, so that the quasi-monopolist
is forced to maintain a high quality of risk management in order not to lose users to other
providers. Additionally, open communication standards enable a wider proliferation of knowl-
edge on the transmission of transaction data. As communication technology becomes common
knowledge, it is likely that market participants react faster and better to systemic emergency
events. However, contestability of the market may also bring along adverse aspects such as the
aforementioned race-to-the-bottom incentives for the provider. An e®ective no-bail-out com-
mitment by governments or central banks may prevent the monopolist from assuming himself
to be too-big-to-fail.CHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 32
2.6 Comparative organizational analysis
The three systems described above are all consistent systems that maximize social welfare
in the sense that an incremental deviation from the con¯guration of its elements would not
lead to further improvements. As such they are better than the current, ine±cient industry
structure employed in the European securities transaction industry which both fails to capture
the static e±ciency bene¯ts from a full-blown consolidation and the dynamic e±ciency gains
from competitive fragmentation. In this section we compare the three systems derived from
our framework and evaluate their relative merits and drawbacks to come to a conclusion which
system policy makers in the EU should strive to implement. In particular we pose the following
questions:
² How robust are these three systems when small deviations from the optimal con¯gura-
tion occur, and how likely is a system to deteriorate into an inconsistent system that is
ine±cient given the micro-motives of the di®erent constituencies?
² Which one of these three systems dominates the other two systems if social welfare is to
be maximized, i.e. which system is the global optimum?
Stability of the systems and the threat of ine±cient systems The ¯rst system of a
regulated monopoly is very stable and not in danger of falling apart easily once its elements
are con¯gured in a consistent way. By its ownership of the infrastructure providers or by the
power it devolved to its regulators, the government commits credibly to stay in this system.
New entrants cannot upset this system, and the incumbent monopolist has only weak incentives
to engage in innovative activities. The stability itself puts a positive feedback into the system,
since long-range planning and routinization become possible that lower the cost imposed by
regulation.
The system is little prone to deteriorate into an ine±cient system: In many European
countries dominant regulated monopolies along the securities transaction value chain ensured
that the underlying economies of scale and scope could be reaped at the domestic level without
incurring a too big social welfare loss due to e±cient regulation. By striking the right balance
between these costs, securities trading, clearing, and settlement in national markets is highly
e±cient, at least from a static and systemic point of view. The past has shown that such a
system needs a very big shock - like the integration of formerly separate ¯nancial markets into
the single European one - to overcome its inertia.
The second system of competitive fragmentation is not very stable and small deviations
from the consistent con¯guration can lead to a deterioration into an ine±cient setting. If,
for example, too many uncoordinated investments are undertaken, the problem of overinvesting
arises. If a bubble builds and subsequently bursts due to any su±cient macroeconomic shock, it
can force these investors to sell many assets below their value. Many providers become insolvent
and are forced to leave the industry. A consolidation process is started by the institutions that
are in a better position.
These ¯rms start to consolidate horizontally to achieve greater economies of scale and in-
crease the degree of static e±ciency. They also integrate vertically to safeguard this horizontal
expansion and to leverage the resulting market power. Since all institutions concentrate on
getting ¯nancially sound again, the rate of technological innovation drops, new entry looks less
attractive, and the whole system can transire to one of the other systems or falls into ine±ciency
if no regulation is introduced to keep the market contestable or if the ownership is reorganized
to a more mutual structure (which is the less likely possibility). The surviving institutions canCHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 33
extract too much of the economic rent, and their monopoly power is not compensated by a
regulator.
The third system of contestable monopolies is equally hard to sustain. A monopolist on
one stage of the securities transaction value chain might be tempted to integrate forwards or
backwards. Such a merger of two dominant monopolies might look good at ¯rst sight: By
integrating the two institutions, the communication between them can be streamlined, and
straight-through processing might be facilitated to the bene¯t of the users. Open access is
guaranteed by the acquiring institution and formally assured by the small regulator. However,
the realization in practice might look di®erent and many potential entrants are deterred by the
more entrenched position of the merged institution. This protection induces the incumbent to
divert its e®orts towards rent-seeking and engage in investments in the 'open' communication
standard that slightly favors its own business. If regulation is not adjusted accordingly towards
a stronger regime, such an institution can lower the overall amount of economic rent that is
generated, thereby decreasing social welfare. At the same time it can gain an economic rent
for itself that is bigger than it would be in a consistently con¯gured system at the expense of
a relatively larger loss in the economic rents that the users can enjoy.
Like the system of competitive fragmentation, the system of contestable monopolies is prone
to deteriorate when even small deviations from the consistent con¯guration occur. The micro-
motives of the infrastructure providers will generally lead to a situation in which a monopoly
prevails that is entrenched through vertical integration, a proprietary communication standard,
and an ownership structure that places too little weight on the bene¯t of the users and society
as a whole. Such a mixture of di®erent con¯gurations will not maximize overall welfare.
Evaluation of the systems and global optimum So far we have not discussed if one of the
idealized systems is better than the others. Calculating an exact ¯gure for social welfare in each
of the three systems is nearly impossible: Too many parameters would need to be measured,
and too many errors would be made in measuring the e±ciency of the organizational design.
We therefore restrict ourselves to indications only. Which of the three systems might be the
global optimum that dominates the others? The system of a regulated monopoly produces at
an e±cient level, so that economies of scale and scope can be reaped. However, it fares poorly
when dynamic aspects of e±ciency are taken into account. No investment incentives are set,
and the cost of regulation or public ownership further decreases the overall welfare generated
by this system.
The system of competitive fragmentation scores especially high when aspects of dynamic
e±ciency are important. However, due to the small scale of the providers, too little of the un-
derlying economies are utilized. The system su®ers also from the coordination problem between
the di®erent ¯rms, so that too many duplicate and incompatible investments are undertaken.
The system of contestable monopolies does not have these drawbacks once con¯gured in a con-
sistent way: The small number of institutions deploys the underlying economies of scale and
scope, and the limited role of the regulator ensures that these costs are kept to a minimum as
well. The market stays open for new entrants, so that improvements due to innovations do not
need to be forgone.
This guesstimate leads to the conclusion that the third system of contestable monopolies
is the best and should be implemented in the TCS-industry in the European Union. A caveat
must be applied, since this system is of rather instable nature and prone to slide down towards
an ine±cient system of unregulated monopoly if not adjusted in a consistent way. Table 2.1
summarizes the merits and drawbacks of the three systems.CHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 34
Regulated Monopoly Competitive Fragmentation Contestable Monopolies
Actionset
Boundary
decision
strong horizontal consolida-
tion, vertical integration, STP-
possibility, no need for transfer
prices
low horizontal consolidation, VI
detrimental: cross-subsidies and
cannibalization e®ects
strong horizontal consolidation, VI
detrimental: incentive to appro-
priate open standard
Standard
and ac-
cessibility
proprietary standard, closed sys-
tem
open standard, open access open standard, regulated access
Ownership
and gov-
ernance
public ownership, not for pro¯t,
heavy public regulation
private ownership, for pro¯t, self-
regulation as parameter of compe-
tition
private ownership (possibly as mu-
tual), for pro¯t; 'regulation light'
or self-regulation
C
o
n
s
t
i
t
u
e
n
c
i
e
s Users low level of decision making power
(DMP), low investment propensity
low - medium level of DMP, (too)
high investment propensity
high level of DMP if mutual own-
ership, else lower; low - medium in-
vestment propensity
Providers very few players (possibly only
one), low { medium level of DMP,
low investment propensity
many players, high level of DMP,
(too) high investment propensity
very few players, Low { medium
level of DMP, low { medium in-
vestment propensity
Regulators high level of DMP very low level of DMP medium level of DMP if providers
are not mutually owned, else lower
C
o
m
p
a
r
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
Static ef-
¯ciency
high due to realized economies,
lessened by regulatory costs
Low due to unrealized economies high due to realized economies,
low regulatory costs
Dynamic
e±ciency
very low due to lack of compe-
tition, low technological progress,
high entry barriers
Very high due to competition, high
technological progress, low entry
barriers
high due to threat from potential
competitors, Medium technologi-
cal progress, Low { medium entry
barriers
Systemic
e±ciency
high due to centralized risk man-
agement, possible moral hazard
problems
High due to redundancies and
open standards, Lessened by low
coordination among players (over-
investment)
high due to centralized risk man-
agement; moral hazard issues un-
likely due to entry threat by po-
tential competitors
System
stability
rather robust against changes in
parameters
robust as long as high degree of in-
novation is existent, bubble-prone
rather fragile; precise con¯gura-
tion necessary; regulation must
ensure accessibility for potential
competitors
Table 2.1: Comparison of the three idealized TCS-systems
The transformation of the securities transaction industry The introduction of the
Single European Market was a strong catalyst that upset the system of a regulated monopoly
that many European countries had in place. Many features of the established system were
suddenly and simultaneously changed. By simply opening the markets and leaving everything
else unchanged, the result, however, is ine±cient. Too many inconsistent con¯gurations of
important elements are in place: Too many regulators increase the costs and thereby decrease
social welfare. Publicly owned or heavily regulated institutions do not have the incentives to
make the right decisions. And previously vertically integrated institutions can bar others from
using parts of their infrastructure. Divergent objectives of the many regulators or unhealthy
competition between them decreases e±ciency even further.
The response by many regulators was to withdraw a bit and let the market mechanism
work. The system in the securities industry in the European Union in the 1990s therefore had
some characteristics of the system of competitive fragmentation: The rate of innovations like
automated trading and the demutualization of exchanges increased dramatically, and many new
entrants tried to do business in the industry. The total amount of new investments was high
and duplication of investments occurred in the process of battling for the dominant position in
a segment of the market. The users were fully aware of the costs imposed by the incompatible
communication standards between the national institutions and tried to shape the industry to
their liking.
Now that the investment boom is over and the rate of technological progress has receded
a bit, the securities industry in the European Union is again at a crossroads. The rate of
consolidation - horizontally as well as vertically - remains high, and many unsuccessful ventures
are forced to close and leave the industry. New entrants who could keep up the pressure to
innovate cannot be seen. The surviving providers try to entrench their monopoly position by
vertical integration and proprietary communication standards.
It is an open question how and if their rent appropriation possibilities will be counteredCHAPTER 2. SETTLING FOR EFFICIENCY 35
either by tougher regulation that would put the European securities industry back to a system
of a regulated monopoly (although now at the European level) or whether the users of the
infrastructure can ensure together with a cut-down regulator that the system of contestable
monopolies can be reached, which is our policy advice. It is very crucial that a consistent con-
¯guration of key parameters is achieved to avoid a system with a quasi-unregulated monopoly
which might be preferred by infrastructure providers, but certainly not by the users and society
at large.Chapter 3
Demutualization, Outsider
Ownership, and Stock Exchange
Performance - Empirical
Evidence¤
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3.1 Introduction
Several stock exchanges have been overhauling their corporate governance structure as a re-
sult of a more demanding competitive environment. A combination of factors has led to in-
creased pressure on the exchanges' businesses. (1) The changing investment behavior of their
(end)customers, now being less home-biased, resulted in increased competition for order °ow
amongst exchanges. (2) The deregulation of ¯nancial markets, particularly in Europe, by ini-
tiatives such as the Single European Market, but also by the Big Bang reforms in UK, opened
the path for increased competitive pressure on the incumbent institutions. (3) Yet, the greatest
impact on stock exchange competition can be attributed to the developments in information
technology and the reduction in communication costs, which resulted in the emergence of new
ways to trade securities. Remote membership, electronic order book trading, electronic com-
munication networks, and the internalization of order °ow by intermediaries became all viable
threats to the traditional °oor trading.
The StockholmsbÄ orsen was the ¯rst stock exchange to react on this changing environment
by restructuring its corporate governance in the early 1990s. As most other exchanges, it
was organized as a mutual, which usually comprises a one-member, one-vote control structure
and a not-for-pro¯t orientation.1 In this restructuring process, which is commonly denoted as
demutualization, it changed its institutional setting towards a pro¯t-oriented one-share, one-
vote structure, as we ¯nd it in a regular capitalist ¯rm. Several other exchanges followed the
suit. They have done so in expectation of improved competitiveness. A survey of exchanges
conducted by BTA Consulting and presented by Scullion (2001) reveals the main motives of
and expected bene¯ts from demutualization. These are - among others - (1) to tap new sources
of capital which is possibly needed to modernize their trading systems (2) to pursue business
opportunities unconstrained by vested interest issues (3) to achieve better cost control and (4)
to increase °exibility, e±ciency and competitiveness.
Figure 3.1: Governance Type of Exchanges 1999-2003.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the growing prevalence of demutualized exchanges in the indus-
try. The chart displays this development for the 50 largest stock exchanges reporting to the
World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV) during the years 1999 until 2003. The number of ex-
1The mutual's objective function is usually to maximize its members' utility. See part III in Hansmann
(1996) for an elaborate analysis on customer-owned ¯rms.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 38
changes that were organized as mutuals (light grey bars) fell from 40 to 25. At the same time
period, the number of demutualized exchanges rose from 10 to 25. However, the demutual-
ization process was not implemented uniformly across all exchanges that decided to change
their organizational form.2 While all of them became pro¯t-oriented ¯rms with equity share-
holders as residual claimants, we empirically observe an important di®erence as to what type
these owners are: Some demutualized exchanges retained their old shareholders and remained
customer-dominated (indicated by the dark grey bars), whereas others sold a substantial por-
tion of their shares to investors via a public listing and thereby usually became dominated by
outsiders (black bars). The two groups of owners possess (stylized) di®erences in their objective
functions: While outside investors foremost have a ¯nancial interest in the exchange, i.e. in the
value of the franchise, customer-owners also take into account their business relationship with
the exchange and are therefore sensitive to any potential negative externalities created on their
own business due to investments undertaken by the exchange.
Some industry experts state that outsider ownership is therefore pivotal if the full expected
bene¯ts of demutualization are to be achieved. Scullion (2001), for example, argues in his
contribution that
Demutualisation is not simply [...] turning into a for pro¯t entity owned by mem-
bers. A truly demutualised exchange would be better placed if it were able to unlock
its hidden value for all stakeholders in order to maximise its potential market capi-
talisation and shareholder value.3
A report published by the OECD takes a similarly positive stance on the e®ect of outside owners
for demutualized exchanges. They note that
Being listed on a stock exchange is likely to improve the value of stock exchanges, as
exchanges are urged to create value for their own shareholders through improvement
of their structure to operate more e±ciently.4
The decision to demutualize and even to go public has far-reaching consequences for the
exchanges, however. Both ¯nancial and strategic aspects need to be considered. Take for ex-
ample the costs that are associated with an initial public o®ering (IPO). According to their
annual reports, Deutsche BÄ orse and Euronext paid 36.8 million and 46 million euros for their
respective °oatation in 2001. Although the proceeds received from an IPO naturally more than
recouped these costs, the IPO-costs amounted to 3.7% of the new proceeds in Deutsche BÄ orse's
case and even to 12.7% for Euronext. Besides these one-o® costs there are also additional
running costs such as stricter disclosure requirements. A strategic implication of going public
is that the creation of an acquisition currency in the form of tradable shares works in both
directions, i.e. it not only facilitates the acquisition of ¯rms, but it also opens the possibility to
be taken over involuntarily.5 We conclude that these costs must be outweighed by the bene¯ts
of restructuring the organizational form. Therefore, the positive e®ects of demutualization and
going public on an exchange's competitiveness and hence its operative performance, should be
somehow observable.
2Aggarwal (2002) describes various steps of the process that exchanges may take.
3Confer Scullion (2001, p. xxix).
4Confer OECD (2003, p.104).
5The London Stock Exchange is the prime example for this. In 2000, it had to fend o® a hostile bid by OM
Gruppen, whereas in 2005/2006, Nasdaq succeeded in purchasing more than 25% in the venue without prior
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Related literature In academia, outsider ownership at stock exchanges has been so far
predominantly analyzed from a social welfare perspective. The most prominent theoretical
contribution is by Hart and Moore (1996) who discuss under which circumstances of competi-
tion and broker composition the migration from a mutual towards an outsider-owned, for-pro¯t
exchange is socially bene¯cial. Hart and Moore's simple pricing model demonstrates that an
outsider-owned governance structure is socially preferable over a mutual structure when there
exists a relatively high level of competition or a relatively high degree of heterogeneity6 among
members. An empirical contribution is made by Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003)
who compare the market quality of the Bombay Stock Exchange, a mutual, with that of the
National Stock Exchange, a demutualized trading venue. Another strand of literature devotes
itself to regulatory issues that emerged, since some of the exchanges undergoing the demutual-
ization process traditionally regulate their trading markets themselves. This raised concerns by
industry participants whether the commercial interests of a for-pro¯t exchange would collide
with its monitoring e®ort to ensure fair conduct of trading. Authors such as Pirrong (2000a),
Karmel (2000) and Elliott (2002), to name a few, have made important contributions in this
¯eld.
Interestingly, the impact of demutualization and outside ownership on the exchange itself,
for example on its operative performance, has so far been scarcely subject to academic interest.
We are aware of one paper by Mendiola and O'Hara (2003) that is directly concerned with the
impact of demutualization on stock exchange performance. The paper analyzes the share price
performance of publicly listed exchanges after their IPO and compares it to other listed ¯rms
and IPOs of other ¯rms. While their results are interesting in their own right, in particular their
¯nding that there exists a positive link between the fraction of equity sold to outside investors
and stock exchange performance, it does not provide a performance comparison with exchanges
that are not listed due to the apparent lack of share price information for these exchanges.
Furthermore, this approach cannot provide any insights to the performance of an exchange
prior to its public listing. Therefore, the use of share prices as indicator of performance is
rather limited and consequently, a method that considers di®erences in governance regimes
must be able to work with data that is available irrespective of the organizational form.
A more promising approach can be found in two contributions by Schmiedel who analyzes
stock exchange performance by applying frontier e±ciency methods on this industry. Both pa-
pers calculate e±ciency scores for the considered exchanges without incorporating share price
information. Instead, information on accounting data, sta® size and transaction data is used.
Each paper makes use of a di®erent frontier analysis approach. While Schmiedel (2001) em-
ploys a parametric stochastic frontier model to evaluate the cost e±ciency of European stock
exchanges during 1985 and 1999, he applies a non-parametric method in the second paper
(Schmiedel (2002)) for the 1993-1999 period.7 In Schmiedel's ¯rst paper, which controls for
demutualized exchanges within the regression, he ¯nd that demutualization has a positive im-
pact on cost e±ciency.8 His second paper indicates that the mean of factor productivity gains,
i.e. the annual change in technical e±ciency, is higher for mutual exchanges.9
6Hart and Moore refer to heterogeneity in terms of the skewness in the members' size distribution
7Both methodologies are widely accepted and were already used for e±ciency measurement of ¯nancial
institutions by a myriad of other papers. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide an comprehensive survey on this
topic.
8Confer Schmiedel (2001, p.22)
9Confer table 7, the 'Malmquist index'-column for demutualized and cooperative exchanges on page 26.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 40
Contribution of this paper The primary focus of Schmiedel's papers is not to elaborate
on di®erences in exchange governance, but to apply the methodology on the stock exchange
sector in general. Our paper is di®erent insofar as it conducts an e±ciency analysis that
devotes particular attention to organizational forms and analyzes the causes for di®erences in
greater detail. Additionally, our sample is more recent (1999-2003) and consequently includes a
larger number of demutualized exchanges. As in Schmiedel (2002), we will also employ a non-
parametric approach to calculate relative e±ciency scores, albeit using a broader set of output
variables in order to better capture the various activities that stock exchanges are engaged in.
Furthermore, in contrast to his proceeding, we will go a step further by regressing the derived
estimations of e±ciency and productivity on a set of factors mapping the framework in which
the respective exchanges are embedded. This procedure will then highlight whether there is a
signi¯cant impact of di®erent governance structures on the performance of the stock exchanges.
Hypotheses The purpose of this paper is therefore to determine whether demutualized stock
exchanges possess a stronger operative performance than mutual exchanges. Furthermore, we
want to analyze whether outsider-owned exchanges perform indeed better in this respect than
demutualized, but customer-owned exchanges. As will be explained in detail in section 3.2, we
approximate the operative performance of exchanges by relative technical e±ciency and factor
productivity scores. Our research question hence generates the following two hypotheses:
H1: Demutualized stock exchanges possess a higher technical e±ciency and factor produc-
tivity than exchanges organized as mutuals.
H2: Publicly listed and thus outsider-owned stock exchanges possess a higher technical e±-
ciency and factor productivity than demutualized, but customer-owned exchanges.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the methodology used in our paper.
Section 3.3 presents the employed data and our results. An interpretation as well as the robust-
ness of our ¯ndings will also be discussed here. Section 3.4 concludes our paper by summing
up our ¯ndings and drawing some policy implications.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 41
3.2 Methodology
This section discusses the methodology used in the paper. For that matter we initially provide
a brief overview of Data Envelopment Analysis and Malmquist Productivity in section 3.2.1, as
these methods are employed to calculate the exchanges' e±ciency and factor productivity values.
Readers familiar with the methods may want to skip this section. Section 3.2.2 describes how
speci¯c e®ects such as di®erent governance regimes can be disentangled via regression analysis.
The structure of the employed regressions will be presented in section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis and Malmquist-Productivity
3.2.1.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). Using their linear programming
algorithm enables the calculation of relative technical e±ciency10 values for similar entities
which process multiple inputs of resources into multiple outputs of products or services. Our
focus will be on technical e±ciency instead of economic e±ciency as it liberates the analysis
from assuming a potentially ill-de¯ned economic objective function such as pro¯t motivation.
This is a more appropriate means to assess the relative performance between for-pro¯t and
not-for-pro¯t entities from the same industry.11 The e±ciency scores of each entity under eval-
uation, which we will later denote as EFF, are determined by calculating the deviation each
organization has from an e±cient frontier. The frontier itself is set up as a piece-wise linear
combination of best-practice observations spanning a convex production possibilities set. The
computed e±ciency value is thus a relative measure as it quanti¯es the performance of each
entity in comparison to a set of "best"-performing peers. DEA is a non-parametric approach
that has no predetermined functional relation between inputs and outputs, i.e. there are no a
priori weights attached to these factors. Instead, the weighting of the factors that are involved
in the production process is endogenously optimized for each decision making unit (DMU)12
individually. By doing so, the weighting factors of the inputs and outputs, i.e. the underlying
production technology, can vary substantially among the DMUs. This allows each DMU to
attain the highest possible e±ciency score subject to the constraint that the e±ciency values of
all remaining DMUs stay within the de¯ned boundaries of the e±ciency measure when using
the same weighting scheme.13 The resulting °exibility in the production function is an advan-
tage whenever the true functional relationship between inputs and outputs is unknown. This
is clearly the case in the stock exchange industry so that it seems sensible to allow for di®er-
ent types of production functions. Considerable uncertainty also remains on the technological
characteristics of this industry. As a consequence, we will calculate e±ciency and factor pro-
ductivity scores for both a constant returns-to-scale (CRS) as well as a variable returns-to-scale
(VRS) environment.14
10The terms technical and economic e±ciency were coined by Farrell (1957). In his de¯nition, technical
e±ciency is achieved when an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an
increase in at least one other input and if a reduction in at least one input requires an increase in at least
one other input or a reduction in at least one output. Economic e±ciency, on the other hand, incorporates
information on prices for the respective inputs and outputs and an economic objective to be pursued such as
cost minimization or revenue maximization. It is achieved by implementing the cost minimizing or revenue
maximizing production plan. Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 9-18)
11Confer for example Pestieau and Tulkens (1993, p.300-301).
12The term "DMU" was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1981) and has been widely adopted by
other authors.
13This procedure ensures that a DMU's activity can be justi¯ed from an economic point of view as it assumes
that the respective decision makers act according to certain factor prices and thus give appropriate weights to
the employed inputs and produced outputs in line with the notion of striving for maximum e±ciency.
14We discuss this issue in further detail in the paragraph "Assumptions on technology".CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 42
The DEA-model Consider DMU1 from a sample of n decision making units. Assume that
this DMU uses one type of input and generates one type of output. Then, taking the output-to-
input-ratio will not be very informative - save for the fact that a higher ratio generally indicates
higher e±ciency - unless DMU1's ratio is compared to e±ciency values of the other n¡1 DMUs.
Calculating the ratios for all n DMUs and normalizing them15 yields relative e±ciency values
that can be interpreted in a meaningful way.
The multiplier and envelopment program The basic DEA input-oriented model16
introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) is based on the same simple intuition,
but generalizes the ratio for the multiple input and multiple output case.17 They calculate an
e±ciency ratio by assigning an e±ciency-optimized weighting scheme to the respective outputs
and inputs so that one aggregated 'virtual' output value is divided by one aggregated 'virtual'
input value. To be more precise, assume that DMU1 has an (m £ 1) input vector X1 = fxl1g
with l = 1;:::;m and an (s £ 1) output vector Y1 = fyr1g with r = 1;:::;s.18 Further assume
that there exists a weighting vector º for the inputs and a second weighting vector ¹ for the
outputs with corresponding dimensions. Then, the non-linear program
max
º;¹
¹0Y1
º0X1
(3.1)
s:t:
¹0Yi
º0Xi
· 1 8i = 1;:::;n
¹;º ¸ 0
states that the e±ciency of DMU1, i.e. the output-input-ratio weighted by the transposed
multipliers ¹0 and º0, is maximized by optimizing the weighting factors subject to the n con-
straints requiring that none of the DMU's e±ciency value exceeds the value of one when the
same weighting scheme is used.19 However, the non-linear program has an in¯nite number of
solutions. By adding the constraint º0X1 = 1 to the program, the denominator of the e±ciency
ratio can be normalized to one so that the program's objective function becomes linear. The
linearization of the constraints is accomplished by multiplying º0Xi to constraint i 8i = 1;:::;n.
The resulting linear 'multiplier' program then has the following form:
max
º;¹
¹0Y1 (3.2)
s:t: º0X1 = 1
¹0Yi · º0Xi 8i = 1;:::;n
¹;º ¸ 0
15This is accomplished by setting a maximum achievable value of one. Hence, perfect e±ciency is achieved at
a ratio of one, while a value of zero indicates absolute ine±ciency.
16Input-oriented models calculate the DMU's e±ciency in terms of the employed quantity of inputs in order
to produce a given level of output. Output-oriented models on the other hand determine the e±ciency by
focusing on the level of produced outputs holding the level of inputs constant. Thus, the choice of the model
depends on whether the emphasis is on input reduction or output augmentation. It is reasonable to use an
input-oriented model when analyzing the stock exchange industry as the inputs can be in°uenced more directly
by the management than the "outputs" which are predominantly in°uenced by market demand.
17Several re¯nements of DEA have emerged in the literature. An overview provides chapter 3 of Charnes,
Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1997).
18The observations are all non-negative, i.e. xl1;yr1 ¸ 0 8l;r.
19The fourth line in equation (3.1) requires the multipliers to be non-negative. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the technology under consideration is convex and has the property of disposability in its strong version.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 43
This program is solved n times, i.e. for each DMU individually. When using matrix notation
and employing an (s £ n) matrix of outputs denoted as Y, and an (m £ n) matrix of inputs
denoted as X the program in (3.2) can be written as:
max
º;¹ ¹0Y1 (3.3)
s:t: º0X1 = 1
Y0¹ · X0º
¹;º ¸ 0
The program now yields a unique solution for º¤ and ¹¤.20
The dual program The dual of equation (3.3), termed as the "envelopment-problem",
is usually preferred to the multiplier problem due to lesser calculation e®ort.21 It also provides
a di®erent point of view to the problem. In particular, the envelopment problem
min
µ;¸
µ (3.4)
s:t: µX1 ¸ X¸
Y1 · Y¸
¸ ¸ 0
solves for the highest possible radial contraction, i.e. the minimum value of µ, with which the
analyzed input vector (X1) uses at least as many inputs as a linear combination of observations
from the reference or best practice set (X¸), while producing (Y1) at most as many outputs as
the linear combination of best performing peers (Y¸).
Assumptions on technology The presented linear program has a relatively strong as-
sumption about the underlying technology. It restricts the input-output-process to a constant
returns-to-scale (CRS) environment. A slightly re¯ned version introduced by Banker, Charnes,
and Cooper (1984) weakens this assumption and calculates e±ciency scores in a variable returns-
to-scale (VRS) surrounding, i.e. it allows for varying returns-to-scale characteristics for di®erent
levels of input-output combinations. This is accomplished by adding a further constraint to
problem (3.4), namely 1¸ = 1, so that the reference point of the analyzed DMU is now required
to be a convex linear combination of e±cient DMUs.
3.2.1.2 The Malmquist-productivity index
The Malmquist productivity was introduced by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). While
DEA measures the relative e±ciency of a DMU for a certain year, the Malmquist-productivity
index compares year-on-year changes in technical e±ciency. The method gained additional
appeal when FÄ are et al. re¯ned it by decomposing the productivity change into two separate
e®ects, namely the change in e±ciency and technological progress. In the following, we sketch
20Linear programs are solved by the Simplex-Algorithm.
21As the number of DMUs (= n) is usually larger than the sum of the inputs and outputs (m+s) used in the
program, the dual needs to calculate n ¡ (m + s) fewer constraint.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 44
the fundamental issues of this method.22
Consider the left panel of ¯gure 3.2 (CRS) where a DMU's one-input (x), one-output (y)
constant returns-to-scale production process is depicted for two subsequent periods t and t+1
with respective e±cient production frontiers Tt and Tt+1. Irrespective of the observed input-
output-combinations (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) the slopes of the two best practice frontiers indi-
cate whether technological progress, which we denote as ¢TECH, has occurred from period t
to t+1. As the slope of Tt+1 is steeper than that of Tt, technology must have progressed, for it
is possible in t+1 to produce the same amount of output with fewer inputs. This can be readily
seen when focusing on points b and c in the ¯gure which determine the inputs that are required
to produce the same output level yt in the respective periods. Thus, using technology Tt+1 en-
ables the same output to be converted by (0b¡0c) fewer inputs. To see the change in e±ciency,
which we denote as ¢EFF, one needs to take a closer look at the actual input-output combi-
nations, i.e. (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) of the decision making unit. Apparently, neither of the two
is produced in an e±cient manner. Note, that the points b and f represent the minimum input
levels for the given output levels yt and yt+1. As the deviation from the frontier has increased
in period t+1 compared to period t, there was a decline in e±ciency for this DMU. In total, the
two factors that comprise the productivity change of the DMU,i.e. MQ = ¢EFF £ ¢TECH,
are running in opposite directions in our illustration. The right panel (VRS) depicts the case
for variable returns-to-scale and can be analyzed analogously. Here, Tt ½ Tt+1 which again
implies that technological progress must have occurred.
Figure 3.2: Input-oriented Malmquist approach for CRS and VRS
In order to determine the aggregate change in factor productivity, FÄ are et al. de¯ne input
distance functions - that are the reciprocals of Farrell's technical e±ciency measure - with
respect to the two adjacent time periods in such a manner that they measure the maximum
proportional change in inputs required to make (xt+1;yt+1) feasible in relation to technology
Tt and make (xt;yt) feasible in relation to Tt+1.23 They de¯ne the productivity index as the
geometric mean of two mixed period distance functions24:
22Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.68-75) and Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.50-53)
for a more detailed discussion.
23The methodology of FÄ are et al. for the output-oriented index is adapted here for the input-oriented approach.
Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.69-70)
24The measurement of productivity in the VRS-case has to be treated with caution, since the results could be
°awed as was noted by Grifell-Tatj¶ e and Lovell (1995). Additionally, FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994,CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 45
MQ(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
(3.5)
where the ¯rst factor uses time period t and the second factor time period t+1 as the respective
reference technology. Equation (3.5) can be transformed into the following equation which
uncovers the two decomposed e®ects stated earlier.
MQ(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
¢
Dt(xt;yt)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
MQ = ¢EFF ¢ ¢TECH
The factor outside the square root indicates the change in e±ciency as it is equivalent to the
ratio of Farrell's technical e±ciency for periods t and t + 1. The factor under the square root
displays the geometric mean of shifts in technology at output levels yt and yt+1, respectively.
The calculation of the distance functions can again be illustrated by ¯gure 3.2:
MQ(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
0d=0f
0a=0b
s
0d=0e
0d=0f
¢
0a=0b
0a=0c
(3.6)
Note that for both factors, a value of one indicates no change whereas a value above (below) one
signi¯es a positive (negative) change in technology and e±ciency. Note further that exchanges
that possess a low DEA-e±ciency value will possess a larger potential to improve their factor
productivity than exchanges that are already highly e±cient. In the extreme, an exchange that
is fully e±cient in two adjacent periods cannot improve its technical e±ciency at all. Therefore,
we need to treat comparisons between productivity gains of highly e±cient and less e±cient
exchanges with caution.25
For the m-input/s-output case, the following four DEA-like linear programs need to be
solved for all i = 1;:::;n DMUs in order to calculate the respective productivity scores26,
keeping in mind that the required input distance functions are the reciprocal of Farrell's input-
oriented technical e±ciency measure. Thus,
[Dt(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (3.7)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y t
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
gives the distance function Dt
1(xt
1;yt
1) of DMU 1. Similarly, D
t+1
1 (x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) is calculated by
substituting the indices t by t + 1 in equation (3.7). The remaining two linear problems are
mixed period calculations meaning that the reference technology is constructed from data of
period t (and t + 1, respectively), whereas the input-output-combinations to be evaluated are
from period t + 1 (and t, respectively). Hence, they provide solutions for Dt
1(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) and
p.73 FN 15) note that solutions from the mixed-period distance functions might not be feasible.
25In our second stage regressions we will control for this e®ect by employing the exchanges' e±ciency values
as additional independent control variable.
26Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 180-186).CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 46
D
t+1
1 (xt
1;yt
1):
[Dt(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 )]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (3.8)
s:t: µX
t+1
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y
t+1
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
and
[Dt+1(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (3.9)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t+1¸
Y t
1 · Y
t+1¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
3.2.2 Two-stage approach for assessing e±ciency di®erences
Section 3.2.1 presented our approach to calculate the DEA-e±ciency and Malmquist produc-
tivity values. We have so far employed input and output variables which we assume are directly
related to the operations of an exchange and are thus under the direct control of the responsible
management. Additional factors, which cannot be controlled directly by the management, such
as di®erent organizational forms, have so far been not incorporated in our analysis. There are
two di®erent approaches in the literature that provide a linkage between the "controllable"
operational and "non-controllable" framework factors.
On the one hand, there are re¯nements to DEA that allow for the direct inclusion of frame-
work factors. These so-called one-stage approaches either calculate DEA-values for each group
of DMUs separately and that are in turn projected on the respective e±cient frontier27 or
they calculate the e±ciency values for di®erent benchmark frontiers depending in which non-
controllable factor environment the respective DMUs are.28 However, there are shortcomings
to this approach. The major drawback is that DEA calculates the e±ciency values for each
subsample of DMUs separately. As a result, the proportion of DMUs that lie on the e±cient
frontier increases which in consequence dilutes the explanatory power of the method.29
The method used here follows a two-stage process. Stage one encompasses the calculation of
e±ciency and productivity values as outlined in section 3.2.1 and is based solely on operational
inputs and outputs. In the second stage, the resulting values for e±ciency and productivity are
used as statistical estimators in a regression analysis. These estimators are regressed on frame-
work factors, such as di®erent governance regimes, that may also have in°uence on exchange
e±ciency and productivity. The procedure therefore enables us to disentangle the individ-
ual e®ects of these variables and provides a solid basis to judge whether there are signi¯cant
di®erences in e±ciency and productivity along the varying governance types.
27Confer Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1981) who provide an example for the use of DEA with non-
discretionary variables to di®erentiate between not-for pro¯t and for-pro¯t ¯rms.
28See Banker and Morey (1986).
29Confer Steinmann (2002, p.34-35). Steinmann also provides further disadvantages of one-stage approaches.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 47
3.2.3 Regression analysis
Using e±ciency scores as dependent variable Using the DEA-scores as estimators of
e±ciency in a regression analysis entails the problem that they are truncated from above at a
maximum value of one. Hence, instead of a regular OLS regression, which would produce biased
results, we follow Dusansky and Wilson (1994) and McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) who apply
Tobit regressions in order to deal with truncated observations. Taking our panel data structure
into account, we use the following general Tobit model:
EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t if EFF ¤
i;t < 1 (3.10)
EFFi;t = 1 if EFF ¤
i;t ¸ 1
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t
Here, EFFi;t is the e±ciency value of exchange i in period t derived from the DEA-
calculation, EFF¤
i;t is the true but unobservable e±ciency of exchange i in period t, Xi;t =
[1 x0] is an ((1 £ (K + 1)) vector of K framework variables plus one and ¯ is a ((L + 1) £ 1)
vector of parameters. The error term is decomposed into an time-invariant individual e®ect of
the exchange denoted as ®i and an independent e®ect ´i;t which is assumed to be uncorrelated
with Xi;t. Thus, we will employ a random e®ects model. The K = 10 framework variables
used in this regression will be introduced and discussed in section 3.3.2. In total, we regress for
i = f1;:::;n = 28g £ t = f1:::T = 5g = 140 observations.
Using productivity values as dependent variable In a similar manner, we will regress
the results from the productivity analysis on the same framework variables. The variables
employed will then explain the impact on overall Malmquist productivity (MQ) as well as
on the two decomposed e®ects, namely on the change in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and on
technological progress (¢TECH). Since there is no truncation in the productivity variables,
we will employ standard panel regression equations. Thus, we obtain three regression models:
MQi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (3.11)
¢EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (3.12)
¢TECHi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (3.13)
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t respectively
Here, MQi;t, ¢EFFi;t and ¢TECHi;t represent the values of Malmquist factor productiv-
ity, change in technical e±ciency and technological progress of exchange i from period t ¡ 1
to period t, respectively. Again, Xi;t = [1 x0] is a ((1 £ (K + 1)) vector of K framework
variables plus one and ¯ is an ((L + 1) £ 1) vector of parameters. In these regressions we will
use a ¯xed e®ects model, since the Hausman tests mostly reject the hypothesis that there is no
systematic di®erence between the ¯xed and the random e®ects estimation - as we will see in
section 3.3.3.2.30 We will make use of the same K = 10 framework variables as in regression
30The Hausman speci¯cation test veri¯es whether the coe±cients of a regression model with random e®ects
are unbiased compared to the coe±cients of a ¯xed e®ects model. The underlying assumption is that ¯xed
e®ects models always produce consistent but potentially ine±cient estimators, whereas a random e®ects model
is always e±cient but can be inconsistent. Confer for example Johnston and DiNardo (1997, p.403-404) for
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(3.10). Additionally, we will employ the calculated EFF-value of period t¡1 of each exchange
as a further independent variable in order to control for the fact that less e±cient exchanges
can potentially improve their productivity by a larger extent than highly e±cient exchanges.31
Since the dependent variables are calculated by comparing two adjacent periods, i.e. MQt con-
sumes data from periods t and t-1, we "lose" one period and have therefore four observations
per DMU. Thus, we regress for i = f1;:::;n = 28g£t = f1:::(T ¡1) = 4g = 112 observations.32
3.3 Data and empirical results
3.3.1 The sample
The study employs a balanced panel data set that includes 28 stock exchanges for a ¯ve year
time period (1999-2003) as can be seen in table 3.1. The sample encompasses ¯ve exchanges
from the Americas, fourteen from Europe/Africa and nine from the Asia/Paci¯c region. All
relevant accounting and transaction data have been converted into US-dollars and adjusted for
in°ation.33 Although the sample lacks completeness of the whole exchange population, it does
comprise on average 85% of the total equity trading volume on stock exchanges reported to
the World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV) by roughly 75 exchanges.34 The sample includes
17 demutualized exchanges of which nine entities have also gone public, whereas eleven ex-
changes remain governed by a mutual structure or are partially state-controlled.35 Taking the
FIBV's ¯fty largest stock exchanges worldwide as the benchmark, our study includes all ex-
changes that were publicly listed until 2003. However, the portion of mutuals and demutualized
exchanges lies at a mere 50%, respectively. This is due to the lack of comprehensive disclo-
sure requirements for demutualized and mutual exchanges in some countries, which makes the
gathering of information on their ¯nancial statements impossible. Hence, these two groups are
underrepresented.
3.3.2 Variables
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the two di®erent sets of variables employed in the analysis.
They will be discussed in detail in sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2. Accompanying descriptive
statistics on the variables are given in Appendix A.1.
3.3.2.1 Operational variables
In the ¯rst stage, the DEA and Malmquist-index calculations will be based on variables that are
directly related to the operations of an exchange and can be in°uenced by the management. An
appropriate choice of variables that represent the "production process" of an exchange is not a
clear-cut task. When considering input variables, it seems plausible to cover both capital and
31Confer our explanation in section 3.2.1, formula (3.6) and footnote 25.
32In order to employ White-corrected estimators to control for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity we use EViews
5 as statistical package. For the Tobit-regressions we will utilize Stata 8 as EViews does not provide a panel
data version for censored data.
33The accounting data was acquired from the annual reports of the exchanges, whereas transaction and other
descriptive data was obtained from the databases of the World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV), the Federation
of European Stock Exchanges (FESE), the HP Handbook of World Stock, Derivatives & Commodity Exchanges
2001, 2002 and 2003, direct correspondence with the exchanges, company web sites and general internet research.
34Trading volume data from (alternative) electronic trading platforms and from banks that internalize cus-
tomer orders are not taken into account. We acknowledge that these forms of equity trading gained considerable
importance in recent years. Nevertheless, it is not possible to include these ¯gures in a comprehensive and
coherent fashion.
35For convenience reasons, the paper will denote the last type of governance structure merely as 'mutual'.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 49
No. Exchange Region Governance Avg. World
Mutual/State Demutualized Listed Market Share
1 BOVESPA Americas
p
- - 0.2%
2 Lima Americas
p
- - 0.0%
3 NASDAQ Americas - 2001 - 25.7%
4 NYSE Americas
p
- - 25.1%
5 Toronto TSX Americas - 2000 2002 1.1%
6 Budapest Europe/Africa - 2002 - 0.0%
7 Copenhagen Europe/Africa - 1996 - 0.2%
8 Deutsche BÄ orse Europe/Africa - 2000 2001 3.7%
9 Euronexty Europe/Africa - 2000 2001 7.7%
10 Hellenic* Europe/Africa - 1999 2000 0.2%
11 Istanbul Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.1%
12 Johannesburg JSE Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.2%
13 London Europe/Africa - 2000 2001 10.0%
14 Malta Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.0%
15 Oslo Europe/Africa - 2001 - 0.2%
16 OM Gruppen Europe/Africa - 1993 1998 1.0%
17 SWX Zurich Europe/Africa - 2002 - 1.5%
18 Vienna Europe/Africa - 1998 - 0.0%
19 Warsaw Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.0%
20 Australian Asia/Paci¯c - 1998 1998 0.7%
21 Hongkong Asia/Paci¯c 2000 2000 0.7%
22 Jakarta Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.0%
23 Kuala Lumpur Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.1%
24 Philippine Asia/Paci¯c - 2001 - 0.0%
25 Singapore SGXy Asia/Paci¯c - 1999 2000 0.2%
26 Taiwan Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 1.8%
27 Thailand Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.1%
28 Tokyo Asia/Paci¯c - 2001 - 4.8%
Total 11 17 9 85.2%
*: Athens Stock Exchange in 1999
y: Pro forma ¯gures for 1999
Sources: HP Handbook of World Stock, Derivatives and Commodity Exchanges, exchange web sites, FIBV .
Table 3.1: Sample of exchanges used in the analysis, 1999-2003
labor aspects of the production process. Thus, labor will be approximated by the number of sta®
working for an exchange i in period t (x1
i;t), whereas the utilization of capital for investments,
such as the setup of an IT-infrastructure, a trading space, and the necessary buildings, are
subsumed by the value of tangible assets employed at exchange i in period t (x2
i;t).
On the output side, four di®erent services are considered that can be 'produced' by an
exchange. The variable y1
i;t stands for the number of listed companies at exchange i in period t.
It will be used as a proxy for the exchange's e®ort to monitor the listed ¯rms on the exchange
in order to ensure fair trading and disclosure practices of company-speci¯c information. Thus,
the supervision of listed ¯rms can be regarded as a service for trading participants to achieve
market transparency. Secondly, the total trading volume in equities as well as in bonds will
approximate the activities of exchange i on the cash market in period t (y2
i;t).36 As several
exchanges have diversi¯ed their businesses into related activities such as derivatives trading
and post-trading services as well as into the development and maintenance of exchange-related
software systems, it is necessary to include them in the output set. Therefore, variable y3
i;t
captures the total number of derivative contracts traded on the derivatives markets. Variable
y4
i;t represents the revenues from post-trading activities and software sales at exchange i in
period t.37
Before proceeding to the next section, a few words should be devoted to the choice of
the proper DEA-model as was mentioned earlier in footnote 2. Considering the employed
inputs and outputs in this paper, it makes sense to employ an input-oriented DEA-model,
36The employment of the number of transactions performed on an exchange would have been a more precise
measure of the activity. Unfortunately, this sort of data was not available for all 28 exchanges.
37The use of revenue numbers for the latter variable is not the most appropriate ¯gure to be included in the
output set. The number of clearing and settlement transactions serviced and the number of software systems
sold would have been better proxies. However, due to the lack of this type of data for all exchanges in our
sample, we opted for this procedure.CHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 50
FIRST STAGE: Operational Variables
Inputs
x
1
i;t Number of sta® employed at exchange i in period t
x
2
i;t Tangible assets at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
Outputs
y
1
i;t Number of listed companies at exchange i in period t
y
2
i;t Total trading volume in bonds and shares at exchange i in period t (in million dollars)
y
3
i;t Total number of derivatives contracts traded at exchange i in period t
y
4
i;t Revenues from post-trading and software at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
SECOND STAGE: Framework Variables
Governance
DEMUTi;t Dummy variable for demutualized exchange i in period t
LISTEDi;t Dummy variable for publicly listed exchange i in period t
Competitive Position and Attractiveness of the Capital Market
LIQUIDITYi;t Level of liquidity at exchange i in period t. Liquidity is de¯ned as the ratio of annual
trading volume in domestic equity and market capitalization of domestic ¯rms. (in %)
¢TRADINGi;t Relative y-o-y change in equity trading at exchange i from period t-1 to period t.
The exchange's percentage change in trading volume is deducted
by the sample median change of trading volume (in %)
FOREIGN LISTINGi;t World market share in new listings of foreign companies at exchange i in period t
measured as the portion of new foreign listings at exchange i
to the total number of new foreign listings worldwide (in %).
Financial Flexibility
¢LTFINANCEi;t Growth of equity and long term debt on exchange i's balance sheet
from period t-1 to period t. (in %)
Business Model
OUTSOURCINGi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i has outsourced its IT-system
in period t.
HORIZONTALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i operates a derivatives platform
in period t.
VERTICALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i provides post-trading services
in period t.
FULL INTEGRATIONi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i is both vertically
and horizontally integrated in period t.
Control Variable for Productivity Regressions
¢EFFi;t¡1 Corresponding e±ciency values (CRS or VRS) of exchange i in period t-1.
Table 3.2: Variables used in the two-stage process
since the number of sta® and the value of tangible assets of an exchange can be more directly
altered by the management than the level of demand for their products and services. Thus,
the management's e®ort to reduce the exchange's inputs seems to be a fairer yardstick than its
exertion to augment the venue's output levels.
3.3.2.2 Framework variables
The second stage considers additional determinants arising from the framework in which an
exchange is embedded and that may also have an in°uence on its performance. As noted by
Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.53-54), the variables of the second stage may have an
impact on the e±ciency with which inputs are transformed to outputs, but they should not
a®ect the production process itself. Thus, the authors require that the variables of the ¯rst andCHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 51
second stage are uncorrelated.38 We will consider four types of factors that deserve particular
attention and present corresponding variables that will function as proxies in our regressions.
These are (1) the exchange's corporate governance regime, (2) the competitive environment and
the attractiveness of the exchange's home capital market, (3) the exchange's ¯nancial °exibility,
and (4) the exchange's business model.
Governance We distinguish between the following three di®erent governance regimes: We
de¯ne an exchange as (1) mutual, if the entity has not announced demutualization and operates
on a one-member, one-vote basis or if it is controlled by the state. An exchange is considered as
(2) demutualized and customer-owned, if the exchange announced demutualization, but has not
sought a public listing yet. We thereby assume that customers mostly retain their shares in the
exchange. And an exchange is considered to possess a (3) demutualized, outsider-dominated
structure if it is publicly listed. Here, the assumption is that the IPO leads to a substantial
substitution of customer owners by outsider owners.
To operationalize the distinctions, we de¯ne two dummy variables as shown in table 3.2. The
variables can take the following con¯gurations: (1) A mutual exchange, denoted as DEMUT=0
^ LISTED=0, i.e. neither demutualized nor listed. (2) A demutualized exchange, denoted as
DEMUT=1 ^ LISTED=0, i.e. demutualized but not listed. (3) A publicly listed exchange,
denoted as DEMUT=1 ^ LISTED=1, i.e. both demutualized and listed.39 Note that the
LISTED-variable will only display the additional in°uence, i.e. on top of being demutualized,
on stock exchange e±ciency and productivity.
Ex ante, as stated in hypothesis H1 in section 3.1, we would expect that the coe±cient of
the DEMUT-variable is signi¯cantly positive, since this would indicate that the demutualized
exchanges outperform mutuals in e±ciency and factor productivity scores. Furthermore, we
expect that the coe±cient of the LISTED-variable is also positive, which would re°ect the
notion of further enhanced e±ciency and factor productivity by becoming a publicly listed
exchange, as was postulated in hypothesis H2.
Competition and attractiveness of capital market The degree of competitive pressure
that an exchange is exposed to may have an in°uence on the operative e±ciency and factor pro-
ductivity of exchanges. We employ three variables that capture distinct aspects of competition
in this industry.
Our ¯rst variable, denoted as LIQUIDITY, measures the depth of the market operated by
an exchange and thereby provides a proxy for an exchange's importance and market power.
A common way to calculate the existing level of liquidity on an exchange's trading platform
is simply to divide the annual equity trading volume by the market capitalization of the ¯rms
listed on the exchange.
The second variable, denoted as ¢TRADING, proxies an exchange's performance capturing
annual changes in the competitive position. To operationalize, we employ year-on-year (y-o-y)
changes in equity trading volume at an exchange. In order to control for general trends on
international equity markets we deduct from each exchange's performance the median change
of the sample in the respective period. The rationale behind this procedure is the following:
38However, for some of our variables we cannot maintain this point as can be seen in appendix A.3, where
table A.3 displays the correlation among the employed variables. In particular the correlation between the ¯rst
stage variables x1, x2, y1, and y2 with the second stage variables FOREIGN LISTING and LIQUIDITY is
highly positive. Therefore our coe±cient estimates may possess some bias. Nevertheless, our ¯ndings remain
robust when we drop the latter variables from our regressions as displayed in table A.4.2.
39Note that the con¯guration DEMUT=0 ^ LISTED=1 does not exist, since all listed exchanges underwent
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A relative gain in trading volume, indicating that the exchange was able to capture more
trading volume than the median exchange of the sample, signals a relatively strong competitive
position vis-µ a-vis other exchanges. By contrast, a relative loss in trading volume would suggest
a deterioration in the competitive position.
Our third variable, denoted as FOREIGN LISTING captures the general attractiveness of
the exchange's home capital market by calculating an exchange's market share in new foreign
¯rms listings as a percentage of the total new foreign listings worldwide. We believe that this
describes the general attractiveness of a capital market quite well, since there are mainly two
reason for such a behavior by a foreign ¯rm: Either the ¯rm is forced to list abroad, for its
home capital market is not attractive, or it possess an additional listing on a foreign exchange
to seek capital from these markets that presumably possess a large and thus attractive pool of
potential investors.40
When we regress the technical e±ciency and productivity of an exchange on these variables,
it is di±cult to establish an ex ante expectation concerning the theoretically correct sign of the
coe±cients. Both directions seem plausible. Consider for example the LIQUIDITY-variable:
An exchange with a relatively deep market can be considered to be in a strong competitive
position which may result in a better exploitation of its resources and thus in higher e±ciency.
The contrary may also hold as monopolistic inertia symptoms could cause excessive (input)
spending and contribute to lower e±ciency values. We would argue that both directions of
the coe±cient's sign of the FOREIGN LISTING-variable can be explained in a similar fashion.
The ¢TRADING-variable may also display di®ering signs: It could have a positive sign when
a loss in trading volume causes a decrease in e±ciency. This will be the case when unfavorable
market conditions coincide with lower absolute equity trading volumes, since this will negatively
a®ect the level of the DEA-output variable y2
i;t and thus ceteris paribus a decrease of the
e±ciency value. Yet, the sign could also be negative when a loss in trading volume means that
the exchange overcompensates this by a disproportionate reduction in the input variables and
thereby achieves higher e±ciency values. By the same token a DMU could spend overly much
in its inputs than the increase in trading volume would allow.
Financial °exibility In reality we observe that several exchanges raised external funds in
order to ¯nance the modernization of their trading venues or to pursue other projects that were
aimed to boost their competitiveness.41 Thus, the ¯nancial °exibility of an exchange, i.e. its
ability to raise new funds to ¯nance investments may also have an e®ect on an exchange's
e±ciency and factor productivity, albeit it remains ex ante unclear whether it will be a positive
or an adverse one. On the one hand, it could lead to ine±ciencies due to overinvestments
resulting from too abundant funds. On the other, the capability of acquiring new proceeds
could be a necessary prerequisite to induce e±ciency-enhancing investments. We employ a
variable which seeks to capture the exchange's in°ow of new proceeds in long term capital in
each period. Ideally, we would measure this by using the respective cash °ow statements of each
exchange in order to capture the actual capital in°ow. However, these ¯gures are not available
for all exchanges. Hence, we use a less accurate means and employ a variable denoted as ¢ LT
FINANCE, which captures the annual change in equity and long-term debt as is stated in the
40Support for this notion can be found in an empirical paper on cross-listings by Pagano, Randl, RÄ oell, and
Zechner (2001) who ¯nd that ¯rms seeking cross-listing tend to choose foreign capital markets with large and
liquid markets as well as where investor protection and e±ciency of courts are high.
41Most explicitly this has occurred at exchanges that went public but one can imagine that - irrespective of
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exchanges' balance sheets.42
Business model Some exchanges do not develop and operate their trading systems them-
selves but buy this service from an external provider. Thus, such an exchange rather incurs
additional operating costs, which primarily materialize in the pro¯t-loss statement and to a
much lesser extent in its sta® size and its tangible assets, which are the considered input factors
in our analysis. Therefore, ignoring the outsourcing of IT-services would ceteris paribus result
in a disadvantage for exchanges that develop their own trading system by employing sta® and
assets for that matter. Consequently, we need to control for this aspect. We do so by em-
ploying a dummy variable, denoted as OUTSOURCING, which equals one when the exchange
under consideration outsources its trading system and zero otherwise. Since outsourcing ceteris
paribus reduces the required input factors and hence increases the calculated e±ciency values,
we expect a positive coe±cient sign at this variable.
We indicated in section 3.3.2.1 that exchanges extended their activities to other areas besides
the classic operation of a cash market. Some of them integrated horizontally by providing an
institutionalized derivatives trading venue, others followed a vertical silo model by integrating
post-trading services into the existing operations. Yet others both integrated vertically and
horizontally, which we denote in the following as 'fully integrated'. We have to control for
this aspect, since it may have an e®ect on exchange e±ciency and factor productivity due to
potential economies of scope between the aforementioned activities. Consider for example the
combination of a cash and a derivatives market, which could be operated by a single trading
system, and therefore save (input) resources. In a similar fashion one could expect economies of
scope when combining trading and post-trading services by utilizing straight-through-processing
applications.43 We will therefore employ three dummy variables, denoted as HORIZONTAL,
VERTICAL, and FULL INTEGRATION, in order to capture the e®ects of horizontal, vertical
and full integration, respectively. Our ex ante expectation concerning the impact of horizontal
and/or vertical integration is that it should enhance exchange e±ciency and factor productivity
vis-µ a-vis exchanges that solely operate a cash market.
3.3.3 Results
3.3.3.1 Results from the ¯rst stage
In Appendix A.2, table A.2 presents the ¯rst-stage results of the DEA-e±ciency and Malmquist-
productivity analysis for both constant and variable returns-to-scale.44 The mean e±ciency
values are greater in the VRS-case than in the CRS-case, since the VRS-e±cient frontiers "en-
velop" the observations more closely. While this e®ect is relatively moderate for most of the
observations, it boosts the e±ciency values of some smaller DMUs like the exchanges of Vi-
enna, Budapest and Malta considerably. Furthermore, the VRS-case computes four exchanges,
namely Copenhagen, Deutsche BÄ orse, Euronext and Malta, that are fully e±cient in all ¯ve
considered periods, whereas there are only two such cases in the CRS-environment (Copen-
hagen and Euronext). When focusing on productivity growth, both underlying technologies
display an overall increase in mean factor productivity except for the 2001/2002-period where
we calculated an overall stagnation in factor productivity. The most remarkable increase is
42In order to prevent distortions from currency °uctuations we use in°ation-adjusted book values of the
exchanges' home currencies.
43Confer Serifsoy and Weiss (2007) for a discussion on the European securities transaction industry from an
industrial organization perspective.
44We are grateful to Holger Scheel whose program 'EMS' we utilized for the calculation of the e±ciency and
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accomplished by the Brazilian exchange BOVESPA, which improved its factor productivity by
an annual arithmetic average of 29% to 34% for the respective settings.
3.3.3.2 Results from the second stage
Table 3.3 displays the results from the regression analysis using the ¯rst stage results as depen-
dent variables as was outlined in section 3.2.3. The table presents the results of White-corrected
regressions against DEA-e±ciency (EFF), Malmquist-productivity (MQ), change in technical
e±ciency (¢EFF) and progress in technology (¢TECH). The table is divided into two panels.
The left panel displays the results for constant returns-to-scale. The right panel provides our
estimates when assuming variable returns-to-scale. We numerated the columns (1-9) for conve-
nience. Overall, the R2-values of the productivity regressions are reasonable, save for the less
appealing values in columns ¯ve and nine. For the two Tobit e±ciency regressions we display
the respective Wald-Â2-values in columns two and six. When comparing the individual coe±-
cients between the two panels we ¯nd that their signs, if signi¯cant, do not change. The results
of the Hausman test demonstrate that a random e®ects model is likely to produce inconsistent
estimates for our factor productivity regressions in all but one case (column nine), since the
p-values display a highly signi¯cant rejection of the null-hypothesis. Thus, the use of the ¯xed
e®ects model is more appropriate.
Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.133*** 0.001 -0.161*** 0.187** 0.191*** -0.083*** -0.107*** 0.025
Std. Err. 0.047 0.049 0.044 0.081 0.063 0.030 0.030 0.025
LISTED 0.040 -0.001 -0.083 0:060y 0.091 0.054 -0.068 0.127**
Std. Err. 0.068 0.113 0.092 0.041 0.079 0.117 0.092 0.058
LIQUIDITY 0.006 -0.032*** -0.002 -0.040 -0.034 -0.021 0.059 -0.063
Std. Err. 0.031 0.011 0.022 0.034 0.043 0.054 0.063 0.087
¢TRADING -0.002 0.008 -0.037 0.060 0.083* 0.040 0.003 0.059
Std. Err. 0.038 0.034 0.034 0.054 0.047 0.039 0.073 0.077
FOREIGN LISTING 1.804*** 0:874y -0.566 1.609* 2.347*** -0.271 -0.109 -0.218
Std. Err. 0.388 0.61 0.848 0.900 0.687 0.868 0.503 1.007
¢LT FINANCE -0.004 -0.029 0.029 -0.084*** -0.007 -0.026 0.054 ¡0:095y
Std. Err. 0.033 0.069 0.071 0.018 0.041 0.073 0.048 0.060
OUTSOURCING 0.045 -0.343*** -0.498*** 0.187 -0.009 -0.400*** -0.450*** 0:099y
Std. Err. 0.059 0.051 0.056 0.078 0.065 0.132 0.088 0.070
HORIZONTAL -0.039 ¡0:214y -0.300** 0.132 0.150** -0.085 -0.154*** 0.053
Std. Err. 0.068 0.154 0.134 0.098 0.076 0.129 0.050 0.098
VERTICAL -0.006 -0.153** -0.247** 0.137 0.180** -0.128*** -0.116*** -0.010
Std. Err. 0.086 0.065 0.120 0.138 0.085 0.048 0.044 0.053
FULL INTEGRATION -0.101 0.029 -0.127 0.147 0.164** 0:145y -0.041 0.153*
Std. Err. 0.085 0.081 0.093 0.140 0.085 0.092 0.044 0.092
EFF -1.096*** -1.003*** -0.096 -0.634*** -1.033*** 0.329**
Std. Err. 0.328 0.351 0.116 0.239 0.312 0.158
CONST 0.592*** 1.923*** 2.032*** 0.888*** 0.654*** 1.674*** 1.977*** 0.766***
Std. Err. 0.080 0.189 0.151 0.047 0.086 0.142 0.211 0.129
Observations 140 112 112 112 140 112 112 112
WaldÂ2=R2(adj:) 54.83 0.334 0.417 0.082 55.28 0.285 0.372 -0.070
Hausman Test (p) - 0.0000 0.0000 0.1097 - 0.0012 0.0000 0.6077
y, ¤, ¤¤, ¤ ¤ ¤, represent 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% signi¯cance levels, respectively.
Table 3.3: Results from the second-stage regression analysis
Results for hypotheses H1 and H2 The DEMUT-variable indicates that demutualized ex-
changes possess e±ciency levels that are 13 to 19 percentage points higher than that of mutual
exchanges depending on the technological setting (confer the DEMUT-coe±cients in columns
two and six). Focusing on the Malmquist-regressions in columns three and seven, we ¯nd noCHAPTER 3. GOVERNANCE OF EXCHANGES 55
evidence that demutualized exchanges have a higher productivity than mutual exchanges in
the CRS-case, whereas in the VRS-case they perform even signi¯cantly worse. The source of
this underperformance is explained in both technology settings by a signi¯cantly lower value in
improvements of technical e±ciency (¢EFF), as can be seen in columns four and eight. Ac-
cording to our estimates demutualized exchanges fare on average 10-16 percentage points worse
on this dimension than mutual exchanges. The demutualized exchanges' progress in technology,
the second component of productivity, is signi¯cantly higher in the CRS-case (column ¯ve) by
19 percentage points. As a result, they are able to compensate their underperformance in the
¯rst component insofar that the overall productivity converges with that of the mutuals' aver-
age performance. In the VRS-case, however, such a recoupment is not observable, since their
improvements in technology is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and therefore equals the
mutuals' performance, as can be seen in column nine. As a consequence, the aforementioned
resulting aggregate e®ect for factor productivity growth is on average lower vis-µ a-vis the mu-
tuals' performance (column seven). Hence, our hypothesis H1 is only partly con¯rmed: While
demutualized exchanges are more e±cient than mutuals, we cannot con¯rm an outperformance
in factor productivity growth.
The coe±cient of the LISTED-variable, which indicates the additional e®ects of an outsider-
owned governance structure on e±ciency and factor productivity, remains largely insigni¯cant,
although its sign is positive in both EFF-regressions and in the MQ-regression of the VRS-
case. The only noticeable signi¯cance can be observed in columns ¯ve and nine. Here, we
¯nd evidence that the observed pattern of demutualized exchanges, i.e. a higher technological
progress, can be found for publicly listed exchanges as well. Since the variable measures incre-
mental e®ects on top of the DEMUT-variable, we conclude that this e®ect is more pronounced
for listed stock exchanges by 6 and 12 percentage points, depending on the technological set-
ting. Overall, we conclude that hypothesis H2 cannot be supported, since neither e±ciency nor
factor productivity are signi¯cantly higher for outsider-owned exchanges.
Analysis of the results on the governance variables When we focus on the two compo-
nents of factor productivity, we notice that demutualized exchanges are less apt in improving
their technical e±ciency (¢EFF), whereas they demonstrate a stronger technological progress
(¢TECH) than mutual exchanges. How can these results be explained? A plausible eco-
nomic interpretation for the former observation is that governance restructuring coincides with
changes in operations that leads to temporary (technical) ine±ciencies until the new processes
are settled and optimized. The stronger rise in technological progress of demutualized and listed
exchanges, on the other hand, may hint towards an increased employment of electronic trading.
This seems likely as an archaic trading °oor can be replaced more easily in a demutualized
governance structure, where members have a reduced in°uence on corporate decisions.45
In the following, we want to provide some support for these interpretations. First, we want
to consider the explanation that the poor performance in ¢EFF by demutualized exchanges
could be due to temporary frictions that occur during a restructuring period. One possible way
to quantify this is by looking at the variation of the exchanges' most relevant input factors over
time. If we assume that a stronger variation in input variables, such as in employee numbers
or in the value of assets, is due to operations restructuring, i.e. buying new businesses and/or
selling others, and if we further assume that these activities are strongly linked to the change in
the exchange's governance regime, we would expect higher variation values for demutualized and
listed exchanges than for mutual entities. To verify our presumption, we pursue the following
45Confer in particular Steil (2002) who analyzes the causes and consequences of a governance change on the
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steps: (1) We calculate the ¯ve year (1999-2003) mean and standard deviation for each of the
28 exchanges' sta® sizes, tangible assets and total assets.46 (2) By dividing each standard
deviation by its corresponding mean, we obtain a variation coe±cient and thus a percentage
value of 'variability' for each input variable and each exchange. (3) We build three subsamples
from our sample. The ¯rst group consists of exchanges that underwent the demutualization
process in 2000 or 2001 in order to incorporate data prior and after the governance change.
We identi¯ed the following nine exchanges: Toronto, Deutsche BÄ orse, Euronext, London Stock
Exchange, Hongkong, NASDAQ, Oslo, Philippine and Tokyo.47 A second group comprises
eleven exchanges that remained mutuals in the considered time period and that serve as a
control group. These are: NYSE, Lima, BOVESPA, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Malta, Warsaw,
Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Taiwan and Thailand. Finally, the third group includes exchanges that
underwent the change in the governance regime prior to our considered time frame, which may
give us an indication on the variability of input variables after the restructuring process is over.
The group encompasses Copenhagen, OM Gruppen, Vienna and Australian Stock Exchange.48
(4) We compare the three groups' mean variation values.
The left panel of ¯gure 3.3 displays the mean variation coe±cients of the three inputs and
the three subsamples. The sample of demutualized exchanges (black bars) indeed exhibits
a higher variability than the sample of mutuals (light grey bars), which therefore con¯rms
our interpretation. Note also that the variability decreases for the third group (dark grey
bars), which we denoted as 'Old-Demutualized' here. Thus, assuming that the variability
indeed decreases after the demutualization process, we would expect that our ¯rst group may
also experience less variability in the future and therefore stronger improvements in technical
e±ciency.
Figure 3.3: Input Variation and Computerized Trading
The second point we want to explore is whether there is evidence that the demutualization
process indeed promotes technology-enhancing measures such as the increased utilization of an
electronic order book (EOB). For this purpose, we calculate the portion of an exchange's annual
equity trading volume that is processed by an EOB. Using the ¯rst and the second subgroup of
exchanges as de¯ned before, we can compare these groups' annual mean values. Unfortunately,
46In order to avoid currency-conversion e®ects on the values of the assets, we employ in°ation-adjusted home
currency book values from the respective balance sheets.
47Although some of these exchanges go a step further by going public it is still reasonable to subsume these
exchanges under one group as the empirical results showed that both groups exhibit a similar pattern for the
¢EFF and ¢TECH-variables.
48We did not incorporate the remaining four exchanges of our sample into the analysis, since they have either
demutualized between 1999 and 2000 or after 2001. Thus, they would have distorted the comparison, for we
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comprehensive information on EOB-trading is only available for the years 2001 to 2003 so that
we cannot provide insights to the situation prior to the actual demutualization of the exchanges
comprising the ¯rst group.
As can be seen in the right panel of ¯gure 3.3, we identify an increased use of electronic
trading by the demutualized group after their restructuring in 2000 and 2001. Yet, the increase
from 50% of total equity volume to 60% within three years is dwarfed by the mean values
of the mutual group. Here, we observe a slight decline from 84% EOB-use in 2001 to a still
very high ¯gure of 82%. Thus, while we can con¯rm that demutualized exchanges indeed
seem to increasingly substitute their trading °oors by EOB-systems, the ¯ndings also suggest
that there is no con¯rmation of the argument brought forward by Steil (2002, p.62-68) that
demutualization is a necessary step to overcome the brokers' resistance against an electronic
order book. In the contrary, the eleven mutual exchanges under consideration used EOB-trading
much more extensively than the exchanges in the subsample of demutualized exchanges.49 The
apparent prevalence of a modern trading infrastructure at mutual exchanges would also explain
why they perform weaker on the ¢TECH-variable: There just might have been no obvious
means to improve their technology as easily as demutualized exchanges that were able to convert
from a non-electronic trading technology towards an EOB.
In°uence of control variables We brie°y want to discuss the results from our control
variables. The coe±cients of the variables representing the competitive environment show
that a favorable market environment tends to improve the e±ciency of exchanges. This can be
seen at variables ¢TRADING and FOREIGN LISTING in the VRS-setting (column six). They
display a signi¯cantly positive relationship towards e±ciency which implies that exchanges that
possess an above sample-median performance in trading volume development and that have a
more attractive capital market are on average also more e±cient. In the CRS-environment
the case is less pronounced, since the ¢TRADING variable is insigni¯cant (column two). The
impact of LIQUIDITY on e±ciency remains insigni¯cant in both technology settings. The
in°uence of the competition variables on the exchanges' productivity is mixed in the CRS-case.
An attractive capital market has a weakly positive e®ect on overall factor productivity, whereas
the contrary holds for higher levels of liquidity (column three). The competition variables in
the VRS-setting are insigni¯cant.
Our variable representing the ¯nancial °exibility of an exchange, i.e. ¢ LT FINANCE,
displays no signi¯cant result except for a negative relation with technological progress (column
¯ve and nine). Thus, additional funds do not seem to have a positive e®ect on the performance
of an exchange.
From our OUTSOURCING-variable we infer that outsourcing has no signi¯cant e®ect on
stock exchange e±ciency, while it signi¯cantly reduces overall productivity (columns three and
seven). Focusing on the sources of this underperformance we observe that the reduction pri-
marily stems from the negative e®ect on the improvement in technical e±ciency (columns four
and eight), while technological progress seems to increase when an exchange outsources its
IT-system. For the latter point,we ¯nd weakly signi¯cant evidence in column nine.
The in°uence of the three integration dummy variables on stock exchange e±ciency is negli-
gible in the CRS-case. In the VRS-setting, all three business con¯gurations seem to be superior
to the e±ciency of exchanges that merely operate a cash market. However, our robustness
49They might have even overdone it, as we observe a decline between 2001 and 2003. This could be explained
by a return to manually executed trading for less liquid stocks. Floor brokers may handle these orders more
intelligently than electronic trading systems. Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2004) ¯nd evidence for this reasoning
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checks displayed in appendix A.4 suggest that these ¯ndings are not very reliable. Alternations
to the model result in a signi¯cant change of their respective signs. Hence, we would not want to
draw any conclusions with regard to the existence of economies of scope between di®erent activ-
ities. On the other hand, our ¯ndings on productivity are somewhat more robust so that some
inferences can be made. Here, horizontally integrated exchanges possess a lower productivity
value than cash markets-only operators in the CRS-case (HORIZONTAL-variable in column
three), which is mainly driven by a weaker performance in e±ciency improvements (column
four). A similar pattern can be observed for the VERTICAL-variable, which also seems to hold
in the VRS-setting. There is evidence that fully integrated exchange have a better performance
than cash markets-only venues in the VRS-case (FULL INTEGRATION-variable in column
seven). However, although this outcome is pretty robust to variations in the regression model
it is not signi¯cant in our bootstrap regressions. Therefore, we take a rather cautious stance
regarding conclusions on the comparative performance of business models.
The control variable EFF shows that productivity indeed is lower for exchanges that pos-
sess higher e±ciency values (columns three and seven). Thus, productivity gains are easier
accomplished by exchanges with lower e±ciency values.
Robustness of ¯ndings To check the robustness of our results, in particular of our ¯ndings
on the two governance variables DEMUT and LISTED, we conducted several robustness checks.
On the one hand, we changed the composition of our regression model in several ways to
verify whether this has any signi¯cant impact on our governance variables. On the other
hand, we veri¯ed the validity of our inference by using bootstrapped standard errors for our
regressions.50 In appendix A.4 we present tables A.4 and A.5 that indicate the results of
the alternations to our model. Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 display the impact on the governance
variables when the variables describing the ¯nancial background and business models as well
as the competitive situation of an exchange are omitted, respectively. Tables A.5.1 and A.5.2
show regressions where competition variables are substituted by other variables from the same
¯eld. Our alternations focus primarily on competition variables, since here we have the highest
uncertainty about the appropriateness of the employed variables. To be more precise, in table
A.5.1 we replace the ¢TRADING-variable by the same variable with a one-year lag in order
to provide more reaction time for the management in case market circumstances change. Table
A.5.2 displays the results when substituting the ¢TRADING-variable by a ¢LIQUIDITY-
variable, which provides information on the annual change in liquidity subtracted by the median
liquidity change of the whole sample. Finally, table A.6 shows our regression results when
utilizing the bootstrap method.
Overall, we ¯nd that the governance variables' coe±cients from our original regression model
are very robust. There are very few changes in the coe±cients' signs and all of those occur for
coe±cients that have been insigni¯cant in the original regression or turn insigni¯cant during
the robustness check. Also the coe±cients' signi¯cance is hardly a®ected by regression model
variations and is also con¯rmed by our bootstrap estimates.
50In particular, we replicated a random drawing with replacement from our sample 2000 times in order to
derive a frequency distribution of coe±cient estimates that allows us to estimate a sample-speci¯c standard
error. Furthermore, we constructed 90% and 95%-con¯dence intervals by using the 2.5%, 5% and the 95%,
97.5% percentiles of the distribution, respectively. We also controlled for our panel data structure by using
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the e±ciency and productivity of the stock exchange industry for the
years 1999 to 2003. The chief aim of this research was to verify, whether demutualization indeed
improves the competitiveness of stock exchanges, which we approximate by calculating technical
e±ciency and factor productivity scores. Contrary to the statements of some researchers, our
¯ndings do not support the view that an outsider-owned exchange enhances the e±ciency of the
exchange. Therefore, the case for an IPO, a measure that involves considerable costs cannot be
advocated from a operative performance perspective. However, a demutualization process that
retains the exchange's customers as its main owners seems promising.
Another point that is commonly advanced in the literature is challenged by this paper:
The assumption that a demutualization process is necessary to install modern trading systems
cannot be con¯rmed empirically. In the contrary, the mutual exchanges of our sample have a
persistently higher portion of electronic order book trading than the considered demutualized
and listed exchanges. Thus, it seems that some mutual exchanges are able to adapt to new
trading technologies without changing their governance structure substantially. In the spirit
of the theoretical ¯ndings by Hart and Moore (1996), we would argue that these mutuals may
possess a relatively homogeneous composition of member interests, thereby preventing major
deadlocks on modernization decisions. However, this is purely speculative and we possess no
means to empirically investigate our reasoning.
We conclude that stock exchange IPOs might have been primarily used as a solution vehicle
for the diverging interests between (few) large international ¯nancial intermediaries and (many)
small local brokers. The exchange's old owners possibly viewed a public listing as a catalyst
to both maximizing the value of their venue and creating an exit option for those members
that were unwilling to bear the costs of an operations restructuring. The fact that most of
these IPOs occurred during the bull market until 2000/01, where relatively high sales prices
were feasible, further strengthens this argument. Therefore, in anticipation of a substantial
appreciation of the value of their voting rights, many small brokers gave up their reluctance to
demutualize and their hitherto relative dominance in the control structure in favor of cashing
out these rights on the stock market.Chapter 4
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4.1 Introduction
The stock exchange industry has been subject to unprecedented dynamics in recent decades,
particularly in Europe and the US. Overall competitive pressure increased on many stock ex-
changes due to a range of signi¯cant changes of the industry environment. Besides globalization
tendencies that led to less home-biased investors and issuers and consequently stronger compe-
tition between national exchanges for order-°ow and listings, the deregulation of ¯nancial mar-
kets resulted in lower barriers to entry, making the incumbents' home markets more contestable.
A major catalyst for increased competitive pressure are also advances in communication and
information technology, creating new forms to conduct business in this industry. Remote mem-
bership, electronic order book trading, alternative trading systems, and the internalization of
order °ow by ¯nancial intermediaries all became viable threats to the core business of stock
exchanges, i.e. the traditional °oor trading activity.
Furthermore, the trading members of the exchanges have become increasingly heterogeneous
in nature. On the one hand, they di®er in the activity they perform at the exchange. As an
example one should think of brokers, dealers or broker-dealers, each with diverging preferences
on exchange-related issues such as the imposed fee structure or the investments undertaken.
On the other hand, members also vary in size and the scope of activities outside the exchanges.
Some banks, for example, are engaged in activities such as over-the-counter trading, derivatives
trading and post-trading services. To the extent that exchanges were also active in these ¯elds,
they became competitors of the exchanges.
Increased competition and divergence in the interests of the trading members led to a decline
in the prosperity of stock exchanges. Some of them arrived at a point where their viability was at
stake. In many cases, this resulted in a restructuring of their governance system, a process which
is usually denoted as demutualization. As a consequence, their organizational form converted
from the traditional mutual structure towards a regular outsider-owned, for-pro¯t corporation.
Take as an example the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), whose seat price, a proxy for the
pro¯tability of possessing a licence to trade on the Big Board, declined sharply in the last years
because of ever-growing pressure from competing trading venues and its members' resistance
to implement a modern trading platform. Recently, the NYSE announced its demutualization
and the successive migration towards electronic trading. Since March 2006, the exchange has
°oated its shares on its own market.
Meanwhile, new business opportunities emerged, partly due to the same technological ad-
vances that threatened the exchanges' core business. Exchanges could for example embrace the
new IT technology to modernize their trading and information dissemination systems. This
promised lower transaction costs and potentially higher rents for their members. Further-
more, related business activities that o®ered both growth opportunities and new sources of
income induced exchanges to diversify into these ¯elds. Vertical integration of post-trading
services, for example, was easier to accomplish with the availability of modern IT-systems and
promised e±ciency gains due to straight-through-processing possibilities. The strong growth in
the derivatives market induced many exchanges to horizontally integrate this business ¯eld by
o®ering a derivatives trading platform.
Hence, the industry seems to experience both a trend towards demutualization and diversi-
¯cation into related business activities. Figure 4.1 con¯rms this notion for the 50 largest stock
exchanges that report to the World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV). The left panel shows the
number of exchanges according to their governance regime for the years 1999 to 2003. It be-
comes clear that the number of exchanges that are organized as mutuals, or are state-controlled,
decreased substantially from 40 to only 25. In the same time period, the number of demutu-CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 62
alized exchanges has increased from 10 to 25. Note that we distinguish between demutualized
and publicly listed exchanges. The main di®erence between the two groups is that the latter
not only underwent a demutualization process, but also sought a public listing. This will be
relevant in the following, as the two groups di®er in the type of owners they possess.
Figure 4.1: Organizational Form and Diversi¯cation of Stock Exchanges 1999-2003
The right panel shows the increase in diversi¯cation activity for the same sample of ex-
changes. The number of exchanges that added post-trading services to their business portfolio
rose from 22 to 30, while the number of entities that operate a derivatives trading platform
marked up from 25 to 31. Despite the strongest relative increase, providers of software solutions
remained rather scarce, with three exchanges o®ering this service in 1999 and seven in 2003.
A preliminary event-study An obvious question seems whether there is a link between the
two trends. One could argue that, since demutualized exchanges are pro¯t-oriented entities,
they are more likely to invest into related business segments to increase their revenues (and
possibly pro¯ts, too). Figure 4.2 seeks to provide some preliminary empirical evidence by
presenting two small 'event-studies'. We compare both the average degree of diversi¯cation and
the development in operating revenues of exchanges that underwent a governance restructuring
with entities that remained organized as mutuals. Without laying out the full details of the
employed methodology at this point - we provide a detailed description in appendix B.6 - the
graphs make clear that the change in governance, especially for exchanges that went public, did
have a profound e®ect on both dimensions.
Figure 4.2: Event Studies on Governance Changes
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event of demutualizing and going public in period t, where one period equals one year, respec-
tively. Note that exchanges that experienced such an 'event' have already been more diversi¯ed
on average than the control sample of mutual exchanges prior to the event. This can be seen by
the fact that both lines are in positive territory in period t-1. However, as our graph indicates,
we still witness a signi¯cant rise in our measure after the event period.1
The right graph provides a somewhat similar picture, especially for publicly listed exchanges.
Here, the indexed development in operating revenues for exchanges that either demutualized
or went public are adjusted for the development in revenues of the control group of mutuals.
As can be seen, publicly listed exchanges have outpaced their mutual counterparts on average
after their respective IPO (at period t), whereas demutualized exchanges did not experience
any signi¯cant excess rise in their revenues. We argue that the lion's share of the increase in
revenues stems from these new related activities. Although one could propose that exchanges
may have also earned more from the traditional cash market operation, our data lends only
limited support to this notion.2
Our contribution and main ¯ndings The purpose of the ¯rst part of the paper is to
provide a theory that explains the diverging investment behavior of exchanges and trading
platforms3 with di®erent governance regimes. To model this, we build on a simpli¯ed version of
Rey and Tirole (2000) which we adapt and extend to certain characteristics of stock exchanges.
In a static model, we analyze the competition between stock exchanges and their investment
behavior. In our basic setup with homogeneous users, both competitors are considering to invest
in an innovation which improves their trading technology and provides uniformly distributed
bene¯ts to all users. The investment is value-enhancing for their users, if the (¯xed) costs can
be recouped by charging a transaction fee on a su±ciently large trading volume. We show that
in competition with an outsider-owned stock exchange, the mutual exchange is typically at a
disadvantage. Our argument is mainly based on the idea that the latter has no ¯nancial bu®er
provided by outside investors and therefore has to pass on its investment costs to its members,
irrespective of the trading volume that remains on its platform. Consequently, the mutual
exchange is exposed to the possibility of runs, as a member's exit exerts a negative externality
on the remaining members. We show that, in most circumstances, the outsider-owned exchange
can exploit this fragility, thereby undermining the ability of the mutual exchange to invest,
despite the existence of a countervailing "second-sourcing"-e®ect, which supports the investment
propensity of a mutual. Second-sourcing connotes a situation where the mutual exchange invests
into the project, even though it knows that its members will migrate to the competing for-pro¯t
exchange. The reason for this is that the mutual can improve the price conditions of the transfer
for its members by investing into the project.
Introducing heterogeneity of members into the model con¯rms our results, when a majority
of members experience a negative externality from the investment project.4 We argue that
this extension of the model structure should be interpreted as investments in related non-core
business activities of an exchange, whose potential bene¯ts are not distributed evenly across
1Note that some of the exchanges that underwent the demutualization process are also part of the IPO-
sample as they went public a short period of time after their demutualization. Thus, the IPO-means partly
show the development of the very same demutualized exchanges, which however, does not a®ect the validity of
our statement advanced here.
2There has been an exceptional rise in revenues from cash trading-related activities by some smaller exchanges.
Oslo Exchange, for example, increased its trading-related revenues from 1999 until 2004 by more 80%, the Wiener
BÄ orse by even 350% in the same time period. Yet, for the majority of the exchanges in our sample, we did not
observe a signi¯cant rise in cash-trading revenues.
3We will use the terms trading platforms and exchanges synonymously.
4If a majority of members bene¯ts from the project, we interestingly observe a higher investment propensity
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di®erent types of members. This aspect of our model has important practical implications, as
industry participants are concerned about certain investments undertaken by exchanges, such
as the vertical integration of post-trading services, which are pro¯table for the exchange, but
may be detrimental to its users. In Europe, outsider-owned Deutsche BÄ orse, which bought
post-trading services provider Clearstream in 2003, is therefore under particular scrutiny by
both users and regulatory authorities due to fears of anti-competitive behavior.5 The results
from our model underline the fact that outsider-owned exchanges are less constrained in their
investment behavior, which could lead to overall welfare losses, if the negative externalities
borne by the users are larger than the gains for the exchange and its owners.
Furthermore, we will extend our basic model to a dynamic setting to analyze the options
of an incumbent mutual exchange to survive in a competitive environment. To answer this
question, we incorporate a standard overlapping generations framework into our model. This
allows us to investigate the viability of a mutual exchange, which competes against an outsider-
owned exchange. We show that when experiencing ¯erce competition from a for-pro¯t trading
platform, a mutual exchange can only survive if it converts to a similar governance regime. This
result hence provides a rationale for the recent wave of demutualization amongst exchanges that
were exposed to increased competitive pressure.
In the second part of the paper we present empirical evidence for the main results de-
rived from our model. For that purpose, we hand-collect information on the business model,
competitive situation and governance regime for a sample of 26 stock exchanges in the time
period 1999-2003. We then formulate two hypotheses that are linked to the main predictions
from our theoretical part: Our ¯rst hypothesis tests whether competitive pressure increases
the likelihood of demutualization, whereas our second hypothesis evaluates whether demutu-
alized exchanges are more likely to invest in non-core business activities. In order to account
for potential endogeneity problems between our governance, competition and business model
variables, we use bivariate Probit regressions that simultaneously estimate our two hypotheses.
Our results provide strong support for our stated hypotheses.
Related literature Our paper is related to di®erent strands of the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature. First of all, the theoretical literature on mutuals and cooperatives is relevant.
However, due to the large volume of contributions, we will merely be able to discuss selected
contributions that are closely related to organizational forms of stock exchanges.6
One of the most cited papers in this area is by Hart and Moore (1996) (see in addition
Hart and Moore (1998) for a more general approach). Focusing on the user welfare of di®erent
governance setups for stock exchanges, the authors analyze the relative merits of a mutual
structure and outside ownership in dependence of the level of competition and the diversity
of member interests. They obtain two main results: (1) Outside ownership becomes more
e±cient than a mutual structure as the members of the mutual become more diverse in terms
of preferences. (2) Outside ownership becomes more e±cient than a mutual structure as the
exchange faces more competition. In contrast to our theoretical approach they do not explicitly
analyze competitive interaction between stock exchanges with di®erent organizational forms,
nor do they investigate dynamic considerations that concern the viability of stock exchanges
under competitive pressure.
Pirrong (2000b) takes a di®erent approach to analyze governance issues. In contrast to
5Several academic contributions have addressed this issue. Confer for example Tapking and Yang (2004) and
KÄ oppl and Monnet (2003).
6For a very impressive analysis of cooperatives in general, see Hansmann (1996). HolmstrÄ om (1999) and
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Hart and Moore (1996), he does not compare di®erent owners of the exchange, but focuses on
di®erent types of users that may organize their stock exchange either as a for-pro¯t or as a
not for-pro¯t entity. He then describes governance mechanisms to mitigate con°icts of interests
between the members. In Pirrong (1999) and Pirrong (2002), an analysis of competition between
stock exchanges is provided and is based on switching costs and liquidity e®ects, respectively.
In contrast to our analysis, these papers do not deal with the issue of investment incentives and
they do not consider explicitly competition between di®erent organizational forms.
Our theoretical analysis has similarities to the theoretical analysis of two-sided markets (see
Armstrong (2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2005) for an overview). Furthermore, we build on two
contributions by Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole, who analyze similar e®ects to the one described
here in the payment card industry.7 We adapt this approach to the stock exchange industry
and extend their analysis in certain aspects. In particular, we explore investment decisions
which have a heterogenous impact on the welfare of stock exchange users. We also investigate
in more detail the investment incentives of di®erent organizational forms and their viability
under competitive pressure in an overlapping generations framework. In addition, based on the
global games framework developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), we provide an analysis
of the fragility of mutual exchanges that incorporates coordination problems of the exchanges'
members.
The number of empirical papers on the governance of stock exchanges is relatively small.
Krishnamurti, Sequeira, and Fangjian (2003) analyze the market quality of exchanges with
di®erent organizational form. They ¯nd evidence that the demutualized National Exchange of
India provides a higher market quality than the mutual Bombay Stock Exchange. Mendiola and
O'Hara (2003) focus on the post-IPO performance of publicly listed exchanges and ¯nd that
these exchanges outperform both the general market and other IPOs. Furthermore, they ¯nd
evidence for a positive link between the fraction of equity sold to outside investors and stock
exchange performance. Yet, their ¯ndings are con¯ned to the group of publicly listed exchanges
and cannot provide any comparison to exchanges that are not outsider-owned. Other empirical
attempts to compare di®erent governance regimes in the stock exchange industry mainly rely
on frontier e±ciency methods. While Schmiedel (2001) employs a parametric stochastic frontier
model to evaluate the cost e±ciency of European stock exchanges, he applies a non-parametric
method in a second paper (Schmiedel (2002)). The former paper controls for demutualized
exchanges within the regression and displays a positive impact of demutualization on cost
e±ciency.8 In his second paper, the mean of factor productivity gains is higher among mutual
exchanges.
A recent paper by Ramos (2005) employs univariate Probit regressions to evaluate the
propensity of exchanges to demutualize. It ¯nds evidence that competitive pressure has a
positive e®ect on the likelihood of exchanges to demutualize. Our paper has most similarities
to the analysis of Ramos (2005) as we will also conduct Probit regressions to analyze the
in°uence competition has on the decision of exchanges to demutualize. However, we need to
employ a more involved estimation technique. As we also seek to provide evidence for the
impact of organizational forms on investment decisions at exchanges, we use a bivariate Probit
approach to account for potential endogeneity issues stemming from our governance variable.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents our model and states our propo-
sitions. Section 4.3 formulates the hypotheses, which we want to test, discusses the data and
methodology employed, and ¯nally presents our empirical results. Section 4.4 concludes.
7See Rey and Tirole (2000) and Rey and Tirole (2001). Rochet and Tirole (2002) provides a very interesting
analysis of the competitive structure of the payment-card industry.
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4.2 Model
4.2.1 The basic setup
Competition, trading volume and users We are considering two exchanges X1 and X2,
which both operate a proprietary trading platform. Initially, each of them has the same (large)
number of identical users. We normalize the number of the users to a continuum of mass 1, such
that we have customers of mass 2 in this economy, equally distributed on both systems.9 We
assume that the exchange's respective customers have made platform-speci¯c investments in the
past in order to access the trading venues. Therefore, we consider each exchange's customers
as its respective installed base. These customers can be dealers, brokers, dealer-brokers, and
banks, who use the trading platform of the exchange to execute trades for themselves and/or
on behalf of the investing public.10
Initially, both exchanges have the same size in terms of trading volume, i.e. their customers
generate a total trading volume of v > 0, respectively, which cannot be moved to another
trading platform. To introduce competition in our model, we assume that the users possess an
additional trading volume k, which can be transferred to the rival exchange without switching
costs. We interpret this as the growth in trading volume. Hence, the higher the ratio k=v,
the higher the degree of potential competition between X1 and X2. By introducing a ¯xed
and a transferable component of trading volume, we want to grasp home-bias e®ects and other
restraints in our model, which typically limit the degree of competition in the stock exchange
industry.11 This is due to the stickiness of trading volume at platforms that o®er the highest
level of liquidity in a certain security and which makes it very di±cult to transfer it to a new
exchange.
Investment project The trading costs that are incurred will determine the competitiveness
of stock exchanges. To ¯x ideas, let us assume that, initially, both exchanges possess per unit
transaction costs equal to c. In addition, both exchanges can invest in a project with ¯xed
investment costs I and a gross surplus of µ for each user.12 We assume that the following
investment condition holds:
vµ < I < (v + k)µ: (4.1)
This condition states that the investment should be undertaken if an exchange not only attracts
the ¯xed base volume v, but also at least the transferable volume k of its own users. However,
the investment is not pro¯table if the exchange only retains the ¯xed volume v. We have chosen
a general formulation for the gross surplus µ from the investment project, since the investment
opportunity will be interpreted in di®erent ways. For instance, it could be viewed as a technical
9In the following, the terms "customers" and "users" of a stock exchange are synonymously.
10We do not explicitly analyze competition e®ects among the customers in the "downstream" market for the
end-users of the exchange, e.g. retail traders and non-¯nancial companies. In that respect we are quite agnostic.
To simplify matters, we assume that trading volume and rents of the users will not be in°uenced by the trading
fees charged by an exchange. Since we are not considering social welfare aspects and our main focus lies on the
analysis of competition among exchanges, our results go through as long as we have some market imperfections
on the end-user market. See Hausman, Leonard, and Tirole (2003) for an in-depth analysis of competition e®ects
in the credit-card industry in a "double-di®erentiation" framework with systems di®erentiated as in Hotelling's
model and end-users, i.e issuers, di®erentiated as in the Lerner-Salop model.
11Many countries just have one national stock exchange with an overwhelming market share in the trading of
domestically listed companies. In these cases, competition comes merely from foreign exchanges, OTC-trading
and intermediaries that internalize client orders.
12In the basic model, we assume that there are no di®erences among the exchanges in the surplus of the
available investment projects. However, this does not imply that the investment projects are necessarily identical.
Instead, each project is adapted to the trading technology the respective exchange uses. With this assumption
we want prevent that our results are biased by the nature of the project.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 67
improvement of the exchange's cash trading operations (e.g. its trading technology) such that
the trading costs c are reduced by µ = c ¡ c0. Alternatively, the investment could take place in
related business activities as described in the introduction, thereby producing less speci¯ed rents
(v + k)µ, which we assume to be proportional to the trading volume as well. However, there is
one distinction between the two types of investment projects: Typically, the former investment
project has a homogeneous in°uence on the users such that each user can potentially gain µ per
trading unit. The latter investment opportunity, on the other hand, may have a heterogeneous
impact in the sense that the distribution of rents is not uniform across all users. This captures
the notion that an investment into related activities may create di®erent externalities on the
business activities of the various types of users (e.g. brokers, dealers, or banks). Thus, while
(v + k)µ still represents total surplus, for di®erent user-groups j, the impact µj may vary.
Consequently, our notation in this case will be
Pn
j=1 yjµj ´ E[µ] = µ, with yj denoting the
mass of the user-group j in the whole population of users of the exchange and the expected
surplus equaling to the µ, as in the homogeneous case. We assume the µj's to be private
information of each user, while the composition of µ is common knowledge.13
Characteristics of organizational forms Our model considers two exchanges that compete
for the transferable trading volume of their members. The exchanges are either organized as
not for-pro¯t, member-owned mutuals or as outsider-owned, for-pro¯t ¯rms. There are three
stylized distinctions between the two organizational forms:
1. Control structure: In the case of a mutual exchange, the customers/members are also the
owners of the exchange and take decisions according to a democratic one-member, one-vote
scheme. Hence, the mutual exchange acts in the customers' interest by maximizing their
expected bene¯ts. As long as the impact of the considered investment is homogeneous for
all members, the decision of the exchange is taken unanimously. In case of heterogeneity,
which we model in the simplest possible way with two types of users, i.e. yj with j = h;l,
the decision rights rest with the member group yj that possesses the majority.14 In
contrast, an outsider-owned, for-pro¯t exchange acts in the interest of its investors and
does not take into account the potential externalities that may emerge for the exchange's
customers. Outside owners are exclusively interested in the pro¯tability of a project and
will decide accordingly.
2. Price discrimination: Mutuals cannot discriminate among their members in terms of the
trading fees. In contrast, outsider-owned exchanges are not constrained in the use of price
discrimination. They may charge di®erent prices for di®erent customers.
3. Access to ¯nance sources: A mutual's budget must be balanced ex post, regardless of the
volume allocated to its trading platform, as it operates on a break-even basis and cannot
make use of outside capital. Since the costs of a potential investment have to be ¯nanced
via trading fees, the mutual exchange will set the transaction price according to the trading
volume that was generated on its platform. Such a ¯nancing mode starkly contrasts with
that of an outsider-owned, for-pro¯t exchange, which can rely on the cushion provided
by equity and long-term debt, if the costs of the investment project exceed the amount
of received trading fees.
13By incorporating heterogeneity and private information into the model, our model has features of the model
by Hart and Moore (1996).
14For the general case with several types of member interests, the median voter-rule should be applied.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 68
Time structure of investment decisions Our time structure will be typical for a long-term
investment, which needs "time to build". Our model has three time periods:
Time period 0: The exchanges decide whether to undertake an investment and announce
their trading fee level a to be charged in period 2.
Time period 1: The customers of the exchanges non-cooperatively decide where to allocate
their transferable volume k.
Time period 2: The projects, if taken, are realized. The exchanges charge their trading fees.
Due to the di®erent ¯nancing patterns outlined above, the time structure will have the
following important implications: (1) A mutual that is considering to invest into the project
has to bear in mind that the project's attractiveness critically depends on whether its users
channel their additional trading volume to the exchange. A diversion of volume by some
members to a competing exchange would leave the volume of the remaining members exposed
to larger trading fees, as the ¯xed costs of the project have to be ¯nanced exclusively by this
source. This in turn may trigger further diversion of trading volume. As the trading fees will be
determined by the budget balance constraint, negative network externalities and coordination
problems emerge. Consequently, the mutual exchange cannot bind itself to its announcement
a in period 0 and is therefore exposed to runs.15 In essence, irrespective of what it announces
in period 0, its fee will ultimately be determined by the retained volume in period 2. (2) The
for-pro¯t exchange on the other hand can credibly commit to its announcement in time period
0, as its outside investors serve as residual claimants if an unexpected event arises, such as
insu±cient trading volume, which needs a ¯nancial bu®er. In essence, the varying ¯nancing
patterns introduce di®erent degrees of commitment to the announcement of trading fees to the
model. This creates a competitive edge for the outsider-owned exchange, which we will outline
in the following sections.
Structure of the theoretical part of the paper Given this setup, in section 4.2.2.1, we
analyze how a mutual's investment behavior is a®ected by di®erent competition scenarios. Thus,
we evaluate its propensity to invest when it faces competition for the transferable volume k from
no other exchange, another mutual, and an outsider-owned exchange. We will initially focus
on an environment with homogeneous users, so that the undertaken projects are interpreted
as investments into the core business activity of exchanges, i.e. the cash trading business. In
section 4.2.2.2, we analyze the same question with respect to investments in related activities,
which have a heterogenous impact on users. Section 4.2.2.3 concludes our analysis of the
static case by presenting the results graphically. In section 4.2.3, we enrich our basic setup
with a dynamic overlapping generations model to investigate the long-run viability of a mutual
exchange that competes against an outsider-owned exchange. Propositions at the end of each
section summarize our ¯ndings.
15The bank run literature presumes a similar investment pattern, for instance in the seminal paper of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). Hence it comes at no surprise that coordination failure and multiple equilibria build the
core aspect of these models. As we will see later on, this will also be an important issue in the model presented
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4.2.2 The static model - Investment propensity of exchanges
4.2.2.1 Competition between stock exchanges with homogeneous users
No competition As an introductory case, we brie°y describe the situation, where neither
exchange has the possibility to attract the transferable volume k from the customers of the
rival exchange, i.e. when the exchanges face no competition. In this case, each exchange will
invest into the e±ciency-enhancing technology, as it knows that it will receive the transferable
volume k with certainty. According to condition (4.1) the investment is worthwhile for each
exchange delivering a surplus of µ(v+k)¡I. In case of two mutual exchanges, this means that
the trading costs will be lowered to
^ a ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + k
) < c: (4.2)
Competition between two mutuals More interesting is the case in which two mutual
exchanges are competing for the total transferable volume 2k of their customers. Which equi-
librium will result and what will be the critical investment cost threshold? Each exchange
will decide to invest at time period 0 if it expects its own customers to leave volume k on its
platform in period 1. This will be the case, if a member/user of an exchange has no incentive
to reallocate its volume. Hence, the following condition must be satis¯ed:
^ a(v + k) · cv + ak (4.3)
with a ´ c¡(µ ¡ I
v+2k) de¯ned as the trading costs if one of the exchanges manages to attract
the transferable growth volume of both exchange users. On the left hand side, we have the
trading costs for a customer when it sticks to its exchange, while the right hand side displays
the average trading costs when it transfers its volume to the exchange, where 2k is traded.
Inserting for ^ a and a from (4.2) and (4.3), we get the following condition:
I ·
µv(v + 2k)
v + k
: (4.4)
Let us denote Im as the investment cost threshold of a mutual that competes against another
mutual, de¯ned as the costs where condition (4.4) is satis¯ed with equality. We can see from
condition (4.4) that the growth trading volume k has a positive impact on the users' loyalty to
their original exchange. The higher k, the more likely condition (4.4) is ful¯lled so that it is in
the interest of customers not to shift their trading volume. Intuitively c.p. a higher k means
that the investment project generates a higher net present value for the users. Given our ¯xed
investment costs I and the fact that the investment of the "home"-exchange also has a positive
impact on the non-transferable trading volume v, a high net present value of the investment will
induce each individual user to prefer its own exchange to invest. In contrast, investments, which
have just a marginally positive net present value, will be undertaken by only one exchange, albeit
it is not clear which exchange will be the investing one in such a symmetric case. However,
introducing a small commonly known productivity di®erence between the exchanges into the
model would favor the more productive exchange to invest, if it is common knowledge that the
users can coordinate on the Pareto-dominant action. For now, we assume this to be the case,
however we will discuss the issue of equilibrium selection in more detail at a later stage (see
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Competition between a mutual and an outsider-owned exchange Let us now ana-
lyze the situation when a mutual exchange faces competition from a for-pro¯t, outsider-owned
exchange. For notational convenience, we assume that X1 is organized as a mutual and X2
as a for-pro¯t exchange controlled by outside investors. Given our assumption on the varying
degrees of commitment between the two organizational forms, the outsider-owned exchange
does not need to be concerned with the risk to lose k of its own users to X1. As we will show
later, this will always be the case in equilibrium as long as the outsider-owned stock exchange
invests. We will therefore start with the assumption that X2 always obtains the loyalty of its
users.16 Given that X2 invests, what are the alternatives for the mutual exchange?
Let us ¯rst suppose that the mutual declares not to invest in time period 0. In this case,
the members of X1 will transfer k to X2, as the latter will o®er a trading fee that is at least as
low as at X1, i.e. c. Since X2 maximizes its pro¯ts, it will just o®er a2 = c.17
Alternatively, both exchanges may announce to invest. Under the assumptions we made, the
mutual exchange is most attractive when all its members stay loyal and trade the transferable
volume k at their home-exchange, which would result in fees amounting to ^ a. However, they
would transfer k to X2 if and only if
a2k · ^ ak: (4.5)
Accordingly, it is Pareto-dominant to remain loyal as long as a2 > ^ a. However, in case of
an equally good o®er, the users of X1 will switch. Hence, X2 will attract the new volume if it
o®ers
a2 · ^ a ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + k
): (4.6)
Note that it is indeed pro¯table for X2 to make such an o®er, since it can potentially serve the
customers at marginal cost c¡µ and can gain revenues from this o®er which are strictly higher
than the marginal costs according to condition (4.6).18
Interestingly, even though the mutual exchange is at a disadvantage to retain the volume
of its own members, let alone to attract new customers, we may still observe that it invests in
the project. The rationale for this is that the terms of X2's o®er for the members of X1 can
be in°uenced to their advantage due to the positive strategic e®ect that emerges when X1 also
invests: Knowing that X2 will invest, the members of X1 anticipate the o®er at transaction costs
c in case X1 does not invest. Therefore, members of X1 could consider to take the investment
at their own exchange and still divert their trading volume k to X2. By doing so, the members
of X1 may force exchange X2 to improve trading conditions from c to c ¡ µ.
To see this, consider the alternatives of the members of X1: They will compare the costs of
16To support this equilibrium, one only needs the out-of equilibrium beliefs that the outsider-owned exchange
would o®er favorable terms to users who want to depart to the mutual exchange.
17We assume that in case of an equally attractive o®er, the original users of an exchange are curious and do
not stay loyal to their home-exchange. Thus, X2 merely has to o®er conditions that are at least as good as their
home exchange for attracting their new customers. This convention, which is without loss of generality, will be
adopted to solve the "openness problem" common to Bertrand games.
18Furthermore, even if the investment project of the outsider-owned exchange is not as productive as the
investment project of the mutual exchange, the former exchange will succeed in getting the growth volume of
all users as long as the di®erence in productivity is not too large. To see this, let us assume that the investment
costs of the projects Ii for both exchanges are equal, I1 = I2 = I, but the return of the investment µi is larger
for the mutual exchange, i.e. µ1 > µ2. Inserting a2 = c ¡ µ2 and ^ a = ^ a1 = c ¡ µ1 in condition (4.6) for a success
of the outsider-owned stock exchange, we observe that
c ¡ µ2 · c ¡ µ1 +
I
v + k
, µ1 ¡ µ2 ·
I
v + k
:
Again, the lower µ the more easily will this condition be satis¯ed. Technologically inferior investments by an
outsider-owned exchange will be undertaken in competition with an mutual exchange because of a stealing e®ect
that gains momentum due to the di®erences in the competitors' underlying organizational forms.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 71
not investing with those of investing, provided that they will divert k in any case. Hence, the
costs will be cv + a2k in the case of not investing. As already mentioned, X2 does not have
to make an o®er a2 below c so that the second summand will be equal to ck. In the case of
investing, the costs would amount to cv + I ¡ vµ + ^ ak. Note that according to our assumption
on the pro¯tability of the investment project, I is always larger than vµ. Hence, if
cv + ck ¸ cv + I ¡ vµ + ^ ak; (4.7)
which after inserting for ^ a and collecting terms can be written as the investment condition
I ·
µ(v + k)2
v + 2k
; (4.8)
the mutual exchange will invest, notwithstanding that it only serves the base volume v. Ioo
denotes the investment cost threshold where this condition is satis¯ed with equality in the case
when a mutual competes against an outsider-owned exchange. Taking the derivative of condition
(4.8) with respect to k, one can see that, in equilibrium, the mutual exchange invests, if k is
relatively large compared to v, i.e. if the competitive pressure is high, given our measure k=v.
Hence, it is in the interest of X1-members to invest when the size of the transferable volume
is large. In such a case, they bene¯t from the better cost structure of the investing mutual
exchange, since this will improve the conditions to which they can trade k on X2. Notice the
similarity of this argument to strategic models of "second-sourcing" in the tradition of Farrell
and Gallini (1987) and Shepard (1987) who show that second-sourcing can be interpreted as
a commitment device to protect buyers' interests against a monopolistic supplier's ex post
opportunistic behavior. In our Bertrand competition model, the mutual exchange - working in
the interest of its members - ful¯lls quite a similar role.
Comparison of investment propensities We have seen that due to the possibility to
credibly commit to a certain fee level, for-pro¯t exchanges will always invest in the e±ciency-
enhancing project. In fact, as the outsider-owned exchange always succeeds to attract the
transferable volume of the mutual exchange k in equilibrium, it knows that its total trading
volume is not only v + k but adds up to v + 2k. Therefore the gross surplus resulting from
the additional volume amounts to kµ. As we have shown in the last section, a part of this rent
has to be given to the new users because of the second-sourcing e®ect. However, the remaining
part can be appropriated by the outsider-owned exchange, and this, in turn, will strengthens
its investment incentives further. Hence, its investment boundary IFP is
µ(v + k) · IFP · µ(v + 2k): (4.9)
The mutual, on the other hand, lacks this characteristic and will therefore invest less heavily.
What we still have to provide an answer for, though, is how the investment propensity of mutuals
depends on the governance regime that the competing exchange possesses.
To see whether an exchange, organized as mutual, has a higher propensity to invest when it
faces competition by an outsider-owned platform or by another mutual exchange, we compare
the respective investment hurdle rates of X1. Therefore, if we presume that Ioo is greater
or equal to Im, and replace the investment boundaries by the respective right hand sights of
conditions (4.8) and (4.4), we obtain the following inequality:
µv(v + 2k)
v + k
¸
µ(v + k)2
v + 2k
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Simplifying (4.10), we obtain the result that as long as
k2
v2 ¡
k
v
· 1; (4.11)
i.e. the level of competition expressed as k
2
v2 ¡ k
v is less or equal to one, the investment cost
threshold, and propensity by same token, of a mutual will be larger, when competing against
another mutual exchange. This holds as long as k is not signi¯cantly larger than v.19 For
transferable volumes signi¯cantly larger than the invariable amount, on the other hand, a
mutual will have a higher propensity to invest when facing competition from an outsider-owned
exchange. Therefore, if the degree of competition is very high among trading platforms, a
mutual is more inclined to invest in e±ciency-boosting modernization projects, if the competing
counterpart is organized as a for-pro¯t exchange. The reason for this rests on the dual-sourcing
argument outlined earlier, which makes investments more likely, but which are only relevant
when competing against a rent-seeking outsider-owned exchange.
Note that we have so far considered situations, where the for-pro¯t exchange treats all
potential new customers from X1 equally in the sense that the announced transaction costs are
non-discriminatory for di®erent customers or customer groups. However, in principle, exchange
X2 could make discriminatory o®ers to the members of the mutual exchange, if this proves
to be pro¯table. As we analyze in appendix B.1, this divide-and-conquer strategy leads to a
snowballing e®ect at the mutual exchange, resulting in a shift of the transferable volume k
to the outsider-owned exchange. Therefore, while this result is skewed in favor of outsider-
owned exchanges, the introduction of discriminatory o®ers also liberates our analysis from the
assumption of the Pareto-dominance criterion, since the divide-and-conquer strategy deters
coordination by the members of the mutual exchange. For our basic model, however, we will
alleviate this strong assumption by analyzing our setup in a global games framework in the
following.
Multiplicity of equilibria So far, by adopting the Pareto-dominance criterion we have
assumed that the members of the mutual exchange can coordinate on an equilibrium to the
best of their common interest. Naturally, this is not the only possible equilibrium. As usual
in coordination games like ours, multiple Nash equilibria are possible. Thus, we will analyze
whether we can get rid of the multiplicity of equilibria and specify precisely the parameter
values of the model for which members choose to move their transferable volume to the outsider-
owned exchange. This would allow us to provide a comparative statics analysis of the factors
that in°uence this decision, without imposing somewhat arbitrary assumptions regarding the
behavior of the members.
To deal with this issue, we draw on the global games approach to ¯nd a unique equilibrium.20
This approach builds on the idea that individual players, in our case the members of the
exchange, are facing payo® uncertainty, which is caused by an underlying state of the economy.
In our framework, this would correspond to uncertainty regarding the productivity parameter
of the investment technology µ. Introducing this type of payo® uncertainty into the analysis,
it can be shown that members, behaving individually optimally, will not be able to coordinate
their actions on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Instead, in dependence of the underlying
state, a unique equilibrium will always result. Typically, the resulting equilibrium will be the
19In fact, the result holds as long as k is smaller than approximately 1.6 times v. Confer also section 4.2.2.3.
20See Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for a ¯rst illustration of this theory and Morris and Shin (2003) for
a recent survey and full analysis of global games. The illustration chosen in appendix B.2 follows closely Allen
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risk-dominant one, using the terminology of Harsanyi-Selten.
However, this equilibrium always implies some coordination failure among the members.21
In our framework, the risk-dominant equilibrium corresponds to the outsider-owned exchange
X2 setting an o®er · a, with a2 < · a < ^ a, such that the trading costs are slightly lower than
· a ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + k
2
): (4.12)
The condition shows that, because of the coordination problems of the members, the outsider-
owned exchange will attract the members of the mutual exchange quite easily, even if it cannot
use discriminatory o®ers, which we outlined in detail in appendix B.1.22 Hence, coordination
problems on part of the mutual's members reinforce the competitive edge of the outsider-owned
exchange. We provide a detailed analysis in appendix B.2.
Summarizing the analysis of this section so far, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1 With homogeneous users we obtain the following results:
1. In a competitive environment with two mutual exchanges, both will invest, provided condi-
tion (4.4) is satis¯ed. For increasing values of k the condition is more likely to be ful¯lled.
In case of an investment project with only marginally positive value, only one exchange
will invest.
2. In a competitive environment with one mutual exchange and one outsider-owned exchange,
the latter has a competitive edge and a higher propensity to invest, even if its investment
project is somewhat less e±cient. However, under certain conditions, the mutual exchange
will invest in the new project, even though it will not retain k on its platform in order to
improve its members' bargaining position vis-µ a-vis the outsider-owned exchange.
3. The competitive advantage of the outsider-owned exchange over the mutual exchange in-
creases if the outsider-owned exchange uses discriminatory o®ers. Additionally, the com-
petitive advantage is higher when the members of the exchange cannot coordinate their
actions.
4.2.2.2 Competition between stock exchanges with heterogeneous users
One important assumption of our analysis so far was that all users are homogeneous. However,
some investment projects of stock exchanges may have a diverse impact on their users. If one
thinks about investments in non-core business activities such as derivative trading, post-trading
activities and software sales, it is plausible to assume that these activities will a²ict stock ex-
change user groups, i.e. brokers, broker-dealers, investment banks and commercial banks, in
di®erent ways. Thus, we incorporate heterogeneity into the model to analyze these kinds of
investments. We will do so in a very simple and stark way by postulating that the investment
decision has a heterogeneous in°uence on the gross surplus µ which di®erent users of the ex-
change can extract. We thereby shortcut many interesting dimensions of these projects, which
may also in°uence the investment decision.
However, in line with the description of investment projects we are considering, one should
interpret µ as an externality exercised on the businesses of the users by the exchange's investment
21Not only the global games literature is in support of the risk dominance criterion. Also the evolution-
ary stochastic adjustment dynamics literature, typi¯ed for example by Young (1993), provides independent
theoretical justi¯cation for the selection of risk-dominant equilibria.
22Interestingly, the o®er generates approximately the same pro¯t for the outsider-owned exchange as the
optimal o®er structure when employing a divide-and-conquer strategy (see equation (B.3)).CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 74
decision. We will assume that authority matters in the sense that the investment decisions will
be taken by the majority of owners of the exchange. Furthermore, each individual µj is private
information of user group j, however, the distribution of µ is common knowledge.23
In the following we focus on the interaction between a mutual exchange X1 and an outsider-
owned exchange X2. To present the argument in the most simple form, we assume that even
though the investment is pro¯table, i.e. vE[µ] < I < (v + k)E[µ] holds, the surplus µ merely
stems from a fraction of users yh such that
E[µ] = yh £ µh ´ µ: (4.13)
Hence, a fraction yh of users experiences a positive impact by the investment project, µh, while
a fraction 1 ¡ yh has no positive in°uence, µ1¡h = 0. To incorporate the °avor of the one-
member, one-vote structure that is prevalent at mutual exchanges, we assume that the decision
rule regarding the investment project is a simple majority rule. Thus, in case of yh ¸ 0:5,
the members with a positive impact will take the decision regarding the investment project,
whereas it will be rejected for yh < 0:5, as a majority of members would not bene¯t from the
project, but would have to bear its costs. Let us presume that the outsider-owned exchange will
invest. We will see later on that, in equilibrium, this will always be the case. Which decision
will be taken by the mutual exchange?
In case the fraction yh of members has a majority in the mutual exchange, the outsider-
owned exchange attracts these members, if its o®er is
a2 · ah ´ c ¡ (µh ¡
I
v + k
): (4.14)
Note that ah di®ers from condition (4.6) by the term µh > µ, since the outsider-owned exchange
has to make an o®er, which matches the unit costs that the members with a strong positive
impact can expect, given that the mutual invests. And in fact the mutual exchange, acting in
the interest of its members with a positive impact, has a high incentive to invest, because only
in this case, they bene¯t from the "second-sourcing" e®ect. The mutual exchange will thus
invest, if it in°uences its members' rents positively, i.e. if
c(v + k) ¸ (c +
I ¡ vµh
v
)v + ahk: (4.15)
The condition for exchange X1 to invest is hence
I · IooHet =
µh(v + k)2
v + 2k
: (4.16)
Therefore, since we have IooHet > Ioo, even relatively high investment costs do not deter the
mutual exchange from investing in such a constellation. The investment costs will be borne in
part by the (1 ¡ yh)-fraction of members who are not positively a®ected by the investment, an
e®ect which increases the investment incentives of the yh-fraction of members. On the other
23More precisely, in line with the arguments made in Hart and Moore (1998) we are assuming that a ¯rm,
which is de¯ned by its non-human assets, has to assign the authority for decisions on the use of assets and
investments via its ownership structure, if a comprehensive contract cannot be written ex ante. Hence, in a
mutual the decision power rests with the members according to the one-member, one-vote rule. In contrast,
in an outsider-owned exchange the investors, which are solely interested in the pro¯tability of projects, possess
the control rights and can therefore be considered as homogeneous according to our understanding. Since we
assume the surplus from the investment µj to be private information, ex post ine±ciencies of the investment
decisions are possible. It is an open question whether sophisticated mechanisms are possible to recontract these
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hand, the members with no positive direct impact from the investment also pro¯t from the o®er
ah made by the outsider-owned exchange, since the outsider-owned exchange cannot distinguish
between di®erent member types. By o®ering ah to all members for their volume k, it provides in
fact a subsidy to the (1¡yh)-members. However, the outsider-owned exchange will still ¯nd it
pro¯table to make the o®er and invest into the project, since it can serve the additional volume
k at marginal costs c ¡ µ. Thus, in equilibrium, the outsider-owned exchange will invest. And
again, as already discussed for the case with homogeneous users, the investment propensity of
the outsider-owned exchange is always higher than that of the mutual exchange, as the former
attracts the users of the latter one.
What happens, when the members with µ1¡h = 0 possess the majority? In that case, the
mutual exchange will not invest, since the members in charge do not bene¯t from the investment.
The outsider-owned exchange merely has to o®er a2 · c to attract the yh-customers with the
positive impact.24 Summarizing this section we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2 With heterogeneous users we obtain the following results in a competitive en-
vironment with one mutual exchange and one outsider-owned exchange:
1. The mutual exchange will invest in the project if condition (4.16) is satis¯ed and members
with high value of µ are in the majority. However, the outsider-owned exchange has always
a higher investment propensity than the mutual exchange.
2. Price discriminating o®ers do not improve the competitive advantage of the outsider-owned
exchange.
3. If the members with µ = 0 are in the majority, the mutual exchange will never invest and
the outsider-owned exchange has the highest propensity to invest, since it merely has to
undercut a quite unfavorable o®er by the mutual, which gives the outsider-owned exchange
large pro¯t opportunities.
4.2.2.3 A graphical illustration
To conclude section 4.2.2 and thereby our analysis of the static case, we provide a graphical
illustration of our results. Figure 4.3 depicts the investment propensity of exchanges with
di®erent governance regimes and competition scenarios. More speci¯cally, for the parameter
values µ = 1, v = 1 and µh = 1:5£µ, we display how the threshold investment costs I (vertical
axis) depend on the level of competition approximated by k=v (horizontal axis), for di®erent
organizational forms. The areas under the respective graphs represent the feasible regions where
the exchanges will invest.
The benchmark case with the highest investment propensity over the whole range is repre-
sented by an outsider-owned, for-pro¯t exchange, indicated by the shaded area between the two
solid lines denoted as IFP. The outsider-owned exchange will always invest in the project as long
24When the outsider-owned exchange is allowed to use discriminatory o®ers, it can - as shown in appendix B.1
- exploit the externalities between the users of the mutual exchange. However, the optimal divide-and-conquer
policy is more di±cult to implement and not as e®ective now due to the heterogeneity of the members and their
privately observed information on µj. To see this, we need to change the framework slightly and assume that the
(1 ¡ yh)-group of user experience a small ²-value from the investment project instead of a zero value. Now an
outsider-owned exchange cannot use the o®er structure depicted in equation (B.2) to implement a snowballing
e®ect, since, literally speaking, the snowball created by the ¯rst o®er might not be su±cient to unleash a full-
scale avalanche. While the outsider-owned exchange cannot distinguish between users with a high and a low
value of µ, it has to overcome the informational problems by its o®er structure. We do not want to go into
more detail, but generally one can expect that the average o®er of the outsider-owned stock exchange E[aµ] will
be higher than the o®er depicted in equation (B.3). The outsider-owned exchange hence has an informational
disadvantage vis-µ a-vis the users it wants to lure to its platform, which makes the transaction more costly.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 76
Figure 4.3: Thresholds for Di®erent Governance Structures and Competition Levels
as it has a positive net present value, i.e. if the right hand side of inequality (4.1) holds. This
is depicted by the line IFPLowerBoundary. However, since, in equilibrium, the outsider-owned
exchange attracts the transferable volume of all members, it can at least partly appropriate the
surplus generated by this volume. In the extreme, i.e. if it acquires the whole rent, it reaches
an upper boundary of investment costs IFPUpperBoundary.
The graph Im (dashed line) illustrates the case, where a mutual faces competition from
another mutual entity. We see that the investment propensity rises quickly with the degree of
competition, but levels o® somewhat for higher k-to-v-ratios.
In contrast, a mutual exchange that competes against an outsider-owned exchange, denoted
as Ioo (dotted line), initially has a lower investment propensity, but surpasses Im for very high
degrees of competition, i.e. for k=v > 1:6.
For mutuals that have heterogeneous members, with a majority possessing µh = 1:5 £ µ,
the investment propensity will be as strong as at an outsider-owned exchange for low levels of
competition (¯ne dotted line denoted as IooHet). The reason is the above mentioned second-
sourcing e®ect in connection with the fact that part of the investment costs will be shared with
those members that have no positive impact from the investment. For high levels of competition
and high investment amounts, however, the costs of investing at the mutual exchange outweigh
the second-sourcing e®ect and make an investment by the mutual unattractive. Consequently,
the investment propensity will increase by a smaller pace than at the outsider-owned exchange.
Finally, if the majority of the members of the mutual exchange possess µ = 0, i.e. they
have no positive value from the investment, the exchange will not invest at all, which would
correspond to a horizontal line at I = 1 in the ¯gure.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 77
4.2.3 The dynamic model - Viability of organizational forms
The framework we used in the last sections was a one-shot game, which is useful to analyze
investment incentives in case of competition between di®erent organizational forms. In the
following, we want to focus on dynamic competition e®ects in order to analyze the viability of
the respective governance regimes, in particular that of mutuals.25 We will demonstrate that
under certain conditions, an incumbent mutual exchange cannot survive, if an outsider-owned
exchange enters its market. We will also see that an incumbent outsider-owned exchange will
survive against another outsider-owned exchange on the other hand. These results imply that
mutual exchanges that face competition from outsider-owned exchanges can only survive by
changing their organizational form. Thus, our model provides a theoretical intuition for the
ongoing demutualization wave in the stock exchange industry.
To model this, we consider an overlapping generations framework with discrete time periods
and an in¯nite time horizon, i.e. t = 0;1;2;:::;n. Users of an exchange live for two periods in
which they want to trade and in each period a new generation with a large number of users is
born. To simplify the exposition, we assume that each generation has a mass of 1. Thus, at
each period a "new" and an "old" generation exists, implying a continuum of agents of mass 2
at each date.
We denote the trading volume generated by the old generation at a certain time period
as v and normalize it to v = 1, whereas the new generation generates a volume of k = 1 at
the same date. Because of the long time periods we have in mind, we additionally assume a
discount factor per time period of ± < 1. Hence, in essence we are analyzing a particular case
of our basic setup in terms of volume. The young generation decides freely where to allocate its
trading volume k, while the old generation, for reasons to be explained in the next paragraph,
always sticks with its volume at the exchange it decided to go one period earlier, i.e. when it
constituted the young generation.
At each time period t ¡ 1, an identical investment opportunity with costs I arises for the
stock exchange and generates a gross surplus of µ for its users at date t. The investment is,
again in accordance with our basic setup, only bene¯cial if the young and the old generation
participate. Using the notation of the last section, the investment condition in discounted value
terms is
I < ±(v + k)µ with v;k = 1: (4.17)
In the following we analyze two organizational forms: (1) An outsider-owned exchange that
can charge an unconstrained trading fee of aoo
t to its users in t to ¯nance the investment that
was initiated in t¡1. (2) A mutual exchange that charges no entry fees and has no redemption
rights makes its members pay the same amount am
t in case of investment irrespective of the
generation they belong to.26 In addition, with the young and old generation members being
potentially heterogeneous groups, we have to specify the generation that has the control rights
in the mutual exchange. In an overlapping generations framework, a generation born in t ¡ 1,
but being in charge of the investment decision at date t, will have no incentive to invest into
a new investment project at date t. This is due to the fact that the payo®s of this investment
accrue at date t + 1, where this generation will not exist anymore. Since we consider a mutual
25In this section we borrow heavily from Rey and Tirole (2001).
26Hence, here we are considering a nondiscriminatory mutual in its purest form which is not allowed to use
entry fees, seniority-based charges, or redemption rights for members or transferable property rights. Of course,
this is not a realistic assumption. However, because of their governance structure mutuals typically do not have
the same high discriminatory power as outsider-owned ¯rms. Thus, just to clarify the argument, the analysis in
this section should be understood as modeling these di®erences in its extreme form. In a future version of the
paper, we want to conduct a more balanced analysis by analyzing mutuals with some discriminatory power.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 78
without redemption rights, there is no means by which they could bene¯t from the investment.
Hence, to prevent a negative bias in the analysis against the mutual exchange, we presume that
the investment decision rights will always be allocated to the young members.27
Investment behavior without competition Let us shortly discuss what happens in this
framework if there is no competition between exchanges. An outsider-owned exchange would
set a trading fee of
aoo
t = µ
in each period.28 In this way, it extracts all the rents resulting from the investment project.
Accordingly, the intertemporal pro¯t of the outsider-owned exchange can be described as
¦oo =
±(v + k)µ ¡ I
1 ¡ ±
: (4.18)
When comparing the pro¯t function with investment condition (4.17), it is obvious that the
investment will be undertaken as ¦oo > 0.
In contrast, a mutual exchange without discriminatory trading fees will have problems to
get the investment process started. In fact, the ¯rst generation of members has to ¯nance
two consecutive investment projects at date 0 and date 1 via its trading fees, but only obtains
returns from the ¯rst investment, which pays o® at date 1. In this sense, the members of
the second generation are free-riding on the ¯rst generation, since the mutual exchange is not
allowed to charge di®erent trading fees to users at a certain point of time. Let us consider this
more formally. Given the investment process gets started, in the steady state, the trading fees
at each date would be
(v + k)am
t = I for t > 0: (4.19)
This will result in a net surplus V m for each generation of members that is born after date 0,
which amounts to
V m
t = µt + ±µt+1 ¡
It
2
¡ ±
It+1
2
= (1 + ±)(µ ¡
I
2
) for t > 0 (4.20)
since µt = µt+1 ´ µ and It = It+1 ´ I. To understand equation (4.20), note the following: At
period t, a member of the new generation that is born in this period has to share the investment
costs It with the old generation and enjoys the gross surplus µt stemming from the investment
at date t¡1. It also has to take into account that it will have to ¯nance the investment costs of
the next project at date t+1 with its trading fees in that period, which will be shared with the
new generation, but also will enjoy the surplus µt+1 from the investment project of date t + 1
initiated at date t. Therefore, both components have to be discounted by the factor ±. Given
our assumption on the investment project (4.17), this surplus is positive. Table 1 illustrates
the overlapping generations (OLG) structure for an ongoing mutual exchange with µt(It¡1)
denoting the surplus of an t ¡ 1-investment at date t.
However, to analyze whether a mutual exchange invests in the ¯rst place, one has to consider
27To align such a decision process with the majority rule, we only have to assume that the population of
young users grows by a constant rate of ´ > 0 from period to period. For notational convenience we skip this
issue here.
28To simplify the exposition in this section, we de¯ne the trading fee here in relation to the surplus generated
by the investment. Hence, the trading fees are the net surcharges which users of the exchange have to incur as
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t = 1;2;::: t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3
Generation t µt(It¡1);
It
2 µt+1(It);
It+1
2
Generation t+1 µt+1(It);
It+1
2 µt+2(It+1);
It+2
2
Generation t+2 µt+2(It+1);
It+2
2 µt+3(It+2);
It+3
2
Table 4.1: The OLG Structure
that the ¯rst investment project will only get started if
V m
0 = ±µ ¡ am
0 ¡ am
1 = ±(µ ¡
I
2
) ¡ I > 0; (4.21)
which describes the fact that the ¯rst generation has to bear the investment costs of the ¯rst
project at t = 0 alone, and share the costs of the second project at t = 1, from which it will not
even bene¯t. Hence, the surplus from the investment project, µ, must be relatively high in order
to get the investment project started. Inserting v;k = 1 and comparing (4.21) with (4.18), one
can easily see that projects with a smaller surplus will be started only by an outsider-owned
exchange. The reason for this is that a mutual exchange invests, if the surplus is higher than
µ = I
2+ I
±, whereas the outsider-owned exchange already invests for a surplus higher than µ = I
2.
We conclude that even if a mutual exchange does not face competition by other exchanges, it
has a lower propensity than an outsider-owned exchange of investing into projects, as long as
it is not allowed to charge new members for investments made in the past. In e®ect, we have a
time horizon problem in the sense that socially desirable investments might not be undertaken.
Therefore, the analysis so far leads to similar results as stated in proposition 1 and 2.
Competition between two mutuals Competition in this framework will, similarly to our
basic setup, center on the decision where the young generation will allocate its volume. For
the old generation it makes no sense to switch to a new-entrant exchange, which still has to
invest. The payo®s of this investment will accrue at a time where the old generation does not
exist anymore. In the following, we assume, as in most parts of section 4.2.2.1, that the users
can coordinate themselves to take the o®er, which ¯ts best their common interest, i.e. we apply
the Pareto-dominance criterion. First, we want to analyze the case, where an existing mutual
exchange, which has invested in the past, faces the threat of entry by a rival mutual exchange.
As can be seen from condition (4.20), the surplus for each young generation from trading at
the incumbent mutual exchange is (1 + ±)(µ ¡ I
2). A rival mutual exchange m0 could at best
make an o®er according to equation (4.21) of V m
0
0 = ±(µ ¡ I
2) ¡ I, which is clearly less. Hence,
a rival mutual exchange cannot succeed in taking over the market from the incumbent, if it has
not invested in the new project beforehand and, naturally, if the investment projects of the two
rival exchanges are similarly e±cient. This result indicates that it is di±cult for a newcomer
mutual exchange to compete against an incumbent exchange, if the newcomer does not possess
a project that is far better.
Competition between a mutual and an outsider-owned exchange The second case we
want to analyze is the competition between an incumbent mutual exchange and a newly created
outsider-owned exchange. The outsider-owned exchange knows that the mutual exchange will
break down if the former can convince the new generation of users to trade on its exchange. In
that case, the members would not retain their volume at the mutual exchange, and since the
old members cannot pro¯t from a new investment, they would decide not to invest, accordingly.
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is better than that of X1. Thus, if the pro¯t of setting up a new outsider-owned exchange is
higher than the surplus the young generation receives when trading its volume at the incumbent
mutual exchange, i.e.
¦oo =
±(v + k)µ ¡ I
1 ¡ ±
> (1 + ±)(µ ¡
I
2
); (4.22)
X2 can make an o®er aoo¤ to the young generation such that its payo® from trading at X2 is
at least as high as (1+±)(µ ¡ I
2). The young generation will trade at X2, thereby generating a
pro¯t of ¦oo ¡ aoo¤ for the exchange. Inserting v;k = 1 and rearranging gives us the following
condition
4±µ + 2µ(±2 ¡ 1) ¡ I(1 + ±2) > 0; (4.23)
which must be satis¯ed to defeat the incumbent mutual exchange's o®er. A closer look at this
condition shows that this will be more likely for higher values of µ and ±, and lower investment
costs I. Then the rents, which can be expropriated from the young users, are large enough
to enable X2 to take over the market. Using the same line of argument, it is obvious that
an entrant organized as mutual cannot defeat an incumbent outsider-owned exchange. The
outsider-owned exchange, maximizing the pro¯ts of its investors, always has the possibility to
underbid the o®er made by the mutual exchange. Thus, we can postulate that in competition
with an investor-owned exchange the mutual exchange is fragile, even if it has an incumbency
advantage.
Competition between two outsider-owned exchanges Finally, we analyze the case in
which an incumbent outsider-owned exchange faces the competitive threat by another outsider-
owned exchange. The incumbent stock exchange again bene¯ts from the fact that it has already
invested in the past period. This ensures the stability and viability of the exchange in future
periods. However, the incumbent outsider-owned exchange is constrained in the level of fees it
can charge to the new generation. The potential entrant could induce the young generation to
join the organization, in fact forming a new for-pro¯t exchange by its own. Such an exchange
would secure its owners at least ¡I + ±µ, even if it is anticipated that both exchange will
compete later on for the still unborn generation in a Bertrand-fashion. Hence, if the investment
project is so valuable that ±µ > I, the incumbent outsider-owned exchange cannot extract all
the rents from its users. The better the investment technology of the potential rival exchange,
the lower will be the pro¯ts of the incumbent exchange. We believe that exactly such a market
environment describes today's situation in the stock exchange industry quite well. The stock
exchanges face strong competition by users which, due to technological developments, can
threaten to, and actually do, form their own trading platforms.
Competition between a mutual and an outsider-owned exchange - revisited How-
ever, this competitive threat also has an interesting feedback-e®ect on the o®er, which an
entering outsider-owned stock exchange can make to the young generation of an incumbent
mutual exchange. Anticipating that it will face strong competition of the type just described
in later periods, the outsider-owned exchange can o®er at best its surplus
¦oo =
±(v + k)µ ¡ ±µ
1 ¡ ±
; (4.24)
which has to be higher than (1 + ±)(µ ¡ I
2) in order to acquire the young generation. Inserting
and rearranging gives a new and stricter condition on the parameters of the investment project
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generation's volume only if:
±µ
2µ ¡ I
>
1 ¡ ±2
2
: (4.25)
Therefore, the anticipation of competition in the future deters the outsider-owned exchange
slightly from taking over the market from the mutual exchange. However, the comparative
statics regarding the parameters of the investment project remain the same as stated above.
Heterogeneity of users Heterogeneity of users would presumably strengthen the e®ects we
described in this section. As already discussed in section 4.2.2.2, the competitive edge of the
outsider-owned exchange is fostered, while the stability of the mutual exchange su®ers when the
members are heterogenous and the members with a low µ are in the majority. Insofar, we can
expect that the dynamics, which we were able to illustrate here, will be even more powerful in
case of investment projects with heterogeneity. In line with our interpretation of such projects,
we therefore should observe particularly investments into non-core activities in order to unravel
the market dynamics we described. However, a formal analysis of the heterogeneous case will
be conserved for a later version of the paper. Summarizing the discussion in this section leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions that each period provides an investment project, which
is only pro¯table for the exchange's total per period business (v+k) and which has a homogenous
in°uence on users, we have the following results in an overlapping generations approach:
1. An incumbent mutual exchange cannot survive against an outsider-owned stock exchange
when condition (4.25) holds.
2. In contrast, an incumbent outsider-owned exchange can never be defeated by a mutual
exchange.
3. The threat of entry by other for-pro¯t stock exchanges or trading platforms does not un-
dermine the viability of an incumbent outsider-owned exchange. However, it limits the
market power of the incumbent outsider-owned stock exchange and forces it to share some
rents with the new users, thereby making the exchange less pro¯table.
Considering these three cases together, a mutual exchange, facing competition from an outsider-
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4.3 Empirical evidence
4.3.1 Hypotheses
The main results of our theoretical model need to be tested empirically in order to verify their
validity. In particular, we are interested whether exchanges are indeed more likely to demu-
tualize when they are under competitive pressure and whether an outsider-owned governance
structure increases the propensity to invest into related activities, which is the essence of our
propositions derived in section 4.2. We will therefore focus on two hypotheses that can be tested
by the data available to us. First, as in Ramos (2005), we test whether competitive pressure
has an impact on the likelihood that exchanges demutualize. Thus our ¯rst hypothesis states:
H1: Competitive pressure will increase the likelihood of demutualization for exchanges.
Second, we want to verify our theoretical outcome that for-pro¯t exchanges have a stronger
tendency to invest into related business activities than mutual exchanges. Our ¯ndings in the
model refer foremost to outsider-owned exchanges as the results are mainly driven by the fact
that these exchanges can take investment decisions unconstrained of correlated business inter-
ests that their members have. Therefore, we state the following hypothesis on this subject:
H2: Outsider-owned exchanges are more likely to invest into post-trading, derivatives trad-
ing and IT-development activities than mutuals.
4.3.2 Methodology
As we will see in detail in section 4.3.3, we employ variables describing the related activities,
the governance regimes, and the competitive environment of exchanges. We will employ Probit
regressions to test our hypotheses, since the data structure of our dependent variables, i.e. the
governance and related activities variables, are all of dichotomous nature. One way to approach
this issue is to estimate the e®ects of competitive pressure on the likelihood of demutualization
and the e®ects that demutualization and competitive pressure have on the likelihood of investing
into related business activities in two separate univariate Probit regressions. However, this
creates a potential endogeneity problem as demutualization itself is explained by the competition
variables and thus cannot assumed to be exogenously given, when we consider the investment
activities of exchanges in related activities. As a result, it is more prudent to employ a bivariate
Probit model as was proposed by Greene (1998) and Greene (2000, p.849-852) and estimate
the investment decision and demutualization equations simultaneously.29
As we consider three distinct related areas in which exchanges can invest, we will estimate
three simultaneous equation pairs. The ¯rst pair of equations calculates Probit regressions on
the likelihood that the exchange invests into post-trading activities (SETTLE) and that the
exchange is demutualized (DEMUT), respectively. For the remaining two pairs of equation
systems, we substitute the dependent variable of the ¯rst equation with DERIV and SOFT in
order to estimate the likelihood of an exchange being active in the derivatives and IT-services
29One drawback of this approach is that we cannot take into consideration our panel data structure as such
a model is not provided by Stata 8. To alleviate this problem, we will adjust for within-cluster correlation of
exchanges by using the cluster option. Additionally, we will separately estimate univariate random e®ects Probit
regressions for robustness check purposes, as is outlined in Greene (2000, p.837-842) The results are provided in
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business, respectively. Therefore, the three regressions have the following form:
SETTLE = ~ ¯1
0
~ x1 + ²1; SETTLE = 1 if SETTLE > 0; 0 else
DEMUT = ~ ¯2
0
~ x2 + ²2; DEMUT = 1 if DEMUT > 0; 0 else
(4.26)
DERIV = ~ ¯1
0
~ x1 + ²1; DERIV = 1 if DERIV > 0; 0 else
DEMUT = ~ ¯2
0
~ x2 + ²2; DEMUT = 1 if DEMUT > 0; 0 else
(4.27)
SOFT = ~ ¯1
0
~ x1 + ²1; SOFT = 1 if SOFT > 0; 0 else
DEMUT = ~ ¯2
0
~ x2 + ²2; DEMUT = 1 if DEMUT > 0; 0 else
(4.28)
E[²1] = E[²2] = 0; respectively
V ar[²1] = V ar[²2] = 1; respectively
Cov[²1;²2] = ½; respectively
The maximum likelihood estimation is derived from the following equations with respective
bivariate cumulative normal distributions ©:
Pr[SETTLE = 1;DEMUT = 1j~ x1; ~ x2] = ©(~ ¯1
0
~ x1; ~ ¯2
0
~ x2;½)
(4.29)
Pr[DERIV = 1;DEMUT = 1j~ x1; ~ x2] = ©(~ ¯1
0
~ x1; ~ ¯2
0
~ x2;½)
(4.30)
Pr[SOFT = 1;DEMUT = 1j~ x1; ~ x2] = ©(~ ¯1
0
~ x1; ~ ¯2
0
~ x2;½)
(4.31)
Hence, the bivariate Probit model allows us to estimate the two equations simultaneously.
In the spirit of the seemingly unrelated regression models, the disturbances may correlate and
will be displayed by the parameter ½.30
4.3.3 Data description
In equations (4.26) - (4.31) , vectors ~ x1 and ~ x2 are a (sub)set of independent variables with
accompanying coe±cients ~ ¯1 and ~ ¯2. To capture governance and competition, we employ the
variables depicted in table 4.2. The ¯rst column provides the names of the employed variables,
while the second column o®ers a brief description. The third column speci¯es in which form
these variables are used in our regressions. Consider for example SETTLE, which is one of
two dependent variables in our ¯rst simultaneous equations pair. For our independent vari-
ables, BOARDCOMP, for instance, is included in both ~ x1 and ~ x2, whereas LISTED, indicating
exchanges with outsider-ownership, is only part of vector ~ x1. As the purpose of the second
equation and vector ~ x2 is to estimate the determinants that a®ect the likelihood of demutu-
alization, it makes no sense to include a state of governance that cannot exist prior to the
restructuring. Columns four and ¯ve provide the mean and standard deviation of our variables,
respectively.
In the following, we will describe the variables that we hand-collected for that purpose
30In a univariate Probit model, in contrast, the implicit assumption is that ½ = 0.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 84
Variable Description in Regression Mean SD
SETTLEi;t Dummy for exchange i possessing post-trading in t Dep. Variable 0.438 0.50
DERIVi;t Dummy for exchange i possessing derivatives trading in t Dep. Variable 0.623 0.49
SOFTi;t Dummy for exchange i possessing software sales in t Dep. Variable 0.200 0.40
DEMUTi;t Dummy for exchange i if demutualized in t Dep. Variable 0.508 0.50
LISTEDi;t Dummy for exchange i if publicly listed in t ~ x1 0.254 0.44
BOARDCOMPi;t Composition of board of directors of exchange i in t ~ x1,~ x2 0.565 0.22
calculated as representation of di®erent stakeholder
groups by directors (sum of squared fractions of broker,
issuer, investor, state and other representatives)
¢TRADEREVi;t Change in revenues per traded share from Cash market ~ x1,~ x2 -0.08 0.37
operations of exchange i from t to t+1
CMCONTROLi;t Index for openness of capital markets provided Fraser ~ x1,~ x2 7.293 1.89
Institute in home country of exchange i in t
TRADECOSTi;t Elkins/McSherry trading costs (commissions and fees only) ~ x1,~ x2 33.27 16.3
in home country of exchange i in t
SIZEi;t Log value of equity shares traded (PPP-adjusted) ~ x1,~ x2 12.36 1.99
at exchange i in t
Table 4.2: Data Description
in more detail. While some of our variables are straightforward, the employed variables to
capture the notion of competitive pressure require a lengthier discussion as it is rather fuzzy in
its speci¯cation.
We acquired annual descriptive data on 50 stock exchanges, which are considered to be
the main equity trading entities in the world according to the World Federation of Exchanges
(FIBV), from the HP Handbook of World Stock, Derivatives & Commodity Exchanges 1999-
2004 and the annual trading statistics reports of the FIBV. Additionally, we gathered infor-
mation from stock exchange annual reports, web sites and by direct mail correspondence with
exchanges.
We collected country-speci¯c data from three sources: (1) Information on trading costs for
42 countries, which we were able to collect from the Institutional Investor that provided the
¯gures calculated by Elkins/McSherry.31 (2) To capture the economic openness of a country's
capital markets, we used the 'Capital Market Controls' measure of the Fraser Institute compiled
by Gwartney and Lawson (2005). (3) We used exchange rate and purchasing power parity data
from the World Bank 'World Development Indicators' for currency conversion purposes.
Depending on the data requirements of our respective empirical analyses, we either consid-
ered the full sample of countries or only a subsample of it. The full sample was used to provide
the descriptive 'event-studies' presented in section 4.1 and discussed in more detail in appendix
B.6. Our regression analysis on the other hand demanded a richer data set, which reduced the
sample size to 26 exchanges. The period under consideration is from 1999 until 2003, although
for one variable (¢TRADEREV) we also considered the change in data from 2003 to 2004.
To test the hypotheses advanced in section 4.3.1 empirically, we need variables that (1)
capture di®erent governance regimes, (2) related business areas that stock exchanges could
potentially invest in, and (3) the notion of competitive pressure. In the following, we will
discuss these variables in more detail.
31We obtained the data for the years 1996-1999 and 2001-2004. For the year 2000, unfortunately we were not
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Related business activities We will employ variables capturing related business activities
for hypothesis H2. To that end, we identi¯ed the provision of derivatives trading, post-trading
services and IT services as the main activities that are related to the traditional cash market
operations of stock exchanges. We assigned the following dummy variables: (1) If an exchange
reported derivatives trading volume to the FIBV and/or reported revenues from this activity
in its annual reports and/or stated a majority stake in a derivatives platform in its annual
reports, we assigned DERIV =1, and DERIV =0 otherwise. (2) An exchange was assumed to
provide post-trading services, if it either reported these revenues separately and/or stated a
majority stake in a settlement institution in its annual reports. We then assigned SETTLE=1,
and SETTLE=0 otherwise. (3) Finally, exchanges that reported revenues from IT-service
activities were assigned SOFT=1, and SOFT=0 otherwise.
Governance regime We need governance variables for both stated hypotheses. For hypothe-
sis H1, we need a dependent variable that indicates whether an exchange has converted towards
a demutualized entity. For hypothesis H2, we will employ a governance variable as independent
explanatory variable, capturing outsider ownership in the exchange.
We distinguish between the following three di®erent governance regimes: We de¯ne an
exchange as (1) mutual, if the entity has not announced demutualization and operates on a
one-member, one-vote basis or is controlled by the state. An exchange is considered as (2)
demutualized, if the exchange announced demutualization, but has not sought a public listing
yet. And an exchange is considered to possess a (3) demutualized, outsider-dominated structure,
if it is publicly listed.
To operationalize the distinctions, we de¯ne two dummy variables. The variables can take
the following con¯gurations: (1) A mutual exchange, denoted as DEMUT = 0^LISTED = 0,
i.e. neither demutualized nor listed. (2) A demutualized exchange, denoted as DEMUT =
1 ^ LISTED = 0, i.e. demutualized but not listed. (3) A publicly listed exchange, denoted as
DEMUT = 1 ^ LISTED = 1, i.e. both demutualized and listed.32
Competition In our regressions, we are interested whether competition a®ects the behavior
of exchanges to demutualize (Hypothesis H1). Additionally, when we estimate the impact of
outsider ownership on investment decisions at stock exchanges, our regression models will also
employ competition variables as control variables (Hypothesis H2).
Specifying competition in the stock exchange industry is relatively straightforward in theory
and there is a signi¯cant body of literature that devoted to di®erent aspects of competition in
this area.33 However, most empirical attempts to measure competition focus on one or few
exchanges and normally use bid-ask spread information.34 Large-scale international compar-
isons on the level of competition at stock exchanges are much rarer due to the demanding data
requirements.
Alternative methods used by industrial economists to quantify competition seem to be
di±cult to implement in this industry. Take for example the widely used Her¯ndahl-index,
which infers information on the competitive environment by calculating a concentration measure
within an industry. Such an approach is not directly applicable here for at least two reasons: (1)
On a country level, the number of sizable competitors is limited. In many countries the exchange
industry has already consolidated, resulting in one major national stock exchange that serves
32Note that the con¯guration DEMUT = 0^LISTED = 1 does not exist, since all listed exchanges underwent
a demutualization process before.
33Ramos (2003) provides a comprehensive survey on the literature concerned with competition in the stock
exchange industry.
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the lion's share of transactions.35 A noticeable domestic threat to the incumbent exchanges may
arise from alternative electronic trading venues and from large ¯nancial institutions that match
customer buy and sell orders internally. Thus, if we had data on these trading volumes, such a
concentration measure would be meaningful. However, to our knowledge, there is no database
that is both consistent and comprehensive enough to meet our cross-sectional and longitudinal
requirements. (2) Instead of measuring concentration within a national market, one could create
supranational regions or even one 'world region'. However, besides the fact that the selection
of regions would be highly subjective due to the lack of a clear distinguishing criterion, such
an approach would also ignore the still persisting regulatory constraints for e®ective cross-
country competition and home bias in equities trading.36 Hence, it would be misleading to
assume that stock exchanges are competing directly against each other on a (global) level
playing ¯eld, as such a setting would strongly depend on the openness of the ¯nancial market
to potential competitors. By the same token, we believe that for most countries in our sample,
competitive pressure is more likely to be exerted by other domestic players, be they competing
regional exchanges, electronic trading platforms or the exchanges' own customers. Therefore, a
concentration measure on the national level would be more desirable in principle.
A further method is the use of the H-statistics by Panzar and Rosse (1987) in order to
derive revenue elasticities for each exchange, providing a crude indicator whether the considered
entity operates under perfect competition, monopolistic competition, or no competition. The
method has great appeal insofar as it seeks to measure the impact of competition directly at
the exchange. Andersen (2003) uses this approach and provides a measure for exchange-speci¯c
level of competition. One drawback is that the method demands a comprehensive breakdown of
the cost and revenues, which we do not possess for all exchanges in our sample. Furthermore, it
assumes that the ¯rm objective is to maximize its pro¯ts, a condition that cannot be maintained
for the mutual exchanges in our sample.
Another, more general point of concern when measuring competitive pressure is that ex-
changes are engaged in several activities that can experience di®erent degrees of competitive
pressure. For our purposes, it makes sense to focus on competition in the cash market opera-
tions for at least two reasons: (1) Cash operations represent the set of activity, which is provided
by every stock exchange in our sample, whereas other - related - activities are only o®ered by
some of them. Thus, in order to ensure comparability of our competition variables, we should
concede ourselves to this activity. (2) Cash trading is what stock exchanges have been created
for, initially. Thus, if we believe that competitive pressure had an impact on the decision of
some stock exchanges to restructure their governance regime, we would conclude that the main
driver for such a move should be strongly correlated with an exchanges' perception of how
threatened this core activity is. In any case, even when we merely focus on the cash market
operations, we are confronted with several distinct activities such as issuer services, trading
services, the dissemination of market information and regulatory functions that may all be in-
°uenced di®erently by the underlying economical characteristics and the regulatory framework
of the industry. Although the competitive pressure felt in these activities may be correlated
to some extent, it becomes clear that measuring competition in this industry is far from being
one-dimensional. As a result, we seek to shed light to this issue from multiple angles in order
35The exception represents the situation in the US, where Nasdaq and NYSE process both signi¯cant volumes
in US equities. Also, in some countries such as Germany, regional exchanges still exist, but the trading volumes
are insigni¯cant compared to those of the main incumbent.
36In countries such as Italy, Spain and France, the national exchange still enjoys considerable regulatory
protection by the so-called concentration rule, which serves as a barrier against entrants. However, with the
implementation of a new regulatory framework for the European securities industry (MiFID) in 2007, the
European Commission strives to create a more level playing ¯eld within the EU.CHAPTER 4. INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF STOCK EXCHANGES 87
to achieve a comprehensive picture of the level of competition that an exchange experiences.
In total, we will employ ¯ve competition variables in our regressions, which we discuss in the
following:
(1) BOARDCOMP: One way to approach competitive pressure is to infer information from
the relative bargaining power of di®erent stakeholders of the exchange, particularly that of
banks and brokers. The intuition is that - provided that exchanges were initially established
by intermediaries - this group also had the control over the entity, which should be observable
in their representation in the board of directors. Now, consider a situation where, due to more
outside options for other stakeholder groups, such as issuers and investors, their bargaining
power declines vis-µ a-vis these other groups. This may happen when new trading venues o®er
their services to issuers and investors. As a consequence, it seems likely that banks and brokers
would be willing to grant a greater say to these customer groups by o®ering seats on the
exchange's board. Thus an increased diversity of representation could be interpreted as a loss
in bargaining power by the incumbent intermediaries, which should be the result of increased
competitive pressure on the exchange and therefore could be the precursor to demutualization.
To this end, we assessed the board's degree of homogeneity. In a ¯rst step we distinguished
between ¯ve stakeholder groups, namely intermediaries, issuers, investors, state and other, and
counted the number of non-executive board directors that represent these groups. In a second
step, we divided each groups' number of representatives by the total number of directors,
squared the results and summed them up. As a result, our measure can reach a minimum value
of 0.2 for a completely uniform distribution of representation among the ¯ve stakeholder groups
and a maximum value of 1.0 for boards that are completely dominated by one group, which
is usually the group of banks and brokers.37 For our sample of 26 exchanges, we were able to
calculate the variable in all years except for Euronext and Singapore in 1999. Here, we assumed
a similar representation in the boards as in 2000, respectively. For our regressions, we ex ante
assume that lower values of our measure will make a demutualization more likely. Thus, we
expect a negative coe±cient.
(2) ¢TRADEREV: This variable captures competition in a more direct way by focusing on
the fees charged to its customers. Since the fee structure at exchanges is often very compli-
cated and subject to negotiation with the customers, the o±cial trading fees are neither very
meaningful nor comparable across exchanges. We therefore approach this issue by calculating
the revenues the exchanges earned per traded share to approximate their true fee structure.
Acknowledging the fact that exchanges will di®er in the way they report their revenues for cash
trading activities and which components of trading services are included in these ¯gures, we
realize that the absolute level of revenues per traded share is not very useful. However, the
change of revenues per traded share may have a stronger explanatory power for competitive
pressure. The intuition is simple: Exchanges will tend to lower their prices (i.e. the revenues
per share) only if they actually have to do so, which should often coincide with increased com-
petitive pressure.38 For our sample of 26 exchanges, we thus calculated the annual log-changes
in revenues per traded share. From this measure, we ex ante expect a negative coe±cient as
this implies that a decrease in revenues led to a higher likelihood of demutualization.
37Our intuition remains largely una®ected for countries were the exchange was founded by the state. In our
sample, the exchanges of Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur and Thailand were wholly owned by the state in 2003 and
state representatives make up the majority of directors in the board. Thus, for these exchanges, our measure is
close to one and therefore points in the same direction as if the board was only represented by intermediaries.
Since a state-owned exchange is usually not under ¯erce competitive pressure, the inference on competition
should be una®ected by this control structure.
38This line of reasoning may be less appealing in the case of not-for-pro¯t mutuals, which may also lower
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(3) CMCONTROL: The economic openness of an exchange's home capital market could
provide an indication on the contestability of the ¯nancial services industry in general and
the stock exchange industry in particular. Thus, if a capital market is more open, then its
incumbent should be under stronger competitive pressure than an exchange operating in a
very repressive capital markets environment. To operationalize this notion, we used the index
of 'Capital Market Controls' provided by Fraser Institute for the home capital markets in
our sample, which assigns index values ranging from 1 (repressive) to 10 (completely open).39
According to the metrics of this index, we would expect a positive coe±cient, as this would
mean that higher openness leads to higher competition, which in turn leads to higher likelihood
of demutualization.
(4) TRADECOST: The trading fees and commissions that investors have to bear when they
trade varies signi¯cantly across exchanges. We presume that this should be somewhat inversely
related with the degree of competition that exchanges are exposed to. This is due to the fact
that exchanges that operate in a more competitive environment will be forced to keep trading
fees and commissions lower ceteris paribus than at trading venues, where competitive pressure is
absent. To proxy this notion, we obtained data from the Institutional Investor which presented
the trading costs incurred by institutional investors and calculated by Elkins/McSherry for the
years 1998-2004.40 The reports break the costs down into an explicit component, which include
fees and commissions for brokerage and exchange services, and into a cost component that is
more implicit in nature, namely market-impact costs. Since the latter depends strongly on the
depths of the underlying market and to a lesser extent on the degree of competition in this
industry, we decided to consider only the explicit cost components of trading.41 We expect
that lower trading costs are the result of competitive pressure and will lead to higher likelihood
of demutualization. We therefore presume a negative coe±cient.
(5) SIZE: It is well documented in the economic literature on network industries that larger
¯rms will possess a stronger bargaining power vis-µ a-vis its customers and will tend to resist
competitive pressure more easily than smaller exchanges.42 We therefore want to include a
proxy for the size of an exchange. As we are primarily interested in describing the competitive
position of the exchange in its traditional cash market, we opted for the log values of annual
trading volume in equity shares at an exchanges in US dollars.43 We expect this variable to
possess a negative relation to the likelihood of changing the governance regime.
4.3.4 Empirical Results
Table 4.3 displays the results from the bivariate Probit regressions for n=130 observations,
where the upper panel displays the results from our maximum likelihood estimates for the ¯rst
equation (SETTLE, DERIV, SOFT) and the lower panel shows the estimates from the second
39We used the data from column '4E' of the Economic Freedom of the World 2005 Annual Report data base
for the years 2000-2003. For the year 1999 in our sample, we employed the data from 1995 as this was the closest
year in which this data was provided prior to 2000.
40By using this type of data we implicitly presume that the trading costs measured per country are equal to
the costs for the respective national exchange, we included in our sample, which may not be completely the case
for countries possessing additional (regional) exchanges.
41Otherwise, exchanges with are larger liquidity pool could be potentially favored in our analysis vis-µ a-vis
smaller exchanges merely on the grounds of possessing a deeper market. When comparing the portion of market
impact costs as of total cost in the Elkins-McSherry data base for the top and bottom quartile of exchanges
measured by value of shares traded in 2004, we however did not ¯nd large di®erences. They amount to 36% and
33%, respectively. As expected, incorporating market impact costs into our analysis therefore has no signi¯cant
e®ect on our results.
42For economics of network industries see for example Economides (1996)
43We adjusted the ¯gures by the purchasing power parity obtained from the data bases of the World Bank
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equation (DEMUT), respectively. The respective Wald-Â2-value for each of the three regressions
in columns (2), (3) and (4) is large, signifying that the hypothesis that our estimated coe±cients
are zero can be rejected. The correlation term ½ suggests that the correlation for our SOFT-
regression in column (3) seems to deviate substantially from zero. Furthermore, the Wald-test of
½=0 provides weakly signi¯cant support on the 15%-level that the term is signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero. As a result, a separate estimation of the DEMUT and SOFT-regression should be
treated with caution.44
Bivariate Probit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Related Business Activity: SETTLE DERIV SOFTWARE
LISTED 1.053** 0.749* 1.372**
Std. Err. 0.462 0.397 0.603
BOARDCOMP 0.148 0.677 0.118
Std. Err. 0.843 0.936 0.998
¢TRADEREV 0.417 -0.032 -0.469*
Std. Err. 0.370 0.297 0.265
CMCONTROL -0.283** -0.02 0.179
Std. Err. 0.126 0.136 0.219
TRADECOST 0.006 -0.056*** -0.035y
Std. Err. 0.012 0.014 0.022
SIZE 0.019 -0.377** 0.006
Std. Err. 0.102 0.162 0.123
CONST 1.115 6.503*** -2.058
Std. Err. 1.919 2.406 2.809
Demutualization:
BOARDCOMP -2.681*** -2.554*** -2.684***
Std. Err. 0.940 0.897 0.957
¢TRADEREV -0.209 -0.188 -0.202
Std. Err. 0.439 0.443 0.433
CMCONTROL 0.298*** 0.301*** 0.301***
Std. Err. 0.115 0.114 0.113
TRADECOST -0.024* -0.023* -0.023*
Std. Err. 0.014 0.012 0.013
SIZE -0.270*** -0.266*** -0.263***
Std. Err. 0.094 0.097 0.092
CONST 3.454* 3.282* 3.295*
Std. Err. 1.833 1.783 1.769
Observations 130 130 130
Wald ¡ Â
2 60.64 74.42 43.03
½ 0.305 0.154 0.369
Wald test of ½ = 0 :
Â
2=Prob > Â
2 1.650/0.199 0.357/0.549 2.315/0.128
y, ¤, ¤¤, ¤ ¤ ¤, represent 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4.3: Bivariate Probit Regressions Results
Results for hypothesis H1 Hypothesis H1 stated that increased competitive pressure will
increase the likelihood of demutualization. As can be seen in table 4.3, demutualization is sig-
ni¯cantly in°uenced by all of our competition variables, save for the ¢TRADEREV-variable.45
The results virtually do not vary across our three regressions in columns (2), (3) and (4). As
expected, a less homogeneous board composition, i.e. when BOARDCOMP becomes smaller,
signi¯cantly increases the likelihood of demutualization, which supports the notion that ex-
changes being under stronger competitive pressure (here expressed in terms of their bargaining
power vis-µ a-vis other stakeholder groups) were more likely to demutualize. A similar picture
provides our CMCONTROL-variable, where we observe a signi¯cant increase in the propensity
44We provide the results from estimating the equations separately in appendix B.5 as a robustness check
to our bivariate regressions. For that matter, we employed univariate Probit regressions with clustering and
with random e®ects as well as a univariate Logit regression with random e®ects. However, we ¯nd no material
changes in our estimates except for the DERIV-regressions, where the coe±cients of the LISTED-variable is
only signi¯cant in the Probit regression with clustering. Furthermore, the estimate of the DERIV-equation in
the Logit random e®ects model does not bring useful results.
45However, at least the sign in all three regressions is as expected: A decrease in revenues per traded share
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to demutualize at exchanges that are based in countries with relatively open and thus more
competitive capital markets. Our variable TRADECOST also signi¯cantly displays the ex-
pected negative sign, implying that lower trading costs for investors lead to a higher likelihood
of demutualization. Finally, our SIZE-measure also produces the expected results, displaying a
signi¯cantly negative relation between size of the exchange and its likelihood of demutualization.
In summary, our regressions strongly support our theoretically derived hypothesis H1 that
competitive pressure in°uences the likelihood of demutualization.46
Results for hypothesis H2 Hypothesis H2 states that an outsider-owned governance struc-
ture will have a positive impact on the likelihood of investments into related activities.
Our results con¯rm hypothesis H2 for all three related business activities, as the coe±cient
of the LISTED-variable is signi¯cantly positive in each case. However, the relationship seems
to be weaker in the DERIV-case, where we see signi¯cance only on the 10%-level.
The impact of outsider-ownership on the propensity of exchanges to invest into related
activities is quite clear. Each of the regressions indicates that outsider-owned exchanges are
more active in this ¯eld. Interestingly, this observation is not as clear for investments into
derivatives trading. Furthermore, our robustness checks with univariate Probit regressions
largely do not con¯rm a signi¯cantly positive impact of outsider-ownership on the likelihood of
possessing a derivatives trading platform. Therefore, customer-owned mutuals might be equally
likely to invest in this ¯eld. Using the line of argument of our model, we would argue that this
may be due to the higher proximity of the derivatives business with the customers' own (cash-
trading) business compared with the other two considered activities. As a consequence, the
potential rents may distributed more evenly across di®erent types of members in this related
activity.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper presented a model that explains why exchanges have increasingly demutualized in
recent years. This is due to the fact that mutual exchanges cannot e®ectively compete against
other exchanges, especially against outsider-owned, for-pro¯t trading platforms. However, we
demonstrate that they can survive against competing exchanges when they demutualize. Fur-
thermore, our model explains the ongoing trend of diversi¯cation among stock exchanges and
shows that outsider-owned exchanges will have a higher propensity to do so vis-µ a-vis mutual ex-
changes. Our main results are empirically con¯rmed by a ¯ve year sample of 26 stock exchanges.
In particular, we ¯nd evidence that competitive pressure induces exchanges to demutualize and
that publicly listed exchanges are more likely to invest into related business activities.
46Our results are con¯rmed by the ¯nding of Ramos (2005) who comes to similar conclusions in her univariate
Probit regressions.Chapter 5
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5.1 Introduction
In recent years, stock exchanges have increasingly diversi¯ed1 their operations into related
business areas such as derivatives trading, post-trading services and software sales. Considering
the world's 50 largest stock exchanges according to the World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV),
¯gure 5.1 displays the development in the number of exchanges that have provided related
activities besides their traditional cash market operations.2 The number of exchanges that
added post-trading services to their business portfolio rose from 22 to 30, while the number
of venues that operate a derivatives trading platform marked up from 25 to 31. Despite the
strongest relative increase, providers of software solutions remained rather scarce, with three
exchanges o®ering this service in 1999 and seven in 2003.
Figure 5.1: Related Activities by Exchanges 1999-2003
Integration activity and governance Interestingly, the great majority of exchanges that
contributed to this rise were trading venues that have migrated from a mutual towards a
shareholder-based, for-pro¯t organizational form, a process, which is usually denoted as de-
mutualization3. In fact, stock exchanges that diversi¯ed into post-trading or software sales
activities were exclusively pro¯t-oriented, while the same group accounted for half of the in-
crease in derivatives trading during the considered time span.4 There are at least two reasons
why predominantly pro¯t-oriented exchanges pursued the integration of related activities: First,
these areas possessed a stronger growth potential than the traditional cash market, an aspect
1The terms ¶integration¶ and ¶diversi¯cation¶ are used as synonyms in this paper.
2We used the following scheme to decide whether an exchange has diversi¯ed: If an exchange reported
derivatives trading volume to the FIBV and/or reported revenues from this activity and/or stated a majority
stake in a derivatives platform in its annual reports, we considered the exchange to be horizontally integrated in
derivatives trading. An exchange was assumed to provide post-trading services, i.e. clearing and/or settlement
and/or custody services, if it either reported these revenues separately and/or stated a majority stake in a
settlement institution in its annual reports. Finally, exchanges that reported revenues from IT-service activities
separately were considered to be active in the software sales business.
3Aggarwal (2002) discusses the process of demutualization in detail.
4More precisely, the exchanges that added post-trading to their business during 1999 and 2003 were Hellenic
Exchange, Copenhagen, Deutsche BÄ orse, Italian Exchange, OMHEX, Vienna, National Stock Exchange India,
and Philippine. Derivatives trading was introduced by Bermuda, Amex, Lima, Hellenic Exchanges, Istanbul,
Johannesburg, and London Stock Exchange. One exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, ceased to operate a
derivatives platform. Therefore, the net increase in derivatives platforms is six. A software sales division was
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which is particularly relevant for exchanges that strive for pro¯t-maximization and relatively
unimportant for non-pro¯t entities such as mutual exchanges. Second, demutualized exchanges
also have presumably more leeway to pursue attractive business opportunities due to a dif-
ferent control structure: Traditional mutual exchanges are usually owned and dominated by
their customers5, which not only seek to maximize the value of the trading venue, but also
take into account their own business interest as customers of the exchange. Therefore, as they
ultimately control the activities of the exchange, they can e.g. prevent investment decisions
that threaten their own business interests, even though they would increase the value of the
trading franchise.6 In contrast, pro¯t-oriented exchanges, particularly those that are publicly
listed, are mostly dominated by outside owners, which merely have a ¯nancial interest in the en-
tity.7 Therefore, as the vested interests of customer-owners are replaced by the outside-owners'
common goal of maximizing the value of their company, an exchange's management can more
freely pursue value-enhancing projects such as diversifying into related business ¯elds.
Figure 5.2: Related Activities by Governance Type 1999-2003
To demonstrate how integration activity varies among di®erent governance structures, we
present the two graphs in ¯gure 5.2. The graph on the left side groups the exchanges according
to their governance type (mutual, demutualized, publicly listed) and displays the ¯ve-year
average portion that is diversi¯ed into the considered activities for each group. It can be seen
that diversi¯cation into related activities is most pronounced for the group of publicly listed
exchanges (light grey bars) as 71% of them provide post-trading services, 84% o®er a derivatives
trading platform and 50% are active in the ¯eld of software sales compared to only 47%, 41%
and 2%, respectively, for the group of mutual exchanges (dark grey bars). The graph on the
right side provides a slightly di®erent perspective on the same issue. Here, the average number
of activities provided by mutuals, demutualized and publicly listed exchanges are shown for
the considered time period. Mutual exchanges have on average two business activities, i.e. one
additional besides the traditional cash market operation, whereas listed exchanges are engaged
on average in approximately three activities. Demutualized exchanges that are not listed lie in
5These are mainly banks and brokers that conduct their businesses on the exchange.
6A prominent example in this respect was the reluctance of some customer-owners to introduce an electronic
trading platform due to fears that this could adversely a®ect their brokerage business. In an analogous manner,
this could be observable for investments in related business activities. Confer Steil (2002) for an elaborate
discussion on this matter.
7Nevertheless outsider ownership can also have the opposite e®ect on integration activity as a recent case
at the Deutsche BÄ orse demonstrates. Here, a public dispute between the management of the Deutsche BÄ orse
and one of its owners, a hedge fund called TCI, emerged over the economic merits of a merger with the London
Stock Exchange and culminated in the withdrawal of the takeover o®er. TCI named the overly expensive bid
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between these extremes.
In order to assess the di®erent degrees of importance of related activities for pro¯t-oriented
as opposed to non-pro¯t stock exchanges, ¯gure 5.3 displays the average revenue breakdowns
of publicly listed and mutual entities for a sample of 28 exchanges during the years 1999 and
2003.8 The revenues from derivatives trading, post-trading services and software sales were
substantial for the listed exchanges, since they represented roughly half of their total operating
revenues (left panel). For mutual exchanges, related activities played a subordinate role and
the lion share of their revenues was generated on the traditional cash market (right panel).
Figure 5.3: Average Revenue Breakdown of Mutual and Listed Exchanges in Sample
Integration activity and e±ciency While diversi¯cation seems to be an attractive way
to boost revenue and pro¯t of an exchange, industry participants, politicians and academics
point to the possibility that some business combinations could have detrimental e®ects on social
welfare. They claim that particularly vertical integration, i.e. the combination of cash trading
and post-trading activities, could lead to anti-competitive foreclosure strategies by (pro¯t-
oriented) exchanges resulting in higher entry barriers for potential competitors and therefore
higher transaction fees.9 However, there are also proponents of vertical integration claiming that
the combination of trading and post-trading activities enables the exchanges to handle transac-
tions faster, more safely and less costly by using straight-through-processing applications, which
would ultimately result in lower prices for customers.10 We believe that this discussion touches
multiple - potentially intertwined - dimensions that need separate analysis beforehand in order
to be able to assess the overall e®ects on welfare in a second step. In particular, we want to
disentangle aspects of (1) proper corporate governance regimes from those that are related to
(2) e±cient business models in this industry.
(1) The governance regime of the entities is certainly a highly relevant aspect that needs
to be analyzed from a social welfare perspective. Special attention should be devoted to the
8These exchanges are also used in the subsequent e±ciency and factor productivity analysis and represent
approximately 85% of the world's equity trading volume executed on exchanges. The sample will be presented
in more detail in section 5.3.1. Note that the yearly average revenue breakdown does not comprise the same
exchanges for the respective years, since some exchanges changed their governance. Hence, the average revenue
breakdown of listed exchanges consists of two exchanges in 1999, whereas the 2003-¯gure includes the average
of nine stock exchanges.
9For academic contributions discussing the merits of horizontal and vertical integration in the (European)
securities transaction industry, see for example Milne (2002), KÄ oppl and Monnet (2003), Tapking and Yang
(2004), van Cayseele (2004), and Serifsoy and Weiss (2007).
10A strong advocate of vertical integration is the management of Deutsche BÄ orse. In their view, not vertical
integration but the di®erent regulatory regimes in Europe prevent an e®ective competition among post-trading
institutions. See for example Seifert (2003) and Deutsche BÄ orse Group (2005).CHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 95
impact of ownership structure and objective function of an exchange on the price and quality
of its services. While outsider-owned, for-pro¯t entities will seek to earn rents and therefore
may charge prices that are above marginal costs, these rents may also induce the necessary
incentives to invest in quality-enhancing technologies which may not exist if non-pro¯t ¯rms
provide these services.11
(2) Irrespective of the governance regime, however, it needs to be clari¯ed whether the
combination of certain business activities makes sense from an operational e±ciency perspective.
Generally, integration of related business ¯elds could lead to di±culties in managing the ¯rm
e±ciently, since it adds to the complexity of existing business processes. However, certain
business combinations may also enable the exchange's management to utilize inherent synergies
between activities. An e±ciency analysis that seeks to answer this question can be conducted
in two di®erent ways. The ¯rst approach, depicted on the left hand side of ¯gure 5.4, would
be to compare the relative e±ciency of exchanges with di®ering degrees of diversi¯cation. If
the results indicate that diversi¯ed exchanges (e.g. ¯rms A, C or D) are more e±cient and
productive than cash market-only exchanges (i.e. ¯rm B), then this would be a clear case to
support the former business models from a social welfare perspective, provided that an optimal
governance regime can be implemented. However, if diversi¯ed ¯rms do not exhibit a higher
operative e±ciency than ¯rms focusing on the cash market, then the reverse conclusion cannot
be drawn from this method.12 Instead, a second approach, as shown on the right hand side
of ¯gure 5.4, would be necessary that compares the e±ciency of a diversi¯ed entity combining
certain activities under one roof with the e±ciency of multiple ¯rms providing these activities
separately. Hence, the e±ciency of e.g. vertical integration would necessitate the comparison of
an exchange that combines trading and post-trading activities (e.g. ¯rm A) with a setting where
these services are provided by three independent entities, namely an exchange, a clearing house
and a settlement institution (e.g. ¯rms B, C, and D). Evidence for the superiority of combined
entities over separate entities would then lead to the conclusion that such an integration of
activities is preferable, and vice versa.
Figure 5.4: Two E±ciency Measurement Methods
Related literature To date, there exists only a small number of studies on how diversi¯-
cation may a®ect the operative performance of exchanges. We are aware of two contributions
which analyze the performance of exchanges and take di®erent business models into account.
The author of both papers is Schmiedel. He analyzes stock exchange performance by employing
11A more detailed discussion on this issue can be found in Serifsoy and Weiss (2007).
12A diversi¯ed exchange may not be as e±cient as a focused exchange, but it may still be superior to a
situation where the same set of activities are provided by multiple, separate entities.CHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 96
two frontier e±ciency methods. While Schmiedel (2001) employs a parametric stochastic fron-
tier model to evaluate the cost e±ciency of European stock exchanges during 1985 and 1999,
Schmiedel (2002) applies a non-parametric method for the 1993-1999 period.13 In Schmiedel's
¯rst paper, which controls within the regression for exchanges that possess both derivatives
trading and post-trading services, he ¯nds a positive impact of integration on cost e±ciency.14
His second paper indicates that the mean of factor productivity gains, i.e. the annual change
in technical e±ciency, is higher for exchanges that focus on cash market operations.15
Contribution of the paper The primary focus of Schmiedel's papers is not to elaborate
on di®erences in business models, but to apply the methodology on the stock exchange sector
in general. Our paper is di®erent insofar as it conducts an e±ciency analysis that devotes
particular attention to business models and analyzes the causes for di®erences in greater detail.
Additionally, our sample is more recent (1999-2003). As in Schmiedel (2002), we will also
employ a non-parametric approach to calculate relative e±ciency scores, albeit using a broader
set of output variables in order to better capture the various activities that stock exchanges
are engaged in. Furthermore, in contrast to his proceeding, we will go a step further by
regressing the derived estimations of e±ciency and productivity on a set of factors mapping the
framework in which the respective exchanges are embedded. This procedure will then highlight
whether there is a signi¯cant impact of di®erent business models on the performance of the
stock exchanges.
This limits our analysis to the ¯rst approach outlined in ¯gure 5.4. We consider this as a
¯rst step to gain insights whether a horizontal and/or vertical integration strategy promises
e±ciency gains compared to staying focused on cash market operations. Although some papers
exist for the second method, such as from Pulley and Humphrey (1993) who measure scope
economies of banks with di®erent activities, we refrain from using a similar method in this
paper, since we do not possess the appropriate data from entities that solely provide one of the
related activities, i.e. independent derivatives exchanges, clearing houses, settlement providers
or software companies.16 Another drawback of their approach is that we would have to estimate
a parametric production function in a very speci¯c way in order to deal with the fact that some
exchanges possess an output of zero for certain activities. As we will later also argue against
the employment of stochastic frontier analysis, we prefer not to impose a certain structure on
the production functions of exchanges, as we do not know how they look like in reality.
Hypotheses The purpose of this paper is therefore to determine whether stock exchanges
that pursue certain integration strategies operate more e±ciently. As will be explained in de-
tail in section 5.2, we approximate the operative performance of exchanges by relative technical
e±ciency and factor productivity scores. Furthermore, as will be presented in section 5.3.2.2,
we consider four integration strategies that can be compared to a cash market-only business
model, allowing us to formulate the following four hypotheses:
13Both methodologies are widely accepted and were already used for e±ciency measurement of ¯nancial
institutions by a myriad of other papers. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide an comprehensive survey on this
topic.
14Confer Schmiedel (2001, p.22)
15Confer table 7, the 'Malmquist index'-column for "Equity only" and "Exchanges with derivatives" on page
26 of Schmiedel (2002).
16Pulley and Humphrey (1993) encounter a similar problem and are therefore only able to calculate an
upper boundary of potential scope economies. In principle, such separate data is more easily available in the
exchange industry than in the banking industry. However, the collection of such information and the use of
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H1: Stock exchanges that diversify into derivatives trading possess a higher technical e±-
ciency and factor productivity than cash market-only exchanges.
H2: Stock exchanges that diversify into post-trading services possess a higher technical e±-
ciency and factor productivity than cash market-only exchanges.
H3: Stock exchanges that diversify into derivatives trading and post-trading services possess
a higher technical e±ciency and factor productivity than cash market-only exchanges.
H4: Stock exchanges that diversify into derivatives trading, post-trading services, and soft-
ware development and sales activities possess a higher technical e±ciency and factor productivity
than cash market-only exchanges.
The papers is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the methodology used in our
paper. Section 5.3 presents the employed data and our results. An interpretation as well as the
robustness of our ¯ndings are also discussed here. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Methodology
We ¯rst provide a brief overview of how to measure technical e±ciency and total factor pro-
ductivity via a non-parametric frontier approach called Data Envelopment Analysis in section
5.2.1. Section 5.2.2 describes how the speci¯c e®ects of further factors such as di®erent business
setups are disentangled via regression analysis.
Before we proceed, it seems warranted to brie°y discuss the need for a relatively sophisti-
cated way to measure e±ciency.17 In principal, one could simply divide the main output of
stock exchanges by an appropriate input measure, e.g. by using the ratio of trading volume
processed to the total assets or number of sta® employed by the exchange. While the ease of
calculation is certainly appealing, we doubt its appropriateness for the stock exchange industry.
The main reason for this - and which actually touches the heart of our paper - is that ex-
changes di®er substantially in the set of activities they provide. Since the integration of related
activities necessitates additional assets and sta®, a simple trading volume/number of sta® or
trading volume/assets-ratio would distort the e±ciency scores in favor of exchanges that focus
on operating a cash market, whereas the additional outputs of more diversi¯ed exchanges would
not be taken into account.
5.2.1 Data Envelopment Analysis and Malmquist-Productivity
Data Envelopment Analysis DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978).
Using their linear programming algorithm enables the calculation of relative technical e±-
ciency18 values for similar entities, which process multiple inputs of resources into multiple
outputs of products or services. Our analysis will focus on technical instead of economic e±-
ciency, as it liberates the analysis from assuming a potentially ill-de¯ned economic objective
17This legitimate objection was raised by one of the referees.
18The terms technical and economic e±ciency were coined by Farrell (1957). In his de¯nition, technical
e±ciency is achieved when an increase in any output requires a reduction in at least one other output or an
increase in at least one other input and if a reduction in at least one input requires an increase in at least
one other input or a reduction in at least one output. Economic e±ciency, on the other hand, incorporates
information on prices for the respective inputs and outputs and an economic objective to be pursued such as
cost minimization or revenue maximization. It is achieved by implementing the cost minimizing or revenue
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function such as pro¯t motivation. This is a more appropriate means to assess the relative
performance between for-pro¯t and not-for-pro¯t entities from the same industry.19
The e±ciency scores of each entity under evaluation, which we later denote as EFF, are
determined by calculating the deviation each organization has from an e±cient frontier. The
frontier itself is set up as a piece-wise linear combination of best-practice observations spanning
a convex production possibilities set. The computed e±ciency value is thus a relative measure as
it quanti¯es the performance of each entity in comparison to a set of "best"-performing peers.
DEA is a non-parametric approach that has no predetermined functional relation between
inputs and outputs, i.e. there are no a priori weights attached to these factors. Instead, the
weighting of the factors that are involved in the production process is endogenously optimized
for each decision making unit (DMU)20 individually. By doing so, the weighting factors of the
inputs and outputs, i.e. the underlying production technology, can vary substantially among
the DMUs. This allows each DMU to attain the highest possible e±ciency score subject to the
constraint that the e±ciency values of all remaining DMUs stay within the de¯ned boundaries
of the e±ciency measure when using the same weighting scheme.21 The resulting °exibility
in the production function is an advantage whenever the true functional relationship between
inputs and outputs is unknown. This is clearly the case in the stock exchange industry so
that it seems sensible to allow for di®erent types of production functions during the analysis.
Considerable uncertainty also remains about the technological characteristics of this industry.
As a consequence, we will calculate e±ciency and factor productivity scores for both a constant
returns-to-scale (CRS) as well as a variable returns-to-scale (VRS) environment.22 A detailed
description of the mechanics of Data Envelopment Analysis is provided in appendix C.1
A limitation of DEA is that it does not account for random error. Potential noise may
evolve from inconsistencies in the input and output ¯gures, diverging accounting practices
and/or di®ering accounting standards or random events that either positively or adversely
in°uence a DMU's performance. Furthermore, noise may not only shift the e±ciency of the
concerned DMU. It might also have an alternating in°uence on all other DMUs when the noise-
a®ected DMU is a member of the e±cient frontier. As a result, econometric methods such as
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) are sometimes seen in a more favorable light among empirical
researchers in order to assess the e±ciency of ¯rms.23 But these parametric approaches have
their own limitations. Wilson and Simar (1995) present several arguments why DEA is not
dominated by these methods: Not only do parametric methods require an a priori speci¯cation
of the used technology, they also need to predispose the noise and the ine±ciency process.
Thus, potential errors in the speci¯cation of the functional form may be mixed up with the
DMU's ine±ciency. Moreover, the incorporated noise term only allows for measurement error
in the regressand, while bias and inconsistency may also exist in the explaining variables. They
therefore conclude that "the presence of a noise term in the parametric models may represent
only a slight advantage, if at all."24 A more practical drawback of SFA is the di±culty to ¯nd
appropriate input prices for stock exchanges.25
19Confer for example Pestieau and Tulkens (1993, p.300-301).
20The term "DMU" was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1981) and has been widely adopted by
other authors.
21This procedure ensures that a DMU's activity can be justi¯ed from an economic point of view as it assumes
that the respective decision makers act according to certain factor prices and thus give appropriate weights to
the employed inputs and produced outputs in line with the notion of striving for maximum e±ciency.
22VRS allows for varying returns-to-scale characteristics for di®erent levels of input-output combinations.
Confer appendix C.1 for further details.
23Confer for example Schmidt (1985) who calls DEA "non-statistical". Yet, Banker (1993) provides a statistical
underpinning for the methodology.
24Wilson and Simar (1995, p.3-4)
25While the price of labor may be reasonably approximated by the personnel expenses per employee, aCHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 99
The Malmquist-productivity index The Malmquist productivity was introduced by Caves,
Christensen, and Diewert (1982). While DEA measures the relative e±ciency of a DMU for
a certain year, the Malmquist-productivity index compares year-on-year changes in technical
e±ciency. The method bases on similar DEA-like linear programming techniques and gained
additional appeal when FÄ are et al. re¯ned it by decomposing the productivity change into two
separate e®ects, namely the change in e±ciency and technological progress. In the following,
we sketch the fundamental issues of this method.26
Consider the left panel of ¯gure 5.5 (CRS) where a DMU's one-input (x), one-output (y)
constant returns-to-scale production process is depicted for two subsequent periods t and t+1
with corresponding e±cient production frontiers Tt and Tt+1. Irrespective of the observed
input-output-combinations (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) the slopes of the two best practice frontiers
indicate whether technological progress, which we denote as ¢TECH, has occurred from period
t to t + 1. As the slope of Tt+1 is steeper than that of Tt, technology must have progressed,
for it is possible in t + 1 to produce the same amount of output with fewer inputs. This
can be readily seen when focusing on points b and c in the ¯gure which determine the inputs
that are required to produce the same output level yt in the respective periods. Thus, using
technology Tt+1 enables the same output to be converted by (0b¡0c) fewer inputs. To see the
change in e±ciency, which we denote as ¢EFF, one needs to take a closer look at the actual
input-output combinations, i.e. (xt;yt) and (xt+1;yt+1) of the decision making unit (DMU).
Apparently, neither of the two is produced in an e±cient manner. Note, that the points b and
f represent the minimum input levels for the given output levels yt and yt+1. As the deviation
from the frontier has increased in period t + 1 compared to period t, there was a decline
in e±ciency for this DMU. In total, the two factors that comprise the overall productivity
change of the DMU, i.e. MQ = ¢EFF £ ¢TECH, are running in opposite directions in our
illustration. The right panel (VRS) depicts the case for variable returns-to-scale and can be
analyzed analogously. Here, Tt ½ Tt+1 which again implies that technological progress must
have occurred. In appendix C.2, we provide a more detailed description of the corresponding
linear programs that need to be solved.
5.2.2 Regression analysis
Section 5.2.1 presented our approach to calculate DEA-e±ciency and Malmquist-productivity
values. We so far assumed to employ input and output variables into the calculation that are
directly related to the operations of an exchange. Additional factors representing the framework
in which the exchanges operate, such as di®ering business models, have so far not been included
in our analysis. We will use a two-stage process that provides a linkage between these operational
and framework factors. Stage one encompasses the aforementioned calculation of e±ciency and
productivity values and is based solely on operational inputs and outputs. In the second stage,
the resulting e±ciency and factor productivity values are used as dependent variables and are
regressed on the framework variables.
proxy for the cost of capital seems to be less clear cut. Confer for example Schmiedel (2001) and Schmiedel,
MalkamÄ aki, and Tarkka (2006) who use a capital expenditures/book value-ratio and a OECD total information
and communication technology expenditure/GDP-ratio, respectively. Furthermore, even if we considered the
use of these proxies, this type of data was not available for all of the exchanges in our sample, because some
of the exchange's home countries were not included in the the OECD-database and lacked the required capex-
information.
26Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.68-75) and Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.50-53)
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Figure 5.5: Input-oriented Malmquist approach for CRS and VRS
Using e±ciency scores as dependent variable Using the DEA-scores as estimators of
e±ciency in a regression analysis entails the problem that they are truncated from above at a
maximum value of one. Hence, instead of a regular OLS regression, which would produce biased
results, we follow Dusansky and Wilson (1994) and McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993) who apply
Tobit regressions in order to deal with truncated observations. Taking our panel data structure
into account we estimate the following general Tobit model:
EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t if EFF ¤
i;t < 1 (5.1)
EFFi;t = 1 if EFF ¤
i;t ¸ 1
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t
Here, EFFi;t is the e±ciency score of exchange i in period t derived from the DEA-
calculation, EFF¤
i;t is the true but unobservable e±ciency of exchange i in period t, Xi;t =
[1 x0] is an ((1 £ (K + 1)) vector of K framework variables plus one and ¯ is a ((L + 1) £ 1)
vector of parameters. The error term is decomposed into an time-invariant individual e®ect of
the exchange denoted as ®i and an independent e®ect ´i;t which is assumed to be uncorrelated
with Xi;t. Thus, we will employ a random e®ects model. The K = 10 framework variables
used in this regression will be introduced and discussed in section 5.3.2. In total, we regress for
i = f1;:::;n = 28g £ t = f1:::T = 5g = 140 observations.
Using productivity values as dependent variable In a similar manner, we will regress
the results from the factor productivity analysis on the same framework variables. The variables
employed will then explain the impact on overall Malmquist factor productivity (MQ) as well
as on the two decomposed e®ects, namely on the change in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and on
technological progress (¢TECH). Since there is no truncation in the productivity variables,
we will employ standard panel regression equations. Thus, we obtain three regression models:CHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 101
MQi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (5.2)
¢EFFi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (5.3)
¢TECHi;t = Xi;t¯ + ²i;t (5.4)
where ²i;t = ®i + ´i;t respectively
Here, MQi;t, ¢EFFi;t and ¢TECHi;t represent the values of Malmquist factor productiv-
ity, change in technical e±ciency and technological progress of exchange i from period t ¡ 1
to period t, respectively. Again, Xi;t = [1 x0] is a ((1 £ (K + 1)) vector of K framework
variables plus one and ¯ is an ((L + 1) £ 1) vector of parameters. In these regressions we will
use a ¯xed e®ects model, since the Hausman tests mostly reject the hypothesis that there is no
systematic di®erence between the ¯xed and the random e®ects estimation - as we will see in
section 5.3.3.2.27 We will make use of the same K = 10 framework variables as in regression
(5.1). Additionally, we will employ the calculated EFF-value of period t ¡ 1 of each exchange
as a further independent variable in order to control for the fact that less e±cient exchanges
can potentially improve their productivity by a larger extent than highly e±cient exchanges.28
Since the dependent variables are calculated by comparing two adjacent periods, i.e. they con-
sume data from periods t and t-1, we "lose" one period and have therefore four observations
per DMU. Thus, we regress for i = f1;:::;n = 28g£t = f1:::(T ¡1) = 4g = 112 observations.29
5.3 Data and empirical results
5.3.1 The sample
The study employs a balanced panel data set that includes 28 stock exchanges for a ¯ve year
time period (1999-2003) as can be seen in table 5.1. The sample encompasses ¯ve exchanges
from the Americas, fourteen from Europe/Africa and nine from the Asia/Paci¯c region. All
relevant accounting and transaction data have been converted into US-dollars on a purchasing
power parity basis30 and adjusted for in°ation.31 Although the sample lacks completeness of
the whole exchange population, it does comprise about 85% of the total equity trading volume
on stock exchanges reported to the FIBV.
In order to see how representative our sample is concerning the discussed business models,
we re-present a modi¯ed version of ¯gure 5.1, which shows the exchanges' related activities
in our sample as a portion of the 50 largest trading venues worldwide. The ¯lled areas of
the bars represent the number of exchanges that are part of our sample. As can be seen, we
included all exchanges that provide software services, whereas we incorporated more than half
27The Hausman speci¯cation test veri¯es whether the coe±cients of a regression model with random e®ects
are unbiased compared to the coe±cients of a ¯xed e®ects model. The underlying assumption is that ¯xed
e®ects models always produce consistent but potentially ine±cient estimators, whereas a random e®ects model
is always e±cient but can be inconsistent. Confer for example Johnston and DiNardo (1997, p.403-404) for
further details.
28Confer our explanation in footnote 10.
29In order to employ White-corrected estimators to control for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity we used
EViews 5 as statistical package. For the random e®ects Tobit-regressions we utilized Stata 8.
30We acquired the PPP-data from World Bank World Development Indicators. In an earlier version we used
data without the conversion on a PPP-basis. Therefore our results vary in some instances.
31The accounting data was acquired from the annual reports of the exchanges, whereas transaction and other
descriptive data was obtained from the databases of the FIBV, the Federation of European Stock Exchanges, the
HP Handbooks of World Stock, Derivatives & Commodity Exchanges, direct correspondence with the exchanges,
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No. Exchange Region Related Activities 5Y-Avg. World
Post-Trading Derivatives Software Market Share
1 BOVESPA Americas -
p
- 0.2%
2 Lima Americas - 2003- - 0.0%
3 NASDAQ Americas - - - 25.7%
4 NYSE Americas - - - 25.1%
5 Toronto TSX Americas - -1999 2002- 1.1%
6 Budapest Europe/Africa -
p
- 0.0%
7 Copenhagen Europe/Africa 2000-
p
- 0.2%
8 Deutsche BÄ orse Europe/Africa 2000-
p p
3.7%
9 Euronexty Europe/Africa
p p p
7.7%
10 Hellenic* Europe/Africa 2001- 2002- 2000- 0.2%
11 Istanbul Europe/Africa - 2001- - 0.1%
12 Johannesburg JSE Europe/Africa
p
2001- - 0.2%
13 London Europe/Africa - 2003- - 10.0%
14 Malta Europe/Africa
p
- - 0.0%
15 Oslo Europe/Africa -
p
- 0.2%
16 OM Gruppen Europe/Africa 2001-
p p
1.0%
17 SWX Zurich Europe/Africa -
p
- 1.5%
18 Vienna Europe/Africa 2000-
p
- 0.0%
19 Warsaw Europe/Africa -
p
- 0.0%
20 Australian Asia/Paci¯c
p p
- 0.7%
21 Hongkong Asia/Paci¯c
p p
- 0.7%
22 Jakarta Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.0%
23 Kuala Lumpur Asia/Paci¯c
p p
- 0.1%
24 Phillippine Asia/Paci¯c 2003- - - 0.0%
25 Singapore SGXy Asia/Paci¯c
p p
2000- 0.2%
26 Taiwan Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 1.8%
27 Thailand Asia/Paci¯c
p
- - 0.1%
28 Tokyo Asia/Paci¯c
p p
2002- 4.8%
Total 17 20 7 85.2%
*: Athens Stock Exchange in 1999
y: Pro forma ¯gures for 1999 p
: Exchange possessed this activity since 1999 or earlier
Table 5.1: Sample of exchanges used in the analysis, 1999-2003
of the exchanges with derivatives trading and about a third of the exchanges with post-trading
services. Hence, particularly exchanges with post-trading facilities are underrepresented in
our sample. This is due to this group's relatively large portion of mutual exchanges - as was
observable in ¯gure 5.2. A substantial share of them is not obliged to disclose their annual
reports to the public. Hence, we were not able to include these exchanges in our sample due to
a lack of available comprehensive information.
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5.3.2 Variables
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the two di®erent sets of variables employed in the analysis.
They will be discussed in sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2. Accompanying descriptive statistics on
the variables are given in Appendix C.3.
FIRST STAGE: Operational Variables
Inputs
x
1
i;t Number of sta® employed at exchange i in period t (year-end ¯gures)
x
2
i;t Tangible assets at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
Outputs
y
1
i;t Number of listed companies at exchange i in period t
y
2
i;t Total trading volume in bonds and shares at exchange i in period t (in million dollars)
y
3
i;t Total number of derivatives contracts traded at exchange i in period t
y
4
i;t Post-trading services and software sales at exchange i in period t (in thousand dollars)
SECOND STAGE: Framework Variables
Business Model
HORIZONTALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i operates a derivatives platform in period t.
VERTICALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i provides post-trading services in period t.
HORI ¡ VERTICALi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i is both vertically and horizontally integrated
in period t.
FULL INTEGRATIONi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i is both vertically and horizontally integrated
and also provides software services in period t.
OUTSOURCINGi;t Dummy variable indicating whether exchange i has outsourced its IT-system in period t.
Governance
LISTEDi;t Dummy variable for publicly listed exchange i in period t.
Competitive Position and Attractiveness of the Capital Market
LIQUIDITYi;t Level of liquidity at exchange i in period t (year-end ¯gures, in %).
Liquidity = Trading volume in domestic equities/Market capitalization of domestic ¯rms
¢TRADINGi;t Change in equity trading at exchange i relative to the sample from period t-1 to t.
(year-end ¯gures, in %)
FOREIGN LISTINGi;t World market share in new listings of foreign companies at exchange i in period t.
Market sharei;t = New foreign listings at exchange i in t/New foreign listings worldwide in t.
(year-end ¯gures, in %)
Financial Flexibility
¢LTFINANCEi;t Growth of equity and long term debt on exchange i's balance sheet from period t-1 to t.
(book values, year-end ¯gures, in %)
Control Variable
¢EFFi;t¡1 Corresponding e±ciency values (CRS or VRS) of exchange i in period t-1.
Table 5.2: Variables used in the two-stage process
5.3.2.1 Operational variables
In the ¯rst stage, DEA-e±ciency and Malmquist factor productivity calculations will be based
on variables that are directly related to the operations of an exchange and can be in°uenced by
the management. An appropriate choice of variables that represent the "production process"
of an exchange is not a clear-cut task.32 When considering plausible input variables, it seems
32Depending on the input and output variables incorporated in the calculation, the e±ciency scores might
have a bias towards certain DMUs. As an example, consider omitted output variables that only some DMUs inCHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 104
sensible to cover both capital and labor aspects of the production process. Thus, labor will
be approximated by the number of sta® working for an exchange i in period t (x1
i;t), whereas
the utilization of capital for investments, such as the setup of an IT-infrastructure, a trading
space, and the necessary buildings, are subsumed by the value of tangible assets employed at
exchange i in period t (x2
i;t).
On the output side, four di®erent services are considered that can be 'produced' by an
exchange. The variable y1
i;t stands for the number of listed companies at exchange i in period t.
It will be used as a proxy for the exchange's e®ort to monitor the listed ¯rms on the exchange
in order to ensure fair trading and disclosure practices of company-speci¯c information. Thus,
the supervision of listed ¯rms can be regarded as a service for trading participants to achieve
market transparency. Secondly, the total trading volume in equities as well as in bonds will
approximate the activities of exchange i on the cash market in period t (y2
i;t).33 Variable y3
i;t
captures the total number of derivative contracts traded on the derivatives markets. Variable
y4
i;t represents the revenues from post-trading activities and software sales at exchange i in
period t.34
Before proceeding to the next section, a few words should be devoted to the choice of the
proper DEA-model. Considering the employed inputs and outputs in this paper it makes sense
to use an input-oriented DEA-model, since the number of sta® and the value of tangible assets
of an exchange can be more directly altered by the management than the level of demand for
their products and services. Thus, the management's e®ort to reduce the exchange's inputs
seems to be a fairer yardstick than its exertion to augment the venue's output levels.
5.3.2.2 Framework variables
The second stage now considers additional determinants arising from the framework in which
an exchange is embedded and that may also have an in°uence on its performance. As noted
by Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p.53-54), the variables of the second stage may have an
impact on the e±ciency with which inputs are transformed to outputs, but they should not
a®ect the production process itself. Thus, the authors require that the variables of the ¯rst and
second stage are uncorrelated.35 We will consider four types of factors that deserve particular
attention and present corresponding variables that will function as proxies in our regressions.
These are (1) the exchange's business model, (2) exchange's corporate governance regime, (3)
the competitive environment and the attractiveness of the exchange's home capital market, and
(4) the exchange's ¯nancial °exibility.36
the sample produce. If we cannot adjust the input variables of these DMUs accordingly in the sense that we
merely include the amount of inputs devoted to the outputs considered in the calculation the unadjusted input
value will be too high. We mitigate this problem by calculating e±ciency and factor productivity scores for
the broadest possible output-set, for it is easier to obtain information on additional outputs than to acquire a
detailed breakdown of the used inputs and adjust them for the omitted outputs.
33The employment of the number of transactions performed on an exchange would have been a more precise
measure of the activity. Unfortunately, this sort of data was not available for all 28 exchanges.
34The use of revenue numbers for the latter variable is not the most appropriate ¯gure to be included in the
output set. The number of clearing and settlement transactions serviced and the number of software systems
sold would have been better proxies. However, due to the lack of this type of data for all exchanges in our
sample, we opted for this procedure.
35However, for some of our variables we cannot maintain this point as can be seen in appendix C.5, where
table C.4 displays the correlation among the employed variables. In particular the correlation between the ¯rst
stage variables x1, x2, y1, and y2 with the second stage variables FOREIGN LISTING and LIQUIDITY is
highly positive. Therefore our coe±cient estimates may possess some bias. Nevertheless, our ¯ndings remain
robust when we drop the latter variables from our regressions.
36Appendix C.5 also provides a correlation table for the variables of the second stage. We observe that the
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Business model As outlined in section 5.1, several exchanges extended their activities to
other areas beyond the operation of a cash market. Some exchanges integrated horizontally,
thereby providing an institutionalized derivatives trading venue. Others followed a vertical silo
model by integrating post-trading services into the existing operations. Yet others are engaged
as software-systems providers, most notably for other stock exchanges. As a consequence, there
are several distinct business models present in this industry which could have varying e®ects
on the exchanges' operative performance: On the one hand, the integration of certain activ-
ities could be bene¯cial due to potential synergies. Consider for example the combination of
a cash and a derivatives market, which could be operated by a single trading system, and
would therefore save (input) resources. In a similar fashion one could expect e±ciency gains
when trading and post-trading services are combined by utilizing a common transaction plat-
form.37 To test our hypotheses and thus for any di®erences in e±ciency and factor productivity
growth among these business setups, we will employ four dummy variables covering ¯ve dis-
tinct business models. We explicitly distinguish between (1) cash market-only operators and
exchanges that operate (2) both a cash and a forward market, using a dummy variable denoted
as HORIZONTAL (3) a cash market and post-trading facilities, employing a variable denoted
as VERTICAL (4) a cash and a forward market as well as post-trading facilities by introducing
a dummy denoted as HORI-VERTICAL and (5) all of these activities as well as a software
sales division. Exchanges that fall under this category will receive a value of one at a dummy
variable denoted as FULL INTEGRATION.38
Furthermore, some exchanges do not develop and operate their trading systems themselves
but buy this service from an external provider. Thus, such an exchange rather incurs addi-
tional operating costs, which primarily materialize in the pro¯t-loss statement and to a much
lesser extent in its sta® size and its tangible assets, which are the considered input factors in
our analysis. Therefore, ignoring the outsourcing of IT-services would ceteris paribus result
in a disadvantage for exchanges that develop their own trading system by employing sta® and
assets for that matter. Consequently, we need to control for this aspect. We do so by em-
ploying a dummy variable, denoted as OUTSOURCING, which equals one when the exchange
under consideration outsources its trading system and zero otherwise. Since outsourcing ceteris
paribus reduces the required input factors and hence increases the calculated e±ciency values,
we expect a positive coe±cient sign at this variable.
Governance Stock exchanges vary in their governance regime. While some of them are
still organized as mutuals, others have demutualized and gone public. Most notably, this
resulted in di®erences in the type of owners that control the exchange. The latter group of
exchanges is no more under the exclusive control of its customers, e.g. banks and brokers, but
is primarily in°uenced by outside investors, whose pro¯t-maximization or - by the same token
- cost-minimization motive may not always be shared by the customers. As a result, we may
observe an impact of the governance and ownership structure on how e±cient an exchange
operates, which we would like to control for. Hence, we employ a dummy variable, denoted
as LISTED, for those exchanges that are publicly listed and are therefore subject to outside
37Confer Serifsoy and Weiss (2007) for a discussion on the European securities transaction industry from an
industrial organization perspective.
38Other combinations of business models such as "cash market and software" or "cash and derivatives market
and software" were omitted, since their respective subsample sizes were too small to draw inferences. As a
consequence, some of the exchanges had to be subsumed in other categories: We assigned the Toronto Stock
Exchange under "cash only"-operator in 2002 despite their operations in software sales. In an analogous manner
we subsumed the OM-Gruppen (in 1999-2000) and the Deutsche BÄ orse (in 1999) to the HORIZONTAL-variable
although both ¯rms possessed a software division in the indicated periods. Finally, we assigned the Hellenic
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ownership and control. Some authors emphasize the importance of being publicly listed in order
to operate e±ciently.39 Therefore, we expect a stronger performance by outsider-dominated
exchanges.
Competition and attractiveness of capital market The degree of competitive pressure
that an exchange is exposed to may have an in°uence on the operative e±ciency and factor pro-
ductivity of exchanges. We employ three variables that capture distinct aspects of competition
in this industry.
Our ¯rst variable, denoted as LIQUIDITY, measures the depth of the market operated by an
exchange and thereby provides a proxy for an exchange's importance and market power vis-µ a-
vis other exchanges. A common way to calculate the existing level of liquidity on an exchange's
trading platform is to divide the annual (equity) trading volume by the market capitalization
of the ¯rms listed on the exchange.
The second variable, denoted as ¢TRADING, proxies an exchange's performance capturing
annual changes in the competitive position. To operationalize, we employ year-on-year (y-o-
y) changes in equity trading volume at an exchange. In order to control for broader market
movements we deduct the median y-o-y change of the whole sample from each exchange's
performance in the respective period. The rationale behind this procedure is the following: A
relative gain in trading volume, indicating that the exchange was able to capture more trading
volume than the median exchange of the sample, signals a relatively strong competitive position
as opposed to other exchanges. By contrast, a relative loss in trading volume would suggest a
deterioration in the competitive position.
Our third variable, denoted as FOREIGN LISTING captures the general attractiveness of
the exchange's home capital market by calculating an exchange's market share in new foreign
¯rms listings as a percentage of the total new foreign listings worldwide. We believe that this
describes the general attractiveness of a capital market quite well, since there are mainly two
reasons for ¯rms to list abroad: Either the ¯rm is forced to, for its home capital market is not
attractive, or it seeks funds from a foreign capital market in order to tap into an additional
large and attractive pool of potential investors.40
When we regress the technical e±ciency and productivity of an exchange on these variables,
it is di±cult to establish an ex ante expectation concerning the theoretically correct sign of the
coe±cients. Both directions seem plausible. Consider for example the LIQUIDITY-variable:
An exchange with a relatively deep market can be considered to possess a strong competitive
position which may result in a better exploitation of its resources and thus in higher e±ciency.
The contrary may also hold as monopolistic inertia symptoms could cause excessive (input)
spending and contribute to lower e±ciency values. An analogous reasoning can be established
for the coe±cient's sign of the FOREIGN LISTING-variable. The ¢TRADING-variable may
also display di®ering signs: It could have a positive sign when the relative loss in trading
volume causes a decrease in e±ciency. This will be the case when unfavorable market conditions
coincide with lower absolute equity trading volumes, since this will negatively a®ect the level
of the DEA-output variable y2
i;t and thus ceteris paribus a decrease of the e±ciency value. Yet,
the sign could also be negative when a relative loss in trading volume means that the exchange
overcompensates this by a disproportionate reduction in the input variables and thereby achieves
higher e±ciency values. By the same token a DMU could spend overly much in its inputs than
39Confer for example OECD (2003) and Scullion (2001).
40Support for this notion can be found in an empirical paper on cross-listings by Pagano, Randl, RÄ oell, and
Zechner (2001) who ¯nd that ¯rms seeking cross-listing tend to choose foreign capital markets with large and
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the increase in trading volume would allow.
Financial °exibility In reality we observe that several exchanges raised external funds in
order to ¯nance the modernization of their trading venues or to pursue other projects that were
aimed to boost their competitiveness.41 Thus, the ¯nancial °exibility of an exchange, i.e. its
ability to raise new funds to ¯nance investments may also have an e®ect on an exchange's
e±ciency and factor productivity growth, albeit it remains ex ante unclear whether it has a
positive or an adverse one. On the one hand, the capability of acquiring new proceeds could
be a necessary prerequisite to induce e±ciency-enhancing investments. On the other, it could
lead to ine±ciencies due to overinvestments resulting from too abundant funds. We employ
a variable which seeks to capture the exchange's in°ow of new proceeds in long term capital
in each period. Ideally, we would measure this by using the respective cash °ow statements
of each exchange in order to capture the actual capital in°ow. However, these ¯gures are not
available for all exchanges. Hence, we use a less accurate means and employ a variable denoted
as ¢LT FINANCE, which denotes the annual change in equity and long-term debt as is stated
in the exchanges' balance sheets.42
5.3.3 Results
5.3.3.1 Results from the ¯rst stage
In Appendix C.4, table C.2 presents the ¯rst-stage results of the DEA-e±ciency and Malmquist-
productivity analysis for both constant and variable returns-to-scale.43 The results of the
e±ciency scores indicate that six exchanges, namely Nasdaq, Toronto, Copenhagen, Deutsche
BÄ orse, Euronext and Malta, are fully e±cient in all ¯ve considered periods in the VRS-case,
whereas there are only two such cases in the CRS-environment (Copenhagen and Euronext).
Furthermore, average technical e±ciency for the whole sample lied between 0.58 and 0.66 in
the CRS-case and between 0.70 and 0.77 in the VRS-case. As expected, average e±ciency was
higher in the latter case due to the closer envelopment of the data.
Both underlying technologies display an overall increase in average factor productivity
growth with strong rises in the 2000/2001 (CRS: 9%, VRS: 8%) and 2002/2003-period (CRS:11%,
VRS: 8%), whereas the 2001/2002-period witnesses an overall stagnation in productivity growth.
The most remarkable individual increase is accomplished by the Brazilian exchange BOVESPA,
which improved its e±ciency from 0.53 and 0.57 in 1999 to full e±ciency in 2003 for the re-
spective settings.
5.3.3.2 Results from the second stage
Table 5.3 displays the results from the regression analysis using the ¯rst stage results, i.e. DEA-
e±ciency (EFF), Malmquist-productivity (MQ), change in technical e±ciency (¢EFF) and
progress in technology (¢TECH), as dependent variables as was outlined in section 5.2.2.
The table is divided into two panels. The left panel displays the results for constant returns-
to-scale. The right panel provides our estimates when assuming variable returns-to-scale. We
41Most explicitly this has occurred at exchanges that went public but one can imagine that - irrespective of
the governance - fresh capital was provided for the exchanges to better cope with increased competitive pressure.
42In order to prevent distortions from currency °uctuations we use in°ation-adjusted book values of the
exchanges' home currencies.
43We are grateful to Holger Scheel whose program 'EMS' we utilized for the calculation of the e±ciency and
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Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL -0.072 -0.096 -0.037 -0.027 -0.120y -0.003 -0.005 -0.012
Std. Err. 0.052 0.074 0.090 0.164 0.080 0.059 0.106 0.151
VERTICAL -0.054 0.555 0.754y -0.012 -0.209*** 0.503 0.728y -0.120*
Std. Err. 0.080 0.457 0.497 0.106 0.082 0.410 0.503 0.074
HORI-VERTICAL -0.026 0.151* 0.265*** -0.009 -0.204*** 0.170*** 0.339*** -0.168y
Std. Err. 0.064 0.092 0.077 0.066 0.084 0.042 0.066 0.106
FULL INTEGRATION -0.053 0.021 0.102 -0.018 -0.192** 0.130y 0.157 -0.060
Std. Err. 0.073 0.052 0.091 0.074 0.103 0.084 0.128 0.088
OUTSOURCING 0.012 0.086 -0.017 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.036 -0.036 0.121***
Std. Err. 0.073 0.274 0.271 0.047 0.053 0.234 0.252 0.015
LISTED 0.063 0.093 -0.063y 0.167** 0.087y 0.066 -0.061 0.136y
Std. Err. 0.047 0.100 0.040 0.070 0.055 0.111 0.062 0.083
LIQUIDITY -0.007 -0.041 -0.004 -0.057 -0.052 -0.031*** 0.036 -0.060
Std. Err. 0.032 0.039 0.104 0.092 0.037 0.002 0.047 0.060
¢TRADING 0.030 -0.127*** -0.122*** 0.004 0.059 -0.115*** -0.121*** 0.011
Std. Err. 0.033 0.021 0.042 0.081 0.043 0.015 0.019 0.039
FOREIGN LISTING 1.004** 1.251y 1.210* 0.213 1.559** 0.688 1.146** -0.538
Std. Err. 0.435 0.816 0.692 0.583 0.663 0.737 0.462 0.907
¢LT FINANCE 0.035 -0.092*** -0.023 -0.075 0.029 -0.080** -0.042 -0.050
Std. Err. 0.031 0.021 0.051 0.072 0.038 0.035 0.047 0.057
EFF -1.370** -1.827*** 0.533*** -0.984*** -1.543*** 0.555***
Std. Err. 0.617 0.609 0.092 0.350 0.459 0.118
CONST 0.661*** 1.806*** 1.979*** 0.728*** 0.916*** 1.638*** 1.915*** 0.725***
Std. Err. 0.052 0.363 0.458 0.105 0.086 0.272 0.432 0.144
Observations 140 112 112 112 140 112 112 112
R2(adj:)=WaldÂ2 22.08 0.309 0.323 -0.165 49.30 0.305 0.405 0.033
Hausman Test (p) - 0.0008 0.0000 0.3663 - 0.0078 0.0000 0.0277
y, ¤, ¤¤, ¤ ¤ ¤, represent 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% signi¯cance levels, respectively.
Table 5.3: Results from the second-stage regression analysis
numerated the columns (1-9) for convenience. Overall, the adjusted R2-values of the productiv-
ity regressions are reasonable, save for the less appealing values in columns ¯ve and nine. We
therefore will primarily draw our conclusions from the remaining regressions. When comparing
the individual coe±cients between the two panels we ¯nd that their signs, if they are signi¯cant,
do not change. The results of the Hausman test demonstrate that a random e®ects model is
likely to produce inconsistent estimates for our regressions in all but one case (column ¯ve),
since the p-values display a signi¯cant rejection of the null-hypothesis. Thus, the use of a ¯xed
e®ects model is more appropriate.
Results for our hypotheses Our business model variables suggest that the integration of
related activities does not enhance technical e±ciency. In the contrary: While in the CRS-
case we cannot observe any signi¯cant di®erence, all our variables indicate a relatively strong
underperformance in the VRS-case, as can be seen in column six. Our VERTICAL, HORI-
VERTICAL and FULL INTEGRATION variable all display technical e±ciencies that are on
average 20 percent lower than for exchanges that are focused on the cash trading activity. A
similar pattern can be observed for exchanges that are horizontally integrated. However, the
negative coe±cient of the HORIZONTAL-variable is merely about half as large (-0.12) and is
only weakly signi¯cant.
As far as overall productivity growth is concerned, the more complex business models seem to
fare better than exchanges that are focused on the cash market. In the HORI-VERTICAL case,
for example, we witness a signi¯cantly stronger growth than at cash trading-only exchanges.
The outperformance amounts to 15.1% and 17%, depending on the considered technological en-
vironment. The main source of the strong productivity growth is attributable to improvements
in technical e±ciency (¢EFF), since the coe±cient here is strongly positive in both technolog-
ical setups. In the FULL INTEGRATION case, overall productivity seems to be higher by 13
percentage points in the VRS-environment.
Exchanges that are merely vertically integrated (VERTICAL), possess the largest positive
coe±cients, with 55% in the CRS-case and 50.3% in the VRS-environment. Even though the
coe±cients are not signi¯cant in the regression results shown here, they turn signi¯cant whenCHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 109
using bootstrapped standard errors44, so that we presume that there exists an outperformance
by this business model with respect to factor productivity.
Therefore, we conclude that none of our stated hypotheses can be fully con¯rmed, since
the integration strategies do not seem to result in higher technical e±ciency for the exchanges.
However, the second component of each hypothesis, i.e. factor productivity growth, seems to
be stronger in those cases where exchanges are diversi¯ed into post-trading activities.
Interpreting the results of the business model variables The results from the business
model variables indicate that a combination of activities is not necessarily e±ciency-enhancing.
In the contrary, exchanges that merely focus on cash-markets seem to perform superior vis-µ a-vis
certain other setups, when we assume a variable returns-to-scale environment. A possible reason
why for example the additional provision of derivatives trading creates technical ine±ciencies
could be related to the inability of the exchanges to integrate this activity in a resource saving
manner. As the Economist noted recently, most exchanges o®ering cash and derivatives trading
have not yet consolidated these services onto a single platform.45 Instead, the exchanges usually
provide cash and derivatives trading on two separate platforms, which adds to the complexity
of the business process on the one hand, and does not take advantage of potential cost synergies
on the other. An analogous reasoning can be established for vertically integrated exchanges.
Another explanation could be that integration activities take time until the bene¯ts of the
combination are realized. As we pointed out in ¯gure 5.1, some of the exchanges diversi¯ed
into related activities during our considered time period. If this is accompanied by substantial
set up costs or operational frictions, it may lead to an initial underperformance in operative
e±ciency.46 To analyze this notion, we took a closer look at the development in operating costs
and in technical e±ciency of the subsample of exchanges that diversi¯ed into post-trading,
derivatives trading, or software services during the considered period. We indexed the costs in
the year of diversi¯cation activity of each exchange and aligned them at the 'event' period t.47
The left panel of ¯gure 5.7 displays the indexed operating costs and technical e±ciency of the
Figure 5.7: Costs and E±ciency of Exchanges with Diversi¯cation Activity
44Confer table C.6 in appendix C.6.
45Confer Economist (2005).
46We thank one of the referees for this suggestion.
47We used those exchanges that invested into new activities during 1999 and 2003 as indicated in table 5.1. In
a prior analysis, we additionally adjusted the calculated values by the corresponding development of a control
group sample, which did not diversify into related activities in the considered time period. Since the results
remain virtually unchanged, we decided to show the unadjusted results to keep the exposition simple.CHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 110
considered sample of exchanges for the periods t-2 until t+2, where the 'event' of diversi¯cation
occurs at period t. We observe that average costs (solid line) did indeed rise at the event
and afterwards. At the same time, technical e±ciency (dotted and dashed line) displays an
m-shaped development, with a higher e±ciency scores directly before and after period t. Since
e±ciency values decreased in t-2 and t+2 in a similar fashion as in period t, we cannot con¯rm
a particularly negative impact on e±ciency due to the event of diversi¯cation. Furthermore, for
the subgroup of exchanges with new post-trading activities shown in the right panel, we observe
an even weaker negative impact by the integration strategy. While average operating costs rose
sharply until period t, which is an indicator that the acquisition of a post-trading institution
demanded considerable ¯rm resources, they did not rise further after the event. Also, technical
e±ciency did not seem to be overly a®ected by this type of integration. In fact, e±ciency rose
at the event period and remained relatively stable thereafter. We conclude that while operating
costs increased substantially, the operative performance did not seem to be strongly in°uenced
in an adverse manner by the change in the business model.
In°uence of control variables We brie°y want to discuss the results from our control
variables. From our OUTSOURCING variable we infer that outsourcing substantially increases
technical e±ciency by 17 percentage points in the VRS-case, whereas we cannot observe any
signi¯cant e®ect in the CRS-case. Furthermore, overall productivity (columns two and ¯ve) does
not seem to be overly a®ected by this strategy, since it displays no signi¯cant e®ect (columns
three and seven).
We only ¯nd weak evidence that publicly listed exchanges possess a higher e±ciency than
mutual exchanges. While the CRS-case in column (2) does not display any signi¯cant di®erence
for the LISTED-variable, we observe a 8.7% higher e±ciency on the 15%-level in the VRS-case
(column six). We conclude that outside ownership does not seem to overly contribute to a higher
operative e±ciency. A somewhat similar picture presents our Malmquist factor productivity
measures in columns three and seven. In both cases, overall productivity is not signi¯cantly
larger for listed exchanges. When focusing on the two components of productivity growth. we
observe that listed exchanges have a signi¯cantly higher technological progress as can be seen in
columns ¯ve and nine, but perform relatively worse in improving technical e±ciency (columns
four and eight). As a consequence, the resulting aggregate e®ect for productivity growth is not
signi¯cantly di®erent from those of mutual exchanges.
The impact of variables representing the competitive environment on exchange e±ciency is
insigni¯cant except for the FOREIGN LISTING-variable. Here we see a signi¯cantly positive
impact of the variable on technical e±ciency in both technological environments (columns two
and six). This implies that exchanges that possess an attractive home capital market also
seem to be more e±cient. As far as MQ-productivity growth is concerned, we observe that
our ¢TRADING variable displays a signi¯cantly negative sign in both the CRS and VRS-case,
which can be seen in columns three and seven. We conclude that an above average loss in
trading volume seems to lead to an additional input reduction e®ort by the management to
boost productivity growth. The decomposition of productivity growth indicates that in both
technological environment it is mainly driven by stronger improvements in technical e±ciency
(¢EFF), as can be observed in columns four and eight.
Our variable representing the ¯nancial °exibility of an exchange, ¢LT FINANCE, displays
no signi¯cant e®ect on the technical e±ciency of exchanges. However, more available funds
apparently lead to lower overall productivity growth in both the CRS and VRS-case.
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sess higher e±ciency values (columns two and ¯ve). Thus, productivity gains are easier to
accomplish for exchanges with lower e±ciency values.
Robustness of ¯ndings To provide more validity to our results, in particular of our ¯ndings
on the business model variables, we conducted some robustness checks. Table C.5 in appendix
C.6 displays the results when using the simple e±ciency measures Cash Volume/Assets and Cash
Volume/Sta®48 as dependent variables as well as taking the annual percentage changes of these
ratios (¢Cash Volume/Assets and ¢Cash Volume/Sta®) as productivity growth measures.
We ¯nd that the e±ciency measures produce somewhat similar results for our business model
variables, although there is a contradictory outcome for our VERTICAL variables. While
column one displays a signi¯cantly negative coe±cient, the same variable in column two possess
a signi¯cantly positive coe±cient. In a similar manner, the two productivity measures are
contradicting each other. The coe±cients of the variables VERTICAL, HORI-VERTICAL,
and FULL INTEGRATION all possess signi¯cantly di®erent signs (columns three and four).
Therefore, we cannot infer any reliable indications from these measures.
Furthermore, we veri¯ed our regression results presented in table 5.3 by using bootstrapped
standard errors.49 As can be seen in table C.6, our bootstrapped results largely con¯rm the
signi¯cance of our e±ciency estimates in columns two and six. For our overall MQ-productivity
growth, we observe that the coe±cient of the VERTICAL variable turns signi¯cant in both
technological settings in columns three and seven, implying that the large coe±cient value
of 50.2-55.5% is indeed statistically signi¯cant. On the other hand, the outperformance in
productivity growth at the HORI-VERTICAL and FULL INTEGRATION variables is not
signi¯cant any more. Overall, we would state that our robustness checks con¯rm our main
result that diversi¯ed exchanges are less e±cient than focused ¯rms. We only ¯nd evidence
that vertically integrated exchanges seem to possess a larger productivity growth than focused
exchanges, whereas exchanges with more than one related activities neither seem to be able to
outperform in terms of technical e±ciency nor in factor productivity growth.
5.4 Conclusion
This paper discussed the ongoing trend of business diversi¯cation within the stock exchange
industry for the years 1999 to 2003 and sought to measure potential di®erences in technical
e±ciency and factor productivity growth that are attributable to di®ering business models. We
noticed that most of the integration activity in these years was conducted by pro¯t-oriented,
demutualized exchanges, whereas mutual exchanges largely focused on their existing operations,
save for a few entities that diversi¯ed into derivatives trading activities. We presume that the
reason for these di®erent patterns lie in the diverging ownership structures and the resulting
objective functions of the exchanges. While pro¯t-oriented, particularly publicly listed stock
exchanges, substantially rely on revenues from related business activities such as post-trading
services, derivatives trading or software sales, we ¯nd only little evidence that the integration of
these activities also leads to better results in e±ciency and factor productivity growth compared
to exchanges that focus on cash market operations. Although some potential for e±ciency
48Because of the wide dispersion in the distribution of e±ciency values - Copenhagen is more than 1300times
more e±cient than Malta according to this measure - we used log values in the regressions.
49In particular, we replicated a random drawing with replacement from our sample 2000 times in order to
derive a frequency distribution of coe±cient estimates that allows us to estimate a sample-speci¯c standard
error. Furthermore, we constructed 85% and 90%-con¯dence intervals by using the 5%, 7.5% and the 92.5%,
95% percentiles of the distribution, respectively. We also controlled for our panel data structure by using clusters.
Confer Bradley and Tibshirani (1993) for an elaborate discussion on bootstrapping.CHAPTER 5. STOCK EXCHANGE BUSINESS MODELS 112
improvements should be possible due to synergies between certain activities, this cannot be
observed. Counterproductive e®ects such as increased business process complexity seem to
dominate the overall e®ect on e±ciency leading to a worse performance as opposed to cash
market-only operators.
It seems that the diversi¯cation strategy of pro¯t-oriented exchanges was not driven by
e±ciency-enhancement motives. However, this does not imply that these exchanges should
not diversify into related businesses. We deliberately considered only technical e±ciency in
order to ensure a better comparability between for-pro¯t and not-for-pro¯t entities. Hence,
the analysis of economic e±ciency, a measure which is more relevant for for-pro¯t ¯rms, may
produce di®erent results. Therefore, the integration of related activities may still prove to be
a pro¯table investment as long as positive excess rents can be earned in these ¯elds. In fact,
stock exchanges that diversi¯ed into derivatives and post-trading seem to have increased their
pro¯tability substantially, as can be seen in the case of the Deutsche BÄ orse, which increased
its operating pro¯ts by more than 16-fold from 1999 to 2003. Furthermore, diversi¯cation may
also be used to reduce business risks.50
Finally, our analysis also touches the much discussed topic, whether vertical integration
is bene¯cial or detrimental to social welfare. As indicated in the introduction, a signi¯cant
outperformance of a vertically integrated business model for our considered measures would
o®er proponents of this business model a plausible justi¯cation. Our ¯ndings, however, provide
only partial support at best. On the one hand, technical e±ciency seems to be actually lower
for exchanges with a vertical business model. On the other hand, we ¯nd some evidence
that vertically integrated exchanges have a stronger factor productivity growth than focused
exchanges. However, it still remains to be analyzed how these exchanges perform relative to
two entities providing cash trading and post-trading, separately, in order to be more conclusive
in this respect.
50In the extreme, this policy may not even be in the interest of the exchange but rather of risk-averse managers
as described by Amihud and Lev (1981) for conglomerates in general.Appendix A
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A.1 Descriptive Statistics
Operational Variables
INPUTS x1 x2
Sta® Tangible Assets
(No. Employed) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 558.5 494.4 52,131 74,936
2000 591.0 503.3 58,622 85,873
2001 615.0 529.7 69,657 94,969
2002 682.3 720.6 74,925 104,044
2003 658.1 696.8 79,959 107,562
OUTPUTS y1 y2 y3 y4
Listing Cash Trading Derivatives Trading Settlement/Software
(No. of companies) (Volume in $ 000 000) (No. of contracts in 000) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 858.1 1071.1 1,432,736 2,629,916 26,430 76,181 20,228 45,169
2000 876.3 1056.7 1,942,741 4,208,753 33,024 89,092 27,044 56,448
2001 817.5 924.7 1,359,079 2,842,350 47,298 124,285 31,500 65,918
2002 797.9 868.3 1,248,960 2,446,333 63,260 174,780 46,235 111,907
2003 901.2 1007.3 1,219,142 2,321,408 74,936 198,740 66,019 179,856
Resulting Dependent Variables for the Second Stage
EFF (CRS) EFF (VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 0.613 0.289 0.685 0.287
2000 0.642 0.293 0.724 0.275
2001 0.632 0.271 0.754 0.260
2002 0.610 0.286 0.766 0.297
2003 0.586 0.328 0.666 0.314
MQ (CRS) ¢EFF (CRS) ¢TECH (CRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.067 0.263 1.088 0.293 0.761 0.273
2000-2001 1.021 0.288 1.034 0.295 0.992 0.079
2001-2002 0.994 0.188 0.967 0.222 1.049 0.168
2002-2003 1.141 0.259 0.938 0.261 1.248 0.203
MQ (VRS) ¢EFF (VRS) ¢TECH (VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.086 0.240 1.105 0.271 0.997 0.138
2000-2001 1.009 0.241 1.104 0.343 0.992 0.079
2001-2002 0.998 0.123 0.993 0.187 1.049 0.168
2002-2003 1.077 0.213 0.893 0.191 1.248 0.203
Independent Framework Variables of the Second Stage
DEMUT LISTED OUTSOURCING HORIZONTAL VERTICAL
Sum Sum Sum Sum Sum
1999 6 2 5 11 4
2000 11 5 7 10 5
2001 15 8 7 10 5
2002 17 9 8 9 4
2003 17 9 7 7 4
FOREIGN LISTING LIQUIDITY FULL INTEGRATION
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Sum
1999 0.026 0.046 0.680 0.535 5
2000 0.031 0.071 1.038 1.103 5
2001 0.028 0.058 0.812 0.746 7
2002 0.028 0.059 0.881 0.772 9
2003 0.013 0.021 0.699 0.518 10
¢ LT FINANCE ¢ TRADING
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1998-1999 0.416 0.899 0.130 0.614
1999-2000 0.165 0.271 0.030 0.515
2000-2001 0.286 0.392 -0.006 0.292
2001-2002 0.095 0.240 0.035 0.275
2002-2003 0.079 0.273 0.101 0.388
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A.2 First Stage Results
Constant-Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Prod. Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.64 0.72 1.00 0.79 0.81 1.23
NYSE 0.45 0.49 0.66 0.60 0.49 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.95
Toronto TSX 0.74 0.79 0.53 0.72 1.00 0.97 0.71 1.43 1.80
Lima 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.05
BOVESPA 0.34 0.50 0.61 0.89 1.00 1.44 1.37 1.23 1.32
Hellenic 0.55 1.00 0.45 0.28 0.35 1.68 0.44 0.78 1.69
Budapest 0.23 0.24 0.47 0.48 0.66 1.10 1.86 0.65 1.50
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.64
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.11 1.06 0.92 0.74 1.07
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.41 0.88 0.83 0.89 0.73
London 0.83 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.00 1.01
Malta 0.41 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.69 0.82 1.22 1.09
Oslo 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.50 0.37 1.01 0.96 0.69 0.97
OM Gruppen 0.91 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.67 0.98 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.69 1.00 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.59 0.84 1.08 1.08
Vienna 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.44 0.26 0.98 0.97 1.25 1.01
Warsaw 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.92 0.80 0.96 1.07
Australian 0.90 0.93 0.82 0.85 0.65 1.01 0.94 1.13 1.12
Hongkong 0.42 0.76 0.70 0.54 0.45 1.79 0.88 1.02 1.14
Jakarta 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.48 0.69 0.91 1.05 1.15 1.28
Kuala Lumpur 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.92 1.16 0.69 1.26
Philippine 0.45 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.26 1.07 0.95 0.99 1.04
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.57 0.66 0.50 0.26 0.58 1.08 1.06 0.69
Taiwan 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.24 1.10 1.07 1.16 1.04
Thailand 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.95
Tokyo 0.50 0.64 0.90 0.84 0.81 1.08 1.51 1.12 1.22
Mean 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.59 1.07 1.02 0.99 1.14
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.26
Variable-Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Prod. Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.90 0.94 1.00
NYSE 0.57 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.49 1.31 0.93 0.97 0.98
Toronto TSX 1.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 1.00 1.52
Lima 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.03
BOVESPA 0.36 0.53 0.64 0.94 1.00 1.41 1.26 1.22 1.25
Hellenic 0.67 1.00 0.45 0.28 0.37 1.51 0.45 0.75 1.66
Budapest 0.44 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.32 1.24 1.00 1.01
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.37
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.13 1.09 0.84 0.74 0.97
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.54
London 0.85 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.00
Malta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.98
Oslo 0.83 0.76 0.73 0.54 0.51 0.95 0.96 0.73 1.05
OM Gruppen 0.92 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.66 0.98 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.70 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.54 0.85 1.08 1.08
Vienna 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.68 0.63 1.00 0.95 1.16 1.02
Warsaw 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.92 0.81 1.00 1.12
Australian 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.04 0.98 1.04 1.07
Hongkong 0.43 0.76 0.71 0.59 0.46 1.78 0.88 1.04 1.15
Jakarta 0.35 0.32 0.72 0.82 0.69 0.91 1.37 1.15 1.26
Kuala Lumpur 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.29 0.22 0.92 1.14 0.78 1.23
Philippine 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.42 1.04 0.96 1.00 1.02
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.58 0.66 0.50 0.27 0.59 1.08 1.06 0.70
Taiwan 0.26 0.33 0.46 0.49 0.25 1.15 1.04 1.16 1.04
Thailand 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.32 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.96
Tokyo 0.51 0.64 0.93 1.00 0.81 1.08 1.46 1.11 1.12
Mean 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.67 1.09 1.01 1.00 1.08
Standard Deviation 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.21
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A.3 Correlation matrix
E±ciency Regression Variables x
1 x
2 y
1 y
2 y
3 y
4
DEMUT 0.160 0.118 0.110 -0.009 0.223 0.290
LISTED 0.309 0.084 0.085 -0.051 0.308 0.422
LIQUIDITY 0.320 0.394 0.502 0.579 0.163 0.110
¢TRADING 0.007 -0.003 0.084 0.081 -0.070 -0.057
FOREIGN LISTING 0.363 0.602 0.698 0.866 0.017 -0.018
¢LT FINANCE -0.013 -0.065 -0.066 0.011 0.056 0.016
OUTSOURCING -0.379 -0.172 -0.180 -0.081 -0.189 -0.185
HORIZONTAL -0.402 -0.327 -0.338 -0.239 0.008 -0.223
VERTICAL -0.175 -0.185 -0.236 -0.189 -0.138 -0.094
FULL INTEGRATION 0.515 0.120 0.068 -0.074 0.300 0.505
Productivity Regression Variables x
1 x
2 y
1 y
2 y
3 y
4
DEMUT 0.188 0.109 0.074 -0.022 0.221 0.351
LISTED 0.386 0.116 0.041 -0.058 0.299 0.494
LIQUIDITY 0.403 0.439 0.531 0.597 0.193 0.187
¢TRADING 0.035 -0.062 0.035 -0.038 -0.071 -0.075
FOREIGN LISTING 0.403 0.670 0.749 0.892 0.020 -0.013
¢LT FINANCE 0.069 -0.048 0.063 0.071 0.197 0.119
OUTSOURCING -0.382 -0.183 -0.176 -0.086 -0.186 -0.207
HORIZONTAL -0.245 -0.271 -0.249 -0.189 -0.154 -0.132
VERTICAL -0.242 -0.285 -0.320 -0.215 0.079 -0.099
FULL INTEGRATION 0.443 0.160 0.094 -0.094 0.253 0.477
EFF(CRS) 0.266 0.167 0.347 0.313 0.358 0.333
EFF(VRS) 0.162 0.157 0.304 0.313 0.289 0.250
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A.4 Robustness Checks
Regressions without ¯nancial °exibility and business model variables
A.4.1 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.123*** 0.056 -0.132* 0.212*** 0.168*** -0.041* -0.095*** 0.057*
Std. Err. 0.046 0.067 0.073 0.091 0.059 0.024 0.015 0.035
LISTED -0.005 -0.047 -0.166 0.103*** -0.003 0.005 -0.139 0.156**
Std. Err. 0.060 0.167 0.149 0.028 0.072 0.161 0.114 0.073
LIQUIDITY 0.006 -0.001 0.033 -0.051* 0.115*** 0.016 0.086* -0.056
Std. Err. 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.038 0.055 0.051 0.087
¢TRADING -0.010 0.032 -0.019 0.057 -0.012 0.082** 0.027 0.069
Std. Err. 0.037 0.037 0.051 0.058 0.047 0.034 0.073 0.069
FOREIGN LISTING 1.851*** 0:766y -0.814 1.795* 3.161 -0.526 -0.348 -0.196
Std. Err. 0.384 0.544 0.855 0.980 - 0.795 0.470 0.996
EFF -1.147*** -0.979*** -0.178 -0.623** -0.981*** 0.281***
Std. Err. 0.307 0.334 0.139 0.274 0.311 0.113
CONST 0.564*** 1.735*** 1.707*** 1.058*** 0.533 1.513*** 1.748*** 0.835***
Std. Err. 0.038 0.208 0.212 0.071 - 0.211 0.222 0.080
Regressions without competition variables
A.4.2 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.103 -0.029 -0.135*** 0.123** 0.136* -0.087*** -0.101*** 0.012
Std. Err. 0.100 0.042 0.021 0.057 0.084 0.025 0.031 0.023
LISTED 0.095 -0.008 -0.080 0.048 0.062 0.055 -0.064 0.126*
Std. Err. 0.096 0.105 0.097 0.045 0.093 0.106 0.094 0.068
¢LT FINANCE -0.003 -0.035 0.029 -0.089*** -0.033 -0.019 0.055 -0.086
Std. Err. 0.035 0.068 0.066 0.032 0.044 0.073 0.054 0.063
OUTSOURCING 0.087 -0.340*** -0.484*** 0.172*** 0.033 -0.419*** -0.455*** 0.073
Std. Err. - 0.047 0.037 0.064 - 0.109 0.069 0.057
HORIZONTAL -0.094 -0.142*** -0.263*** 0.171 -0.167* -0.112*** -0.124*** 0.020
Std. Err. 0.111 0.057 0.108 0.133 0.094 0.044 0.051 0.054
VERTICAL -0.071 -0.204 -0.314*** 0.162 0.006 -0.065 -0.163*** 0.087
Std. Err. 0.078 0.170 0.105 0.145 0.095 0.141 0.050 0.143
FULL INTEGRATION -0.160 0.043 -0.161*** 0:209y -0.237** 0.182*** -0.041 0.209*
Std. Err. 0.136 0.091 0.058 0.144 0.116 0.067 0.062 0.113
EFF -1.039*** -1.038*** 0.005 -0.648*** -1.033*** 0.314*
Std. Err. 0.300 0.303 0.054 0.22 0.317 0.165
CONST 0.668*** 1.892*** 2.035*** 0.843*** 0.857*** 1.647*** 2.026*** 0.699***
Std. Err. 0.087 0.184 0.148 0.055 0.097 0.128 0.234 0.159
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Regressions with di®erent competition variables
A.5.1 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
¢TRADINGt¡1 for t (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.111* -0.004 -0.157*** 0.171** 0.107* -0.085** -0.095*** 0.006
Std. Err. 0.060 0.041 0.037 0.072 0.057 0.038 0.033 0.028
LISTED 0.015 0.010 -0.077 0.079** 0.049 0.038 -0.107 0.152**
Std. Err. - 0.112 0.087 0.036 0.069 0.125 0.100 0.070
LIQUIDITY -0.034 -0.041*** 0.011 -0.074* 0:064y -0.03 0.076* ¡0:099y
Std. Err. 0.024 0.016 0.035 0.041 0.044 0.039 0.043 0.066
¢TRADING 0.020* 0.022 0.015 0.035 0.046 -0.034 -0.078* 0.045
Std. Err. 0.010 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.041 0.037 0.046 0.030
FOREIGN LISTING 1.154*** 0:872y -0.643 1.687* 3.120*** -0.184 -0.041 -0.166**
Std. Err. 0.407 0.552 0.853 0.956 0.642 0.842 0.429 0.937
¢LT FINANCE 0.009 -0.025 0.026 -0.070*** -0.001 -0.025 0.044 -0.081
Std. Err. 0.031 0.062 0.076 0.024 0.040 0.077 0.047 0.040
OUTSOURCING 0.109 -0.345*** -0.479*** 0.162*** 0.156*** -0.421*** -0.457*** 0.074
Std. Err. - 0.050 0.041 0.052 0.062 0.11 0.057 0.063
HORIZONTAL -0.017 -0.129*** -0.244** 0.189 -0.140** -0.149*** -0.192*** 0.052
Std. Err. 0.037 0.022 0.123 0.185 0.072 0.05 0.046 0.071
VERTICAL -0.008 -0.206 -0.307*** 0.158 0.098 -0.081 -0.174*** 0.083
Std. Err. 0.045 0.15 0.122 0.124 0.082 0.121 0.053 0.122
FULL INTEGRATION -0.088 0.052 -0.146* 0.222 -0.146* 0.152* -0.100 0.239*
Std. Err. - 0.095 0.088 0.180 0.083 0.09 0.080 0.128
EFF -1.104*** -1.000*** -0.119 -0.624*** -1.008*** 0.313**
Std. Err. 0.311 0.351 0.125 0.239 0.307 0.148
CONST 0.578 1.923*** 2.019*** 0.902*** 0.718*** 1.684*** 1.985*** 0.772***
Std. Err. - 0.18 0.152 0.038 0.085 0.137 0.201 0.122
A.5.2 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
¢LIQUIDITY for ¢TRADING (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.129*** -0.002 -0.156*** 0.177** 0.172** -0.090** -0.108*** 0.015
Std. Err. 0.048 0.044 0.042 0.076 0.078 0.038 0.037 0.030
LISTED 0.039 0.005 -0.079 0:059y 0.021 0.058 -0.070 0.134**
Std. Err. 0.073 0.107 0.088 0.040 0.085 0.114 0.094 0.061
LIQUIDITY 0.009 -0.084** -0.026 -0.049 0.048 -0.065 0.076** -0.128**
Std. Err. 0.031 0.041 0.037 0.035 0.047 0.055 0.039 0.067
D LIQUIDITY -0.021 -0.069** -0.058 0.024 -0.018 -0.037 0.025 -0.057***
Std. Err. 0.037 0.035 0.044 0.030 0.051 0.032 0.021 0.017
FOREIGN LISTING 1.796*** 1.060* -0.489 1.655* 3.107*** -0.094 -0.184 0.049
Std. Err. 0.383 0.567 0.803 0.94 0.663 0.939 0.433 1.021
DELTA LT FINANCE -0.007 -0.030 0.022 -0.074*** -0.013 -0.020 0.054 ¡0:086y
Std. Err. 0.033 0.067 0.077 0.021 0.041 0.071 0.053 0.055
OUTSOURCING 0.047 -0.362*** -0.493*** 0.165*** 0.158** -0.427*** -0.446*** 0.058
Std. Err. 0.061 0.038 0.043 0.062 0.077 0.121 0.076 0.059
HORIZONTAL -0.044 -0.149*** -0.257** 0.155 -0.105 -0.115*** -0.116** 0.010
Std. Err. 0.071 0.062 0.120 0.148 0.083 0.044 0.055 0.056
VERTICAL -0.006 -0.222 -0.320*** 0.153 0.071 -0.079 -0.148*** 0.06
Std. Err. 0.084 0.166 0.132 0.119 0.09 0.126 0.057 0.116
FULL INTEGRATION -0.100 0.047 -0.148** 0.192 -0.165* 0.183*** -0.041 0.210*
Std. Err. 0.086 0.103 0.073 0.159 0.089 0.073 0.067 0.121
EFF -1.079*** -0.981*** -0.114 -0.643*** -1.027*** 0.315**
Std. Err. 0.329 0.355 0.119 0.246 0.314 0.150
CONST 0.595*** 1.957*** 2.048*** 0.895*** 0.701*** 1.710*** 1.958*** 0.820***
Std. Err. 0.081 0.157 0.134 0.032 0.092 0.144 0.224 0.114
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Regressions with Bootstrapping (2000 Replications, 5%, 10%, and 15%-Levels)
A.6 Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
Bootstrapping (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
DEMUT 0.133* 0.001 -0.161* 0.187** 0.191** ¡0:086y -0.107 0.025
Std. Err. 0.097 0.106 0.098 0.047 0.133 0.091 0.097 0.055
LISTED 0.040 -0.001 -0.083 0.060 0.091 0.054 -0.068 0.127*
Std. Err. 0.150 0.159 0.129 0.062 0.201 0.160 0.124 0.079
LIQUIDITY 0.006 -0.032 -0.002 -0.040 -0.034 -0.021 0.059 -0.063
Std. Err. 0.065 0.105 0.106 0.080 0.094 0.059 0.092 0.089
¢TRADING -0.002 0.008 -0.037 0.060 0.083** 0.040 0.003 0.059
Std. Err. 0.049 0.066 0.066 0.059 0.060 0.057 0.091 0.074
FOREIGN LISTING 1.803** 0.874 -0.566 1.609** 2.347* -0.271 -0.109 -0.218
Std. Err. 0.914 0.926 0.873 0.906 1.336 0.880 0.983 0.896
¢LT FINANCE -0.045 -0.029 0.029 -0.084 -0.007 -0.026 0.054 -0.095*
Std. Err. 0.037 0.123 0.091 0.060 0.067 0.076 0.061 0.059
OUTSOURCING 0.045 -0.343** -0.498** 0.187 -0.010 -0.400* -0.450** 0.099
Std. Err. 0.097 0.240 0.190 0.145 0.158 0.282 0.228 0.138
HORIZONTAL -0.039 -0.214** -0.300* 0.132 0.150* -0.085 -0.154 0.053
Std. Err. 0.129 0.160 0.145 0.160 0.191 0.140 0.221 0.199
VERTICAL -0.006 -0.153 -0.247 0.137 0.180 -0.128 -0.116 -0.010
Std. Err. 0.208 0.294 0.211 0.162 0.408 0.300 0.238 0.167
FULL INTEGRATION -0.101 0.029 -0.127 0.147 0.164 0.145 -0.041 0.153
Std. Err. 0.173 0.217 0.163 0.165 0.232 0.194 0.224 0.206
EFF -1.096** -1.002** -0.096 -0.634** -1.033** 0.329**
Std. Err. 0.224 0.192 0.113 0.193 0.165 0.168
CONST 0.592** 1.923** 2.032** 0.888** 0.654** 1.674** 1.977** 0.766**
Std. Err. 0.111 0.219 0.182 0.149 0.170 0.197 0.189 0.179
Table A.6: Bootstrap testAppendix B
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B.1 Discriminatory o®ers by for-pro¯t exchanges
In the analysis so far, we only allowed for identical o®ers made by X2 to the members of the mu-
tual exchange. Let us now assume that the outsider-owned exchange might use discriminatory
o®ers. In this case, an outsider-owned exchange will pursue a divide-and-conquer strategy.1,
which means that the exchange makes a sweet o®er to a fraction x of randomly chosen cus-
tomers of X1 such that these customers will transfer their new volume to X2. The remaining
1¡x do not get this special o®er, however they can observe the o®er made to the others. Hence,
they know that they would have to bear a higher unit ¯xed cost by staying loyal in the case
that X1 invests and will therefore be individually induced to leave the mutual exchange, which
results in a snowballing e®ect.
Thus, X2 will o®er the following trading fee structure to the customers of X1: The portion
x of targeted customers obtain an o®er of (or slightly below) ^ a ´ c¡(µ¡ I
v+k). As a result, they
will transfer their new volume, since they cannot get a better o®er at X1, even if all members
stayed loyal. Furthermore, the outsider-owned exchange will o®er the remaining 1¡x customers
a2 such that
a2(x) ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + (1 ¡ x)k
): (B.1)
Note that the outsider-owned exchange obtains larger rents from charging the fraction x of
customers a trading fee ^ a and the remaining customers 1 ¡ x a fee of a2(x) > ^ a, than charging
all customers ^ a. By applying such a divide-and-conquer strategy, the outsider-owned exchange
dilutes the customer base of the mutual exchange without o®ering the defecting customers
signi¯cantly better conditions from an expected value viewpoint. This strategy will be successful
as X2 knows that a shrinking customer base at X1 results in higher trading fees for its customers
who stay loyal with their new volume, if X1 decides to invest. This will lower the value of the
investment for the mutual stock exchange and reduces its incentive to decide for it at period 0.
As a consequence, the second-sourcing e®ect discovered in the last section loses its relevance in
this scenario. Hence, the mutual exchange will have a lower propensity to invest in the project
than before.
To show this, we derive the optimal strategy of the for-pro¯t exchange. X2 o®ers the
customers of X1 with x 2 [0;1] a continuum of o®ers a2(x) such that
a2(x) ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + (1 ¡ x)k
) for all x: (B.2)
At the boundaries of x, this translates into the o®ers a2(0) = ^ a and a2(1) = ¹ a ´ c¡(µ¡ I
v).
Note that by using such a strategy, the outsider-owned exchange essentially o®ers the ¯rst
member of the continuum the same conditions (or slightly below) she could expect if all other
members stayed loyal to the mutual exchange. Since this customer will accept the o®er, the
second gets an o®er that is a little bit worse, and so on. The last customer merely obtains ¹ a,
which is equivalent to what it could expect as unit costs if she was the only remaining member
who trades her transferable volume at X1. Applying this strategy also deters coordination by
the members, since everyone runs to be the ¯rst in line, thereby getting the best o®er from the
investor-owned exchange. Essentially, the outsider-owned exchange induces a run amongst the
members of the mutual exchange.
Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the parameter values at which the mutual exchange
will decide to invest in period 0, taking into account the outlined strategic move by X2. Since
customers will be treated heterogeneously by such a policy, we have to formulate the condition
1For a general analysis of these strategies, see for instance Segal (2003).APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 4 122
in expected value terms. A representative member can expect a fee of
E[a2(x)] = · a ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + k
2
): (B.3)
If the mutual exchange does not invest, all members can expect to get conditions such that
they are indi®erent between changing their volume to exchange X2 and staying at their home
exchange X1. It follows that they can expect trading costs of c(v + k). However, if the mutual
exchange decides to invest into the project, the members can expect trading costs to be at
(c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v
))v + · ak (B.4)
From inserting · a = c ¡ (µ ¡ I
v+ k
2
) into condition (B.4) we obtain the following condition for
investing by a mutual after rearranging:
I ·
(2v + k)(v + k)
2v + 3k
: (B.5)
Only if the investment costs are lower than depicted in condition B.5, a mutual exchange
operating in the interest of its member will invest into the project. In order to compare this
result with the investment cost hurdle of nondiscriminating o®ers, we obtain:
(2v + k)(v + k)
2v + 3k
S
µ(v + k)2
v + 2k
: (B.6)
We ¯nd that the range of investment costs such that the mutual exchange will invest into the
project is lower if the investor-owned exchange uses the above formulated divide-and-conquer
strategy. In fact,
(2v + k)(v + k)
2v + 3k
<
µ(v + k)2
v + 2k
, 0 < k(2v + k); (B.7)
which holds, since v;k > 0 by assumption. Hence, the mutual exchange has a lower propensity
to invest, even though we still observe the "second-sourcing" e®ect that makes the investment
attractive by increasing the bargaining power of its members.
B.2 Multiplicity of Equilibria
Coordination games like the one analyzed in this paper are typically a²icted with the problem
of multiple equilibria, where signi¯cantly di®erent e±ciency outcomes may occur. The global
games framework, which we employed, provides a mitigation to this problem. To illustrate
that in our analysis, let us consider a situation where the outsider-owned exchange can only
make nondiscriminatory o®ers. In the equilibrium we analyzed in section 4.2.2, the condition
on trading costs such that the volume will be transferred to the outsider-owned exchange is
a2 · ^ a = c ¡ (¹ µ ¡
I
v + k
):
where µ = ¹ µ is a certain level of e±ciency gain. Our analysis implied that each member expects
the other members of the mutual exchange to stay until a dominating o®er arrives for all of
them. This forces the outsider-owned exchange to deliver an o®er which is at least as good for
the user as the best possible o®er of the mutual exchange. Thus in a certain sense, members
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outsider-owned exchange. But given a di®erent structure of beliefs by the members, other
equilibria are also possible. For instance, if each member believes that the other members will
move their new volume as soon as
a2 · ¹ a = c ¡ (¹ µ ¡
I
v
);
then it is also individually rational to move the new volume if such an o®er will be made by
the outsider-owned exchange. But, because of ¹ a > ^ a the latter o®er is not very attractive for
the members of the mutual exchange in total. Hence, we have multiple equilibria with the
payo® for each member depending on the equilibrium on which they coordinate. Thus, the
outsider-owned exchange is in a situation of strategic uncertainty, since it does not know how
the members will react to a given o®er. To be on the safe side, it would o®er ^ a to attract
all members with certainty. However, in case it overestimated the coordination abilities of the
members, this would be a too costly deal viewed from the perspective of the outside owners
whose interests X2 has to maximize. Therefore, we analyze the circumstances under which
the outsider-owned exchange can a®ord to make an o®er which is strictly lower than ^ a, but
nevertheless attracts the total transferable volume k of the mutual's members.
To deal with this issue we draw on the global games approach to ¯nd an unique equilibrium.
The global games approach builds on the idea that individual players, in our case the members
of the exchange, are facing payo® uncertainty which is caused by an underlying state of the
economy. In our framework, this would correspond to uncertainty regarding the productivity
parameter of the investment technology µ. We assume that for each exchange Xi, µi is inde-
pendently drawn from the same smooth distribution F(µ) on the real line with an expected
value E[µ]. Furthermore, we assume that the density function f(µ) is unimodal with nearly
all its mass lying on the expected value E[µ]. Each member i of the mutual exchange X1
receives an individual signal s1;i concerning the project's productivity at its own exchange µ1,
which is distributed uniformly on the interval [µ1¡²;µ1+²] such that for two distinct members
i 6= j, s1;i is independent of s1;j. Regarding the productivity of the outsider-owned exchange,
let us assume that all its potential users as well as its outside owners, in whose interests the
exchange acts, merely know that this exchange will have an expected productivity gain of E[µ].
Likewise, the outside owners of the for-pro¯t exchange (and its management) also merely know
the expected productivity of the investment of the mutual exchange. Hence, we assume that
the management of the outsider-owned exchange neither knows the future realization of the
productivity state µ2 of its own exchange nor the productivity state of the mutual exchange µ1
at the time, at which it has to make its o®er a2 to the members of X1.2 Therefore, its o®er
is based on the expected productivity gain E[µ]. Note that this information structure is in
line with our assumption on the time structure and credibility of the o®ers made by the two
exchanges. Since X2 will move ¯rst to make its o®er due to its higher commitment to the o®er,
it is plausible to assume that the members who individually decide over accepting this o®er,
act later on a better information basis.
For the members of the mutual exchange the payo®s of the game are determined by the
underlying state variable µ1, given the cumulative probability distribution F(µ). The signal
they receive regarding the state variable µ1 tells them about the payo®s of other members and,
crucially, also about the signals that other members are likely to have received. Thus, they
2We think that these assumptions on the information structure are quite realistic. Mutual exchanges are
owned by its main users who have typically a better information base than outside owners of a for-pro¯t exchange
whose only interest is ¯nancially motivated and who often lack deeper stock industry knowledge. In addition,
it seems plausible that given our time structure the management of the outside-owned exchange at the time it
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possess not only di®erent beliefs, but also di®erent beliefs about the other members' beliefs,
and so on. As we will see, this belief structure will determine how they will act in equilibrium.
To understand why this is the case, let us consider an example with just two members
mi;i = 1;2, each with transferable trade volume k=2 so that the total adds to k. In essence,
both members are playing a coordination game with the following payo®s: The payo® that each
Stay Withdraw
Stay ^ a(µ1); ^ a(µ1) ~ a(µ1);a2
Withdraw a2; ~ a(µ1) a2;a2
Table B.1: Payo® Structure with Two Members
member receives, if they both trade its volume k=2 at the mutual exchange is equal to
^ a(µ1) = c ¡ (µ1 ¡
I
v + k
): (B.8)
If both members accept the o®er of the outsider-owned exchange, they each have trading costs
of a2 per unit. However, if only one of the member accepts the o®er, the remaining member
has trading costs of
~ a(µ1) ´ c ¡ (µ1 ¡
I
v + k
2
): (B.9)
Hence, ~ a(µ1) is clearly higher than ^ a(µ1). Note that the type of coordination game played
depends on the o®er a2 made by X2, which is a strategic variable for this exchange. To examine
how the o®er by X2 will be set, we need to analyze two scenarios: The ¯rst scenario, as we will
see, has an unique equilibrium where both members withdraw if and only if
a2 <
1
2
(^ a(µ1) + ~ a(µ1)): (B.10)
The same logic can be used to show that both members are staying with its transferable volume
at the mutual exchange if and only if
a2 ¸
1
2
(^ a(µ1) + ~ a(µ1)); (B.11)
which is our second scenario. To conclude the argument, we have to show that given our
assumption on the distribution function of µ, the outsider-owned exchange's optimal choice is
an o®er a2 where the trading costs are (slightly lower than) (^ a(µ1)+~ a(µ1))=2, thereby inducing
all the members to transfer its volume to the outsider-owned exchange.
From our assumption regarding the information on the state variable µ1 which the two
members of the mutual exchange X1 receive, we know that they are highly correlated. Each
member will therefore expect trading costs of ^ a(s1;i(µ1)) in case the other member also stays
with its volume at X1, and ~ a(s1;i(µ1)) if it expects the other member to divert its volume.
When observing a certain o®er of a2, which will be derived later on, both members i know that
staying with their volume is the best choice for them if both get a signal s1;i concerning the
trading costs of its mutual exchange such that
^ a(s1;i(µ1)) + 2² < a2 for i = 1;2: (B.12)
When both members get such a high signal on the productivity of the investment at their own
exchange, they also know that the other's signal will be high enough to prefer to stay at the
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2² of their own signal. For a numerical example, let us normalize the trading o®er of the
outsider-owned exchange with a2 = 1 and suppose ² = 0:05. In this case, if member 1 gets a
signal that results in trading costs of ^ a(s1;1) = 0:95 it can deduce that the true state µ1 must
result in trading costs in the range 0:9 ¡ 1 and hence that the signal which member 2 gets can
only lie in a range that infers trading costs of 0:85¡1:05. Only if the signal-related trading cost
of member 1 lies at ^ a(s1;1) < 0:9, it knows that member 2 will also get a signal that induces
its to prefer to trade its total volume at the mutual exchange, given the o®er a2 = 1 of the
outsider-owned exchange. Therefore, if both members get a signal which results in trading costs
^ a(s1;i) < 0:9 = 1 ¡ 2² both members know that they prefer to trade at their exchange X1.
Going one step further, when do both members know that both members know that both
signals are such that both members prefer to trade at its mutual exchange? Hence, we are
talking about the second order beliefs of the members. By the same argument as given above
one can show that only if both signals are such that, given the signal, the trading costs are
^ a(s1;i) < 0:8 = 1 ¡ 4², these second order beliefs will be satis¯ed. To see this, suppose that
member 1 gets a signal indicating its trading costs would be 0:85, given the signal. Member 1
deduces that the true trading costs must lie between 0:8 and 0:9, and hence member 2's signal
makes its infer that the trading costs are between 0:75 and 0:95. However, member 1 also has to
think about what member 2 would deduce about the signal that member 1 had received. Since
member 1 knows that member 2 could have received a signal which produces trading costs of
0:95 it also knows that such a member 2-type would result in a positive probability that the
signal of member 1 is in the range 0:85¡1:05 as above. Only with signals which lead to trading
costs lower than 1 ¡ 4² = 0:8, such second order beliefs are excluded and both members know
that both members know that both prefer trading at their home exchange.
As we increase the number of order of beliefs, the range of µ1 will rise. Thus, even with
very high productivity parameters µ1, it can never be common knowledge that both members
will stay with their volumes at the mutual exchange.
What follows from these higher order beliefs in general? One should analyze the conse-
quences when ² is very small. The reason is that such a structure presumes small di®erences of
information among members and therefore can be considered as a relatively minor departure
from the basic framework depicted in section 4.2.1. Since µ is smoothly distributed, this implies
that the probability of the signal s1;j of the member j being above or below the signal s1;i of
member i fori 6= j approaches 0:5 in each case as ² ! 0. Thus, we will take it as 0:5 in following.
How do the members behave in equilibrium? The most natural strategy for each member
would be a switching strategy, where they only stay with their volume at X1 if their signal s1;i
is at least as large as some threshold value l, and withdraw their additional volume otherwise.
Let us suppose that member 1 follows this strategy and member 2 gets a signal s1;2 = l. What
does member 2 infer from the signal that member 1 got? Given that ² is very small and µ1 is
drawn from a smooth distribution, member 2 deduces a probability of 0:5 that s1;1 < l and that
member 1 will withdraw its transferable volume and with a probability of 0:5 that s1;1 ¸ l and
that member 1 will stay with its volume at the mutual exchange, according to the presumed
switching strategy. Hence, the trading cost of member 2 from staying is
0:5^ a + 0:5~ a = 0:5(c ¡ (µ1 ¡
I
v + k
) + c ¡ (µ1 ¡
I
v + k
2
)) = c ¡ (µ1 ¡
I
v + 3k
4
); (B.13)
and the trading costs from withdrawing is
0:5a2 + 0:5a2 = a2: (B.14)APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 4 126
Therefore, member 2 will withdraw if
a2 < c ¡ (µ1 ¡
I
v + 3k
4
): (B.15)
If condition (B.15) is satis¯ed, then member 2 will withdraw. In fact, it will withdraw even when
its signal s1;2 = l is higher than l, but lower than some cuto® point l¤, where it is indi®erent
between staying and withdrawing in terms of expected trading costs. However, now again we
have an infection argument of the kind described above going on. Since both members are in
symmetric positions, using the same argument one can show that member 1 will have a cuto®
point higher than l¤. That is a contradiction with the initial assumption that member 1 will
remain at the mutual exchange and therefore both members staying with its volume at the
mutual exchange cannot be an equilibrium. Instead, both members will always withdraw in
equilibrium, if condition (B.15) is satis¯ed, and for small values of ² this equilibrium is indeed
unique.3
Hence, we have shown that withdrawing is the only remaining equilibrium if the outsider-
owned exchange makes an o®er a2 to both members similar to the one depicted in condition
(B.15). Note that the payo® of retaining the volume at the mutual exchange depends on µ1,
which we have assumed to be a random variable. However, given our assumption that the
density function of µ has nearly all its mass on its mean E[µ], the outsider-owned exchange can
expect that µ1 will be close to this parameter. Substituting E[µ] for µ1 in condition (B.15) gives
us a condition for an optimal o®er of the outsider-owned exchange such that the outsider-owned
exchange can expect that members of the mutual exchange to withdraw their volume. As can
be seen from equation (B.13), this optimal o®er corresponds to condition (B.10) given above.
In consequence, the outsider-owned exchange will succeed in destabilizing the mutual. Note
also that the resulting equilibrium is the risk-dominant equilibrium which always implies some
coordination failure among the members.
Generalizing to the case with a continuum of traders we can focus on the risk-dominant
equilibrium which is the unique equilibrium when the perception of a small payo® uncertainty
exists, as shown by the global games approach. Hence, given this equilibrium the outsider-
owned exchange X2 will set the o®er a2 < · a such that the trading costs are slightly lower
than
· a ´ c ¡ (µ ¡
I
v + k
2
): (B.16)
The condition corresponds to the one given in section 4.2.2.1.
3The argument used to eliminate an equilibrium depends on members using a switching strategy, where
below some signal level, the members withdraw and above some level they stay with their volume at the mutual
exchange. Naturally, there also exist other strategies. However, Morris and Shin (2003) show that switching
strategies are optimal in the global games approach.APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 4 127
B.3 Stock exchanges employed in regressions
No. Exchange Governance Related Activities
Mutual/State Demutualized Listed Post-Trading Derivatives Software
1 Australian - 1998- 1998-
p p
-
2 BOVESPA
p
- - -
p
-
3 Budapest - 2002- - -
p
-
4 Copenhagen - 1996- - 2000-
p
-
5 Deutsche BÄ orse - 2000- 2001- 2000-
p p
6 Euronexty - 2000- 2001-
p p p
7 Hellenic* - 1995- 2000- 2000- 2002- 2000-
8 Hongkong - 2000- 2000-
p p
-
9 Istanbul
p
- - - 2001- -
10 Jakarta
p
- -
p
- -
11 Johannesburg JSE
p
- -
p
2001- -
12 Kuala Lumpur
p
- -
p p
-
13 Lima - 2003- - - 2003- -
14 London - 2000- 2001- - 2003- -
15 NASDAQ - 2001- - - - -
16 NYSE
p
- - - - -
17 OMX - 1993- 1998- 2001-
p p
18 Oslo - 2001- - -
p
-
19 Philippine - 2001- - 2003- - -
20 Singapore SGXy - 1999- 2000-
p p
2000-
21 SWX Zurich - 2002- - -
p
-
22 Taiwan
p
- -
p
- -
23 Thailand
p
- -
p
- -
24 Tokyo - 2001- -
p p
2002-
25 Toronto TSX - 2000- 2002- - -1999 2002-
26 Vienna - 1998- - 2000-
p
-
Total 9 17 9 17 20 7
*: Athens Stock Exchange in 1999
y: Pro forma ¯gures for 1999 p
: Exchange possessed this activity since 1999 or earlier
Table B.2: Exchanges Included in Probit Regressions (1999-2003)
B.4 Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) SETTLE 1
(2) DERIVAT 0.144 1
(3) SOFTWARE 0.217 0.27 1
(4) DEMUT 0.081 0.294 0.408 1
(5) LISTED 0.268 0.235 0.548 0.566 1
(6) BOARDCOMP 0.037 0.105 -0.087 -0.33 -0.192 1
(7) DELTRADEREV 0.082 -0.033 -0.098 -0.07 -0.076 0.06 1
(8) CMCONTROL -0.315 0.189 0.28 0.442 0.287 -0.179 -0.025 1
(9) TRADECOST 0.221 -0.311 -0.285 -0.285 -0.152 0.131 0.122 -0.517 1
(10) SIZE -0.077 -0.147 0.216 -0.001 0.162 -0.224 -0.089 0.275 -0.539 1
Table B.3: Correlation of Employed Variables (1999-2003 Pooled)APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 4 128
B.5 Robustness Checks
Univariate Probit Regressions (clustering)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Related Business Activity: DEMUT SETTLE DERIV SOFTWARE
LISTED 1.149*** 0.893** 1.719***
Std. Err. 0.415 0.396 0.505
BOARDCOMP -2.600*** 0.563 0.709 0.283
Std. Err. 0.910 0.942 0.907 0.857
¢TRADEREV -0.202 0.867 0.002 -0.317
Std. Err. 0.437 1.239 0.305 0.278
CMCONTROL 0.303*** -0.344*** -0.03 0.139
Std. Err. 0.113 0.121 0.138 0.213
TRADECOST -0.024* 0.011 -0.057*** -0.039*
Std. Err. 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.023
SIZE -0.268*** 0.056 -0.375** 0.004
Std. Err. 0.096 0.111 0.16 0.118
CONST 3.325* 0.433 6.488*** -1.756
Std. Err. 1.808 2.104 2.392 2.823
Observations 130 130 130 130
Wald ¡ Â2 28.73 23.52 19.42 19.95
Univariate Probit Regressions (Random E®ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Related Business Activity: DEMUT SETTLE DERIV SOFTWARE
LISTED 1.325*** -0.347 7.853***
Std. Err. 0.384 0.925 3.200
BOARDCOMP -4.105*** 0.240 2.560y -2.912y
Std. Err. 1.472 0.835 1.634 2.023
¢TRADEREV -0.275 0.424 -0.344 -1.533
Std. Err. 0.413 0.356 0.969 1.548
CMCONTROL 0.323** -0.299*** 0.188 0.838y
Std. Err. 0.166 0.123 0.259 0.594
TRADECOST -0.037** 0.006 -0.127*** -0.155***
Std. Err. 0.019 0.012 0.040 0.057
SIZE -0.428** 0.014 -0.807*** 1.244y
Std. Err. 0.184 0.100 0.244 0.822
CONST 6.401** 1.185 12.282*** -23.021*
Std. Err. 3.279 1.886 5.248 13.372
Observations 130 130 130 130
Wald ¡ Â2 14.94 15.78 16.57 8.63
Univariate Logit Regressions (Random E®ects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Related Business Activity: DEMUT SETTLE DERIV SOFTWARE
LISTED 4.962*** 1.124 7.390***
Std. Err. 1.565 - 2.751
BOARDCOMP -7.274*** 1.993 4.633 -4.447
Std. Err. 2.803 3.614 - 3.803
¢TRADEREV -0.476 -0.148 0.213 -2.155
Std. Err. 0.743 1.254 1.413 2.146
CMCONTROL 0.568* -1.309*** 0.327 0.813
Std. Err. 0.304 0.521 - 0.953
TRADECOST -0.065** -0.064 -0.186*** -0.269***
Std. Err. 0.034 0.047 0.064 0.101
SIZE -0.777** -0.294 -1.891*** -0.006
Std. Err. 0.343 0.285 0.556 0.559
CONST 11.583* 10.024* 26.103*** -2.245
Std. Err. 6.302 6.057 8.833 -
Observations 130 130 130 130
Wald ¡ Â2 13.21 13.31 - 10.80
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B.6 Event Studies
This section describes the methodology used in ¯gure 4.2. We ¯rst discuss the construction of
the event study for the degree of diversi¯cation.
In a ¯rst step, we identi¯ed from our sample of 50 largest exchanges those that demutualized
or went public in the ¯ve year time frame 1999-2003, and labeled them as 'Demutualized Group'
(16 exchanges) and 'IPO Group' (7 exchanges), respectively. Thus, these exchanges were subject
to the 'event' under consideration. We then identi¯ed those exchanges that remained mutuals
during 1999 and 2003, which we denoted as 'Control Group' (25 exchanges). For each of the
considered exchanges we counted the number of related activities they o®ered in each year.
We then divided the sums by the amount of possible related activities in each year. Since
we considered three related activities (derivatives, post-trading, software), each exchange was
assigned a value of either zero (no related activities), 1=3, 2=3 or one (all three related activities)
for each year. We then adjusted the fractions of the 'Demutualized Group' and 'IPO Group'-
exchanges by deducting the 'Control Group's mean degree of diversi¯cation from it, for each
year. This provided us an indication by how much the two groups' degree of diversi¯cation
di®ers from that of the 'Control Group'. Then, we aligned the calculated values for the two
groups according to the timing of the respective event. To be more speci¯c, we rearranged the
values for each of the exchanges of the 'Demutualized Group' and the 'IPO Group' in such a
way that their values occurred at the same time, i.e. either prior (t-2, t-1), at (t), or after the
event (t+1, t+2). Finally, we calculated the mean values of diversi¯cation for each of these
time periods. The results for demutualization and IPO can be seen in tables B.5 and tables
B.6, respectively.
In analogy to the procedure outlined above, conducted an event study that measured the
change in revenue growth for the three groups of exchanges. In a ¯rst step, we again identi¯ed
those exchanges that qualify for the event. In contrast to the approach above, we selected the
exchanges from a smaller sample, as we do not have ¯nancial statement data for all of the 50
largest exchanges. This reduced our considered subsamples 'Demutualized Group', 'IPO Group'
and 'Control Group' to 13, 7, and 13 exchanges, respectively. For the 'Demutualized Group'
and 'IPO Group', we calculated the development in revenues by indexing them at the period
in which the event occurred, i.e. the revenues of 2001 were used as base year, if the event
took place in that year. For the exchanges of the control group we calculated these indices
for several starting points separately, depending on the years an event had occurred in the
'Demutualized Group' and 'IPO Group'. To be more speci¯c, we calculated the indices with
the base years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 in the event of demutualization as there occurred this
event in these years. We the matched the exchanges from the 'Demutualized Group' and 'IPO
Group' with the corresponding 'Control Group' tables and adjusted the revenue index as in
analogy with the former event study. Then, as before, we aligned the calculated values for the
'Demutualized Group' and the 'IPO Group' according to the timing of the respective event and
calculated mean values for each time period. The results can be seen in tables B.7 and tables
B.8, respectively.APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 4 130
No. Diversi¯cation - Demutualized Group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Singapore (1999) 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 TSX (2000) 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33
3 Deutsche BÄ orse (2000) 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 Euronext (2000) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 London (2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
6 Hong Kong (2000) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
7 Mexico Stock Exchange (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 Nasdaq (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 Oslo (2001) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
10 Osaka (2001) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
11 Philippine (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
12 Tokyo (2001) 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.00 1.00
13 Swiss Exchange (2002) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 Spanish Exchanges (2002) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 Budapest (2002) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
16 Lima (2003) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
No. Diversi¯cation - Control Group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Amex 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
2 Buenos Aires 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
3 Chicago Stock Exchange 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Colombo 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
5 Irish 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 Istanbul 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33
7 Jakarta 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
8 JSE South Africa 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67
9 Korea 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
10 Kuala Lumpur 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
11 Ljubljana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 Malta 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
14 Mumbai 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
15 NYSE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 Santiago 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 Sao Paulo 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
18 Shanghai 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 Shenzhen 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
20 Taiwan 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
21 Tehran 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
22 Tel-Aviv 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
23 Thailand 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
24 Warsaw 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Mean 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31
Median 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
No. Control Group mean-adjusted 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Singapore 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
2 TSX 0.06 -0.28 -0.31 0.03 0.03
3 Deutsche BÄ orse 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
4 Euronext 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
5 London -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.03
6 Hong Kong 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36
7 Mexico Stock Exchange -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
8 Nasdaq -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
9 Oslo 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
10 Osaka 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36
11 Philippine -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.03
12 Tokyo 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.69 0.69
13 Swiss Exchange -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
14 Spanish Exchanges -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
15 Budapest 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
16 Lima -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 -0.28 0.06
No. Event-adjusted (Demutualization) t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
1 Singapore 0.39 0.72 0.69
2 TSX 0.06 -0.28 -0.31 0.03
3 Deutsche BÄ orse 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69
4 Euronext 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.69
5 London -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31
6 Hong Kong 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36
7 Mexico Stock Exchange -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
8 Nasdaq -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
9 Oslo 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
10 Osaka 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36
11 Philippine -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.03
12 Tokyo 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.69 0.69
13 Swiss Exchange -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
14 Spanish Exchanges -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
15 Budapest 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
16 Lima -0.28 -0.28 0.06
Median Demutualization -0.28 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.19
Mean Demutualization -0.08 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.22
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No. Diversi¯cation - IPO Group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Hellenic Exchanges (2000) 0.00 0.67 0.67 1 1
2 Hong Kong (2000) 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
3 Singapore (2000) 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 Deutsche BÄ orse (2001) 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 Euronext (2001) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
6 London (2001) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
7 TSX (2002) 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33
No. Diversi¯cation - Control Group 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Amex 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
2 Buenos Aires 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
3 Chicago Stock Exchange 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 Colombo 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
5 Irish 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 Istanbul 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33
7 Jakarta 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
8 JSE South Africa 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67
9 Korea 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
10 Kuala Lumpur 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
11 Ljubljana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 Malta 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
14 Mumbai 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
15 NYSE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 Santiago 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 Sao Paulo 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
18 Shanghai 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 Shenzhen 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
20 Taiwan 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
21 Tehran 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
22 Tel-Aviv 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
23 Thailand 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
24 Warsaw 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
Mean 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31
Median 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
No. Control Group mean-adjusted 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Hellenic Exchanges -0.28 0.39 0.36 0.69 0.69
2 Hong Kong 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36
3 Singapore 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
4 Deutsche BÄ orse 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
5 Euronext 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
6 London -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.03
7 TSX 0.06 -0.28 -0.31 0.03 0.03
No. Event-adjusted (IPO) t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
1 Hellenic Exchanges -0.28 0.39 0.36 0.69
2 Hong Kong 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36
3 Singapore 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69
4 Deutsche BÄ orse 0.39 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
5 Euronext 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69
6 London -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.31 0.03
7 TSX -0.28 -0.31 0.03 0.03
Mean IPO 0.14 0.19 0.37 0.36 0.53
Median IPO 0.06 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.69
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No. Demutualized Group indexed at Event 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Singapore (1999) 1.00 0.90 1.10 1.10 1.32
2 TSX (2000) 0.70 1.00 0.80 0.96 1.04
3 Deutsche BÄ orse (2000) 0.90 1.00 1.08 1.58 2.35
4 Euronext (2000) 1.14 1.00 1.41 2.02 2.01
5 London (2000) 0.90 1.00 1.14 1.20 1.27
6 Hong Kong (2000) 0.71 1.00 0.85 0.82 0.90
7 Nasdaq (2001) 0.74 0.97 1.00 0.93 0.69
8 Oslo (2001) 0.69 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.02
9 Philippine (2001) 1.30 2.02 1.00 0.99 0.70
10 Tokyo (2001) 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.95 1.05
11 Swiss Exchange (2002) 0.58 0.74 0.97 1.00 1.02
12 Budapest (2002) 1.32 1.37 0.97 1.00 1.07
13 Lima (2003) 1.59 1.41 1.05 0.93 1.00
No. Control Group - Indexed at 1999 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Chicago 1.00 1.35 1.29 1.05 0.88
2 Istanbul 1.00 2.05 1.63 1.45 1.97
3 Jakarta 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.08 1.15
4 JSE South Africa 1.00 1.22 1.51 1.64 1.56
5 Kuala Lumpur 1.00 0.67 0.39 0.37 0.69
6 Ljubljana 1.00 1.20 1.36 1.74 1.44
7 Malta 1.00 1.22 1.27 1.38 1.38
8 NYSE 1.00 1.12 1.51 1.49 1.51
9 Sao Paulo 1.00 0.99 0.88 0.83 1.00
10 Taiwan 1.00 1.06 0.73 0.75 0.69
11 Thailand 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.15 1.71
12 Warsaw 1.00 1.41 0.99 0.72 0.89
Mean 1.00 1.19 1.13 1.14 1.24
Median 1.00 1.16 1.15 1.11 1.26
Control Group - Indexed at 2000 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean 0.89 1.00 0.95 0.96 1.06
Median 0.86 1.00 0.97 0.94 1.08
Control Group - Indexed at 2001 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean 1.02 1.12 1.00 1.00 1.14
Median 0.88 1.04 1.00 1.01 1.07
Control Group - Indexed at 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean 1.05 1.16 1.02 1.00 1.15
Median 0.90 1.08 0.99 1.00 1.04
Control Group - Indexed at 2003 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean 0.90 1.03 0.94 0.92 1.00
Median 0.80 0.93 0.93 0.96 1.00
No. Control Group mean-adjusted 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Singapore 0.00 -0.29 -0.03 -0.03 0.08
2 TSX -0.20 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.02
3 Deutsche BÄ orse 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.61 1.29
4 Euronext 0.25 0.00 0.47 1.06 0.95
5 London 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.21
6 Hong Kong -0.19 0.00 -0.10 -0.15 -0.16
7 Nasdaq -0.28 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 -0.45
8 Oslo -0.33 -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.11
9 Philippine 0.28 0.91 0.00 0.00 -0.44
10 Tokyo -0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.05 -0.08
11 Swiss Exchange -0.47 -0.42 -0.05 0.00 -0.13
12 Budapest 0.27 0.21 -0.05 0.00 -0.07
13 Lima 0.68 0.38 0.12 0.00 0.00
No. Event-adjusted (Demutualization) t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
1 Singapore 0.00 -0.29 -0.03
2 TSX -0.20 0.00 -0.14 0.00
3 Deutsche BÄ orse 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.61
4 Euronext 0.25 0.00 0.47 1.06
5 London 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.24
6 Hong Kong -0.19 0.00 -0.10 -0.15
7 Nasdaq -0.28 -0.15 0.00 -0.07 -0.45
8 Oslo -0.33 -0.24 0.00 0.00 -0.11
9 Philippine 0.28 0.91 0.00 0.00 -0.44
10 Tokyo -0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.05 -0.08
11 Swiss Exchange -0.42 -0.05 0.00 -0.13
12 Budapest 0.21 -0.05 0.00 -0.07
13 Lima 0.12 0.00 0.00
Median Demutualization -0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.06
Mean Demutualization -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.07
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No. IPO Group Revenues Indexed at Event 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Hellenic Exchanges (2000) 1.84 1.00 1.50 0.98 1.22
2 Hong Kong (2000) 0.71 1.00 0.85 0.82 0.90
3 Singapore (2000) 1.11 1.00 1.22 1.22 1.46
4 Deutsche BÄ orse (2001) 0.84 0.92 1.00 1.46 2.17
5 Euronext (2001) 0.80 0.71 1.00 1.43 1.42
6 London (2001) 0.79 0.88 1.00 1.05 1.11
7 TSX (2002) 0.72 1.04 0.83 1.00 1.08
No. Control Group - Revenues Indexed at 2000 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Chicago 0.74 1.00 0.96 0.78 0.65
2 Istanbul 0.49 1.00 0.79 0.71 0.96
3 Jakarta 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.12
4 JSE South Africa 0.82 1.00 1.24 1.35 1.28
5 Kuala Lumpur 1.50 1.00 0.59 0.56 1.04
6 Ljubljana 0.83 1.00 1.13 1.45 1.20
7 Malta 0.82 1.00 1.04 1.12 1.13
8 NYSE 0.89 1.00 1.35 1.33 1.35
9 Sao Paulo 1.01 1.00 0.89 0.83 1.01
10 Taiwan 0.95 1.00 0.69 0.71 0.66
11 Thailand 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.13 1.68
12 Warsaw 0.71 1.00 0.70 0.51 0.63
Mean 0.89 1.00 0.95 0.96 1.06
Median 0.86 1.00 0.97 0.94 1.08
Control Group - Indexed at 2001 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean 1.02 1.12 1.00 1.00 1.14
Median 0.88 1.04 1.00 1.01 1.07
Control Group - Indexed at 2002 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Mean 1.05 1.16 1.02 1.00 1.15
Median 0.90 1.08 0.99 1.00 1.04
No. Control Group mean-adjusted 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 Hellenic Exchanges 0.94 0.00 0.56 0.02 0.16
2 Hong Kong -0.19 0.00 -0.10 -0.15 -0.16
3 Singapore 0.21 0.00 0.27 0.26 0.40
4 Deutsche BÄ orse -0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.46 1.03
5 Euronext -0.22 -0.41 0.00 0.43 0.28
6 London -0.23 -0.24 0.00 0.05 -0.02
7 TSX -0.33 -0.12 -0.19 0.00 -0.06
No. Event-adjusted (IPO) t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2
1 Hellenic Exchanges 0.94 0.00 0.56 0.02
2 Hong Kong -0.19 0.00 -0.10 -0.15
3 Singapore 0.21 0.00 0.27 0.26
4 Deutsche BÄ orse -0.19 -0.19 0.00 0.46 1.03
5 Euronext -0.22 -0.41 0.00 0.43 0.28
6 London -0.23 -0.24 0.00 0.05 -0.02
7 TSX -0.12 -0.19 0.00 -0.06
Mean IPO -0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.23 0.24
Median IPO -0.20 -0.19 0.00 0.27 0.14
Table B.8: Operating Revenue Data for Event Studies on IPOAppendix C
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C.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
In the following we will discuss the linear programs involved in DEA in more detail.
Consider DMU1 from a sample of n decision making units. Assume that this DMU uses one
type of input and generates one type of output. Then, taking the output-to-input-ratio will not
be very informative - save for the fact that a higher ratio generally indicates higher e±ciency
- unless DMU1's ratio is compared to e±ciency values of the other n ¡ 1 DMUs. Calculating
the ratios for all n DMUs and normalizing them1 yields relative e±ciency values that can be
interpreted in a meaningful way.
The multiplier and envelopment program The basic DEA input-oriented model2 in-
troduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) is based on the same simple intuition, but
generalizes the ratio for the multiple input and multiple output case.3 They calculate an ef-
¯ciency ratio by assigning an e±ciency-optimized weighting scheme to the respective outputs
and inputs so that one aggregated 'virtual' output value is divided by one aggregated 'virtual'
input value. To be more precise, assume that DMU1 has an (m £ 1) input vector X1 = fxl1g
with l = 1;:::;m and an (s £ 1) output vector Y1 = fyr1g with r = 1;:::;s.4 Further assume
that there exists a weighting vector º for the inputs and a second weighting vector ¹ for the
outputs with corresponding dimensions. Then, the non-linear program
max
º;¹
¹0Y1
º0X1
(C.1)
s:t:
¹0Yi
º0Xi
· 1 8i = 1;:::;n
¹;º ¸ 0
states that the e±ciency of DMU1, i.e. the output-input-ratio weighted by the transposed
multipliers ¹0 and º0, is maximized by optimizing the weighting factors subject to the n con-
straints requiring that none of the DMU's e±ciency value exceeds the value of one when the
same weighting scheme is used.5 However, the non-linear program has an in¯nite number of
solutions. By adding the constraint º0X1 = 1 to the program, the denominator of the e±ciency
ratio can be normalized to one so that the program's objective function becomes linear. The
linearization of the constraints is accomplished by multiplying º0Xi to constraint i 8i = 1;:::;n.
The resulting linear 'multiplier' program then has the following form:
1This is accomplished by setting a maximum achievable value of one. Hence, perfect e±ciency is achieved at
a ratio of one while a value of zero indicates absolute ine±ciency.
2Input-oriented models calculate the DMU's e±ciency in terms of the employed quantity of inputs in order
to produce a given level of output. Output-oriented models on the other hand determine the e±ciency by
focusing on the level of produced outputs holding the level of inputs constant. Thus, the choice of the model
depends on whether the emphasis is on input reduction or output augmentation. It is reasonable to use an
input-oriented model when analyzing the stock exchange industry as the inputs can be in°uenced more directly
by the management than the "outputs" which are predominantly in°uenced by market demand.
3Several re¯nements of DEA have emerged in the literature. An overview provides chapter 3 of Charnes,
Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1997).
4The observations are all non-negative, i.e. xl1;yr1 ¸ 0 8l;r.
5The fourth line in equation (C.1) requires the multipliers to be non-negative. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the technology under consideration is convex and has the property of disposability in its strong version.APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 5 136
max
º;¹
¹0Y1 (C.2)
s:t: º0X1 = 1
¹0Yi · º0Xi 8i = 1;:::;n
¹;º ¸ 0
This program is solved n times, i.e. for each DMU individually. When using matrix notation
and employing an (s £ n) matrix of outputs denoted as Y, and an (m £ n) matrix of inputs
denoted as X the program in (C.2) can be written as:
max
º;¹
¹0Y1 (C.3)
s:t: º0X1 = 1
Y0¹ · X0º
¹;º ¸ 0
The program now yields a unique solution for º¤ and ¹¤.6
The dual program The dual of equation (C.3), termed as the "envelopment-problem", is
usually preferred to the multiplier problem due to lesser calculation e®ort.7 It also provides a
di®erent point of view to the problem. In particular, the envelopment problem
min
µ;¸
µ (C.4)
s:t: µX1 ¸ X¸
Y1 · Y¸
¸ ¸ 0
solves for the highest possible radial contraction, i.e. the minimum value of µ, with which the
analyzed input vector (X1) uses at least as many inputs as a linear combination of observations
from the reference or best practice set (X¸) while producing (Y1) at most as many outputs as
the linear combination of best performing peers (Y¸).
Assumptions on technology The presented linear program has a relatively strong as-
sumption about the underlying technology. It restricts the input-output-process to a constant
returns-to-scale (CRS) environment. A slightly re¯ned version introduced by Banker, Charnes,
and Cooper (1984) weakens this assumption and calculates e±ciency scores in a variable returns-
to-scale (VRS) surrounding, i.e. it allows for varying returns-to-scale characteristics for di®erent
levels of input-output combinations. This is accomplished by adding a further constraint to
problem (C.4), namely 1¸ = 1, so that the reference point of the analyzed DMU is now required
to be a convex linear combination of e±cient DMUs.
6Linear programs are solved by the Simplex-Algorithm.
7As the number of DMUs (= n) is usually larger than the sum of the inputs and outputs (m+s) used in the
program, the dual needs to calculate n ¡ (m + s) fewer constraint.APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 5 137
C.2 Malmquist Productivity Index
In order to determine the aggregate change in factor productivity, FÄ are et al. de¯ne input
distance functions - that are the reciprocals of Farrell's technical e±ciency measure - with
respect to the two adjacent time periods in such a manner that they measure the maximum
proportional change in inputs required to make (xt+1;yt+1) feasible in relation to technology
Tt and make (xt;yt) feasible in relation to Tt+1.8 They de¯ne the productivity index as the
geometric mean of two mixed period distance functions9:
MQ(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
(C.5)
where the ¯rst factor uses time period t and the second factor time period t+1 as the respective
reference technology. Equation (C.5) can be transformed into the following equation which
uncovers the two decomposed e®ects stated earlier.
MQ(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt(xt;yt)
¢
s
Dt(xt+1;yt+1)
Dt+1(xt+1;yt+1)
¢
Dt(xt;yt)
Dt+1(xt;yt)
MQ = ¢EFF ¢ ¢TECH
The factor outside the square root indicates the change in e±ciency as it is equivalent to the
ratio of Farrell's technical e±ciency for periods t and t + 1. The factor under the square root
displays the geometric mean of shifts in technology at output levels yt and yt+1, respectively.
The calculation of the distance functions can again be illustrated by ¯gure 5.5:
MQ(xt+1;yt+1;xt;yt) =
0d=0f
0a=0b
s
0d=0e
0d=0f
¢
0a=0b
0a=0c
(C.6)
Note that for both factors, a value of one indicates no change whereas a value above (below) one
signi¯es a positive (negative) change in technology and e±ciency. Note further that exchanges
that possess a low DEA-e±ciency value will possess a larger potential to improve their produc-
tivity than exchanges that are already highly e±cient. In the extreme, an exchange that is fully
e±cient in two adjacent periods cannot improve its technical e±ciency at all. Therefore, we
need to treat comparisons between factor productivity gains of highly e±cient and less e±cient
exchanges with caution.10
For the m-input/s-output case, the following four DEA-like linear programs need to be
solved for all i = 1;:::;n DMUs in order to calculate the respective productivity scores11,
keeping in mind that the required input distance functions are the reciprocal of Farrell's input-
oriented technical e±ciency measure. Thus,
8The methodology of FÄ are et al. for the output-oriented index is adapted here for the input-oriented approach.
Confer FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994, p.69-70)
9The measurement of productivity in the VRS-case has to be treated with caution since the results could be
°awed as was noted by Grifell-Tatj¶ e and Lovell (1995). Additionally, FÄ are, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang (1994,
p.73 FN 15) note that solutions from the mixed-period distance functions might not be feasible.
10In our second stage regressions we will control for this e®ect by employing the exchanges' e±ciency values
as additional independent control variable.
11Confer Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt (1993, p. 180-186).APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 5 138
[Dt(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (C.7)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y t
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
gives the distance function Dt
1(xt
1;yt
1) of DMU 1. Similarly, D
t+1
1 (x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) is calculated by
substituting the indices t by t + 1 in equation (C.7). The remaining two linear problems are
mixed period calculations meaning that the reference technology is constructed from data of
period t (and t + 1, respectively), whereas the input-output-combinations to be evaluated are
from period t + 1 (and t, respectively). Hence, they provide solutions for Dt
1(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 ) and
D
t+1
1 (xt
1;yt
1):
[Dt(x
t+1
1 ;y
t+1
1 )]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (C.8)
s:t: µX
t+1
1 ¸ X
t¸
Y
t+1
1 · Y
t¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0
and
[Dt+1(xt
1;yt
1)]¡1 = min
µ;¸
µ (C.9)
s:t: µXt
1 ¸ X
t+1¸
Y t
1 · Y
t+1¸
1¸ = 1 (only for V RS)
¸ ¸ 0APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 5 139
C.3 Descriptive Statistics
Operational Variables
INPUTS x1 x2
Sta® Tangible Assets
(No. Employed) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 558.5 494.4 60,022 75,947
2000 591.0 503.3 67,704 84,542
2001 615.0 529.7 79,143 91,690
2002 682.3 720.6 91,852 105,551
2003 658.1 696.8 91,670 102,105
OUTPUTS y1 y2 y3 y4
Listing Cash Trading Derivatives Trading Posttrade/Software
(No. of companies) (Volume in $ 000 000) (No. of contracts in 000) ($ 000)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 858.1 1071.1 1,511,495 2,663,612 26,430 76,181 25,152 48,678
2000 876.3 1056.7 2,105,375 4,231,607 33,024 89,092 31,900 66,163
2001 817.5 924.7 1,517,787 2,884,889 47,298 124,285 39,976 78,829
2002 797.9 868.3 1,440,771 2,586,961 63,260 174,780 53,985 124,713
2003 901.2 1007.3 1,202,790 2,277,716 74,936 198,740 65,976 167,821
Resulting Dependent Variables for the Second Stage
MQ (CRS) ¢EFF (CRS) ¢TECH (CRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.011 0.273 1.053 0.291 0.970 0.125
2000-2001 1.090 0.433 1.112 0.481 0.988 0.084
2001-2002 1.002 0.157 0.958 0.205 1.069 0.148
2002-2003 1.113 0.251 0.913 0.253 1.260 0.264
MQ (VRS) ¢EFF (VRS) ¢TECH (VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999-2000 1.027 0.283 1.032 0.293 1.008 0.110
2000-2001 1.080 0.364 1.162 0.472 0.952 0.129
2001-2002 1.003 0.125 0.973 0.174 1.047 0.122
2002-2003 1.076 0.206 0.935 0.189 1.175 0.238
EFF(CRS) EFF(VRS)
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 0.625 0.275 0.709 0.264
2000 0.639 0.295 0.708 0.276
2001 0.661 0.270 0.771 0.264
2002 0.631 0.293 0.756 0.299
2003 0.580 0.320 0.705 0.314
Independent Framework Variables of the Second Stage
LISTED OUTSOURCING FULL INTEGRATION
Sum Sum Sum
1999 2 5 1
2000 5 7 3
2001 8 7 4
2002 9 8 6
2003 9 7 6
VERTICAL HORIZONTAL HORI-VERTICAL
Sum Sum Sum
1999 5 10 5
2000 6 6 6
2001 5 6 7
2002 4 6 6
2003 5 8 6
FOREIGN LISTING LIQUIDITY
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 0.026 0.046 0.680 0.535
2000 0.031 0.071 1.038 1.103
2001 0.028 0.058 0.812 0.746
2002 0.028 0.059 0.881 0.772
2003 0.013 0.021 0.699 0.518
¢ LT FINANCE ¢ TRADING
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1999 0.416 0.899 0.130 0.614
2000 0.165 0.271 0.030 0.515
2001 0.286 0.392 -0.006 0.292
2002 0.095 0.240 0.035 0.275
2003 0.079 0.273 0.101 0.388
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C.4 First Stage Results
Constant Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Productivity Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.66 0.76 1.00 0.79 0.82 1.24
NYSE 0.48 0.49 0.57 0.51 0.60 1.02 0.92 0.96 0.96
Toronto TSX 0.72 0.83 0.77 0.84 1.00 0.97 0.86 1.08 1.70
Lima 0.74 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.06 1.07 1.04 1.05
BOVESPA 0.53 0.49 0.61 0.81 1.00 1.02 1.39 1.15 1.40
Hellenic 0.50 0.17 0.56 0.34 0.44 0.28 3.12 0.79 1.50
Budapest 0.22 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.31 1.02 1.25 0.89 1.34
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.79 1.57
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.01
Istanbul 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.13 1.02 0.83 0.94 1.08
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.99 1.03 0.49
London 0.83 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.00 1.00
Malta 0.40 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.83 0.82 1.24 0.97
Oslo 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.66 0.37 1.01 0.91 0.82 0.96
OM Gruppen 0.91 0.75 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.45 0.95 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.70 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.56 0.84 1.08 1.07
Vienna 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.54 0.28 0.97 0.96 1.32 1.05
Warsaw 0.29 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.92 0.81 0.96 1.07
Australian 0.82 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.68 1.04 0.96 1.09 1.06
Hongkong 0.36 0.68 0.64 0.53 0.52 1.95 0.90 1.07 1.19
Jakarta 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.45 0.36 0.81 1.01 1.19 1.24
Kuala Lumpur 0.69 0.54 0.70 0.30 0.34 0.88 1.22 0.57 1.38
Phillippine 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.33 0.23 1.04 0.92 0.95 0.99
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.51 0.61 0.49 0.28 0.59 1.13 1.09 0.68
Taiwan 0.23 0.30 0.36 0.42 0.25 1.11 1.12 1.13 1.04
Thailand 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.41 0.33 0.96 0.99 0.95 0.96
Tokyo 0.50 0.67 0.79 0.82 0.75 1.10 1.29 1.16 1.17
Mean 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.58 1.01 1.09 1.00 1.11
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.43 0.16 0.25
Variable Returns-To-Scale
DEA Technical E±ciency Malmquist Productivity Index
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03
NASDAQ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.94 1.00
NYSE 0.53 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.35 0.89 0.97 0.98
Toronto TSX 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.53
Lima 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.04
BOVESPA 0.57 0.50 0.62 0.82 1.00 1.02 1.37 1.14 1.38
Hellenic 0.67 0.18 0.60 0.35 0.47 0.29 2.76 0.79 1.49
Budapest 0.44 0.65 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.15 1.28 1.04 1.02
Copenhagen 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00
Deutsche BÄ orse 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.28
Euronext 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Istanbul 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.93 0.80 0.92 1.11
Johannesburg JSE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.51
London 0.85 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00
Malta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.96 1.00 0.98
Oslo 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.68 0.67 0.97 0.92 0.85 1.03
OM Gruppen 0.92 0.76 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.44 0.95 1.00
SWX Zurich 0.70 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.52 0.83 1.08 1.07
Vienna 0.53 0.59 0.70 0.79 0.78 0.99 0.94 1.19 1.06
Warsaw 0.32 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.92 0.83 1.00 1.13
Australian 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 1.07 0.98 1.05 1.05
Hongkong 0.37 0.68 0.65 0.58 0.53 1.98 0.91 1.08 1.19
Jakarta 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.42 0.81 1.00 1.19 1.16
Kuala Lumpur 0.73 0.55 0.70 0.33 0.35 0.88 1.22 0.59 1.34
Phillippine 0.53 0.51 0.38 0.33 0.29 1.02 0.90 0.95 0.99
Singapore SGX 1.00 0.52 0.61 0.50 0.29 0.59 1.14 1.09 0.69
Taiwan 0.28 0.33 0.44 0.53 0.26 1.19 1.03 1.21 1.03
Thailand 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.42 0.35 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.96
Tokyo 0.51 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.11 1.19 1.07 1.10
Mean 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.70 1.03 1.08 1.00 1.08
Standard Deviation 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.36 0.13 0.21
Table C.2: First Stage ResultsAPPENDIX C. CHAPTER 5 141
C.5 Correlation Matrices
1st and 2nd Stage Variables x
1 x
2 y
1 y
2 y
3 y
4
HORIZONTAL -0.292 -0.256 -0.284 -0.210 -0.029 -0.212
VERTICAL -0.213 -0.271 -0.243 -0.160 -0.164 -0.132
HORI-VERTICAL -0.023 0.025 -0.013 -0.153 -0.147 -0.024
FULL INTEGRATION 0.571 0.212 0.038 0.033 0.595 0.678
OUTSOURCING -0.379 -0.183 -0.180 -0.071 -0.189 -0.210
LISTED 0.412 0.171 0.108 -0.050 0.327 0.462
LIQUIDITY 0.393 0.383 0.510 0.568 0.177 0.154
¢TRADING 0.036 0.062 0.091 0.094 -0.067 -0.023
FOREIGN LISTING 0.342 0.540 0.694 0.834 0.012 -0.038
¢LT FINANCE -0.014 -0.070 -0.066 0.025 0.056 0.017
Table C.3: Correlation matrix for ¯rst and second stage variables
2nd Stage Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) HORIZONTAL 1 -0.27 -0.31 -0.24 0.16 -0.21 -0.08 -0.18 -0.19 -0.11
(2) VERTICAL -0.27 1 -0.24 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 0 -0.05 -0.19 0.16
(3) HORI-VERTICAL -0.31 -0.24 1 -0.21 0.07 0.08 -0.23 0.12 -0.15 -0.1
(4) FULL INTEGRATION -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 1 -0.14 0.49 0.14 0.01 -0.04 0.01
(5) OUTSOURCING 0.16 -0.18 0.07 -0.14 1 -0.04 -0.22 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12
(6) LISTED -0.21 -0.17 0.08 0.49 -0.04 1 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05
(7) LIQUIDITY -0.08 0 -0.23 0.14 -0.22 0.01 1 0.13 0.45 0.08
(9) ¢TRADING -0.18 -0.05 0.12 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 0.13 1 0.07 0.01
(9) FOREIGN LISTING -0.19 -0.19 -0.15 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.45 0.07 1 -0.05
(11) ¢LTFINANCE -0.11 0.16 -0.1 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 0.08 0.01 -0.05 1
Table C.4: Correlation matrix for second stage variablesAPPENDIX C. CHAPTER 5 142
C.6 Robustness Checks
Regressions with Simple E±ciency and Productivity Measures
E±ciency Measures Productivity Growth Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Volume/Assets Cash Volume/Sta® ¢(CashVolume=Assets) ¢(CashVolume=Sta®)
HORIZONTAL -0.118 -1.144 -0.307 0.345
Std. Err. 0.204 1.057 0.413 0.464
VERTICAL -0.411y 5.817*** -0.884*** 0.139
Std. Err. 0.286 1.481 0.225 0.252
HORI-VERTICAL -1.063*** -6.307*** -0.685* 0.697*
Std. Err. 0.282 1.460 0.359 0.363
FULL INTEGRATION -1.032*** -1.494 -0.834** 1.092**
Std. Err. 0.277 1.436 0.341 0.468
OUTSOURCING -0.022 -1.654 -0.280y -0.654***
Std. Err. 0.285 1.474 0.184 0.232
LISTED -0.354** -0.625 -0.216 -0.110
Std. Err. 0.168 0.869 0.476 0.225
LIQUIDITY 0.296** -0.418 -0.716*** -0.576***
Std. Err. 0.117 0.608 0.066 0.04
¢TRADING 0.499*** 0.743y -0.240** -0.298***
Std. Err. 0.096 0.498 0.114 0.076
FOREIGN LISTING -1.214 16.288** 4.956*** 2.509***
Std. Err. 1.341 6.948 1.610 0.666
¢LT FINANCE 0.113y -0.012 0.068 0.006
Std. Err. 0.078 0.406 0.112 0.111
CONST 6.350*** 4.107*** 1.094*** 0.254
Std. Err. 0.193 0.999 0.354 0.327
Observations 140 140 112 112
R2(adj:)=WaldÂ2 0.4586 0.4634 0.167 0.287
Table C.5: Robustness check with alternative measures
Regression with Bootstrapping (500 Replications, 10% and 15%-Level)
Constant Returns-To-Scale Variable Returns-To-Scale
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH EFF MQ ¢EFF ¢TECH
HORIZONTAL -0.072y -0.096 -0.035 -0.030 -0.120* -0.004 -0.004 -0.013
Std. Err. 0.078 0.427 0.382 0.190 0.120 0.293 0.286 0.132
VERTICAL -0.054 0.555* 0.755* -0.013 -0.209* 0.502* 0.728* -0.121
Std. Err. 0.149 0.516 0.552 0.202 0.277 0.372 0.431 0.17
HORI-VERTICAL -0.026 0.153 0.267 -0.009 -0.204* 0.171 0.339* -0.168
Std. Err. 0.156 0.464 0.431 0.208 0.218 0.317 0.344 0.17
FULL INTEGRATION -0.053 0.025 0.105 -0.017 -0.192* 0.131 0.156y -0.059
Std. Err. 0.174 0.426 0.375 0.245 0.303 0.309 0.248 0.19
OUTSOURCING 0.012 0.084 -0.017 0.167 0.170* 0.033 -0.037 0.119*
Std. Err. 0.116 0.337 0.312 0.133 0.155 0.269 0.225 0.095
LISTED 0.063 0.093 -0.064 0.168* 0.087 0.068 -0.061 0.137*
Std. Err. 0.133 0.194 0.135 0.104 0.177 0.196 0.12 0.099
LIQUIDITY -0.007 -0.043 -0.003 -0.06 -0.052* -0.033 0.038 -0.063
Std. Err. 0.056 0.104 0.147 0.091 0.099 0.09 0.106 0.070
¢TRADING 0.030 -0.126* -0.120* 0.003 0.059 -0.115* -0.121* 0.011
Std. Err. 0.045 0.082 0.082 0.063 0.063 0.070 0.063 0.042
FOREIGN LISTING 1.004* 1.276* 1.100y 0.373 1.559* 0.769 1.107y -0.444
Std. Err. 0.997 1.050 1.210 1.638 1.187 1.066 1.11 0.953
¢LT FINANCE 0.035 -0.092* -0.023 -0.075y 0.029* -0.079* -0.041y -0.050*
Std. Err. 0.045 0.069 0.056 0.051 0.067 0.045 0.064 0.030
EFF -1.369* -1.813* 0.519* -0.991* -1.539* 0.545*
Std. Err. 0.470 0.545 0.230 0.405 0.485 0.182
CONST 0.661* 1.807* 1.972* 0.736* 0.916* 1.642* 1.911* 0.732*
Std. Err. 0.091 0.368 0.393 0.214 0.152 0.337 0.361 0.167
Observations 140 112 112 112 140 112 112 112
Table C.6: Robustness check with bootstrappingBibliography
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